Oral Answers to Questions

TRANSPORT

The Secretary of State was asked—

Carlisle Railway Station

Eric Martlew: What representations he has received on the number of birds killed at Carlisle railway station.

Derek Twigg: We have received no representations about the number of birds killed at Carlisle railway station, though I am aware that some have become trapped in roof netting and have subsequently died. Network Rail tells me that work is due to take place later this year in an effort to resolve the issue.

Eric Martlew: May I apologise to the House and to my hon. Friend for having to table that question? For three years many other passengers and I have been trying to get Network Rail and Virgin to take away the netting on the station. At present there are 40 dead birds decomposing on the netting. The starlings and pigeons get in and cannot get out. At this time of year, they are being roasted to death. Is it not ridiculous that it takes a parliamentary question to get action on the matter?

Derek Twigg: My hon. Friend is a great advocate for the west coast main line development and takes a great interest in all the happenings at Carlisle station, including those involving birds. The situation is clearly unacceptable. Network Rail and Virgin are working together and hope to do something about it later this year. It is possible that something could be done to remove the dead birds and deal with the netting and access in future, but it is a particularly difficult area to deal with because of the nature of the station. Hopefully, action can be taken in August to resolve the problem.

Road Congestion

Philip Davies: What plans he has to tackle road congestion; and if he will make a statement.

Douglas Alexander: The Government's strategy is based on three elements—first, sustained investment, adding road capacity where appropriate; secondly, making the most of the existing network through better management; and thirdly, in line with our manifesto commitment, the Government are exploring the scope for developing a national scheme for road pricing.

Philip Davies: Saltaire roundabout is probably the most congested part of the whole of the Bradford district and is the responsibility of the Highways Agency. The Highways Agency, with Bradford council, has done a joint study on what could be done to alleviate the congestion there. Given the importance of Saltaire as a world heritage site, will the Secretary of State ensure that the money is available to put in place the recommendations made by that joint study?

Douglas Alexander: I appreciate that the Saltaire roundabout on the A650 suffers from congestion. It is certainly the case that the Highways Agency and Bradford council are working together to find a solution to address both safety and congestion concerns in relation to the roundabout, and I hope to be able to announce the outcome of that work and decisions on funding in the autumn.

Kerry McCarthy: I welcome the announcement this week of £42 million of investment in the Greater Bristol bus network, which will play a major role in freeing up the roads and easing congestion in the centre of Bristol. Can my right hon. Friend advise me about the progress of the road pricing pilot, for which Bristol is always working on a bid?

Douglas Alexander: My hon. Friend recalls the recent announcement, which is only one part of the £1.7 billion that is provided for buses annually by the Department. We are working with a number of local authorities, including the authorities in Bristol, looking at the pilot projects for road pricing. In recent days I met representatives of one of the other local authorities to hear directly of their plans, and I can assure my hon. Friend that a number of local authorities are moving forward in anticipation of bids being received by the Department in the course of next year.

Brooks Newmark: Given that the Minister acknowledged that road pricing schemes can cut congestion, what plans do the Government have for a potential toll road on the M11 between London and Stansted?

Douglas Alexander: We are not at present planning a toll road, as the hon. Gentleman describes it. On paper, road pricing can lead to significant cuts in congestion, but we are maintaining our approach to targeted investment on our road network in the meantime.

Ann Cryer: Since I live only a few hundred yards from Saltaire roundabout, I agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). I was becoming a little hopeful because the island there is weed-strewn instead of being planted, as it usually is, so I had hoped that alterations would be made there. Is that not the case?

Douglas Alexander: I do not feel qualified to comment on the specific detail that my hon. Friend has observed while passing the roundabout, but I am happy to note for the record that the A650, to which both my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) have referred, has already benefited from the £47.9 million Bingley bypass, which opened ahead of schedule in December 2003.

Chris Grayling: Last month, I pressed the Secretary of State to give some detailed answers about how his planned road pricing pilot will work, but he chose not to do so. May I press him about the overall principle of his policy? I heard what he said to the hon. Member for Bristol, East (Kerry McCarthy), but is he still planning a major single pilot project of his proposed national satellite-based road pricing system in an area such as Greater Manchester, the west midlands or Bristol in about 2010? Is it still Government policy to launch such a scheme on a national basis in about 2015?

Douglas Alexander: I tested the thesis that the hon. Gentleman put to me at the last Transport questions in a recent meeting with the authorities in Manchester, and I do not recognise his characterisation of the pilots, which we are taking forward with local authorities, given my conversations with the Manchester authorities. The Manchester authorities are pressing forward on the detail of their proposed bid, which they aim to get to the Department by about next July with a view to the Department having reached a conclusion by the following December. Equally, we are already in close dialogue with the west midlands authorities, and we have made it clear to them that they need to come forward with specific proposals for the west midlands. The pilots will, of course, inform our thinking on national road pricing. We want to see them implemented by the earliest possible time scale, which will probably be four to five years. We hope to be able to develop a national scheme by about the middle of the next decade.

Chris Grayling: Given the fact that we are discussing probably the largest technology project ever seen in this country and the central part of the Government's transport strategy, the Secretary of State's responses are astonishingly vague, so I shall press him again. When will most people in this country start to experience road pricing? When does he expect to tell us in detail how his proposals will work? And will any national scheme that he plans be revenue neutral?

Douglas Alexander: We hope that the pilots will be operational in four to five years. We face considerable technological questions, which is why we want to gain experience from local pilots to inform our thinking on the national scheme. On the national scheme and revenue neutrality, road pricing involves moving away from the present system of motoring taxation.

Graham Stringer: I am sure that my right hon. Friend is aware of the recent report on road pricing by Professor Glaister of the independent transport commission. Professor Glaister has concluded that revenue neutrality will be difficult to achieve and that it is almost inevitable that road users in urban areas will pay more than everybody else. Will my right hon. Friend assure me that if there is a pilot project in Manchester, it will not be a scheme that effectively transfers taxation from rural areas to urban areas?

Douglas Alexander: Through the local pilots, we want a fair deal for motorists in urban areas, and I discussed that subject with the leaders of the authorities in Manchester when I visited the city last week.

Alistair Carmichael: I urge the Secretary of State to be a little less cautious on road pricing. He has outlined three legs of his policy today, of which road pricing is by far the most important. He will be aware that the difficulties that he anticipates have not been experienced by the scheme in Germany. What lessons has his Department drawn from that?

Douglas Alexander: We have looked at the international comparisons—indeed, a study examining the international experience of road pricing has been published in the past couple of weeks. A balance needs to be struck between advancing a national debate and gaining individual experience within the discrete pilot areas, which will cover a significant portion of the population. As we seek to build a national consensus, it is incumbent on us all to engage with the discussions and to gain practical experience, which only the pilots can provide.

Bus Companies

Linda Riordan: What steps he is taking to make bus companies more accountable to the communities they serve; and if he will make a statement.

Gillian Merron: We encourage bus companies to work in close partnership with local authorities and the communities that they serve. That can be done through voluntary agreements, quality partnerships or quality contracts.

Linda Riordan: I could give countless examples of how the bus deregulation policy introduced by the Tories is failing the people of Halifax. As part of any policy review, will the Minister consider re-introducing a system of regulation to ensure that buses are run in the interests of local people and not of the profit margins of cherry-picking bus operators?

Gillian Merron: Like many hon. Members, my hon. Friend is rightly concerned about bus services in her area. I assure her and the House that we intend to take a long hard look at the various issues over the coming months to identify the right framework to reverse declining bus patronage outside London. I emphasise that no decisions have been made. Our job is to find the right framework, because local circumstances dictate what works best.

Christopher Chope: Does the Minister agree that one of the reasons for declining bus patronage is that companies such as Yellow Buses in Wiltshire and Dorset are removing their services from the people they are meant to be serving, namely pensioners living in my constituency? Is it not time that we gave the traffic commissioners some teeth to deal with the haughty way in which these bus companies change routes without consultation?

Gillian Merron: In order to change a route or a timetable, a bus operator must give 56 days' notice to the traffic commissioner and the local authority. There is a specific reason for that—namely, to give the local authority time to replace the bus service if necessary. Of course, local authorities are able to do that if it is the right decision for the local area.

Railway Industry

Albert Owen: What steps he plans to take to improve further the performance of the railway industry.

Douglas Alexander: My Department continues to work with Network Rail and the train operating companies to secure further improvements in performance. Punctuality and reliability is now at 86.8 per cent., the highest level for six years, and continues to improve steadily. The industry has committed to achieving in excess of 88 per cent. by March 2008.

Albert Owen: The Secretary of State will be aware of the huge investment in the west coast main line, which benefits services from London on the important Euro-route to Holyhead in my constituency. He will be further aware that the post-2008 timetable refers to additional through trains. However, there is confusion as to whether those trains will go from London right the way through to the north Wales coast. There is also the question of a maintenance depot in the area, which is vital to improve the railways for the future. Will my right hon. Friend agree to meet a delegation of myself and hon. Friends to discuss these important issues?

Douglas Alexander: I am always happy to meet parliamentary colleagues. The scheme in relation to the Holyhead rail depot is being discussed between Network Rail and the train operators but is also being considered by the Welsh Assembly Government. The post-2009 timetable is being discussed by officials in my Department but also by Network Rail and Virgin Trains, with further discussions between the Department, the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities.

Robert Goodwill: What is the Secretary of State's current thinking on the thorny problem that was described by his predecessor as transporting fresh air around the country?

Douglas Alexander: Perhaps unsurprisingly, I find myself agreeing with my predecessor that we want to see an expanding rail network. During previous questions in the House, the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, my hon. Friend the Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), posed a challenge to a questioner who suggested that we had secret plans to close a number of stations. We are still awaiting word on what stations Opposition Members were suggesting that we intended to close. None the less, a feature of an expanding rail network would be our ability to take serious decisions reflecting the changing nature of the network given changing patterns of demand in the future. We need to keep all options open, but we have no plans to reduce the number of people travelling on the railways; indeed, numbers have significantly increased in recent years.

Kelvin Hopkins: Does my right hon. Friend accept that we are facing a shortage of route capacity, particularly for freight? Will he look positively at the possibilities for developing dedicated rail freight capacity for the future?

Douglas Alexander: My hon. Friend is right. There has been a 46 per cent. increase in rail freight since 1997, sitting alongside the significant uplift in the number of passengers choosing to use the rail network during those years. We are giving serious consideration to what scope there is for further investment in rail freight. That is why only last month I announced that we would take forward several of the transport innovation fund productivity bids, which included rail freight as one of the considerations.

Adam Price: On average, a £10 fare will carry a passenger 38 miles in the UK, 107 miles in France and 315 miles in Poland. Why is it that, nine years into a Labour Government, we have the most expensive, most overcrowded and least punctual rail service in Europe?

Douglas Alexander: I do not recognise that description of an expanding railway system—indeed, the fastest growing passenger railway in Europe.

Sally Keeble: I welcome the improvements that have been made in the train services for my constituents, especially the introduction of the new improved high-speed rail link. However, is my right hon. Friend aware that the new Virgin lines that have been provided are not guaranteed post-2009? What reassurances can he give my constituents that those services will be not only kept but improved post-2009?

Douglas Alexander: I know that my hon. Friend represents an area that is close to the growth areas, which were so designated by the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. I assure her that the needs of the growth areas will be considered when we publish the high level output specification next summer.

Stephen Hammond: The biggest problem on our railways today is overcrowding. Lloyd's corporation has estimated that 60 per cent. of commuters into London travel on overcrowded trains. It is estimated that passenger growth nationally will increase by 30 per cent. between now and 2014, yet there are no plans for capacity increases. The Government's strategy emerged a couple of weeks ago—they intend to do deals to price commuters off the railways by increasing fares. Will the Secretary of State confirm that his solution to overcrowding is pricing people off the railways?

Douglas Alexander: No, that has never been the Government's approach. We recognise that capacity will be a challenge in the years ahead. That is one of the main criteria for the high level output specification, which will be published next summer. We must acknowledge that the challenge that we now face on the railways is that of success. More people want to use them, with significantly increased passenger usage in recent years. Few solutions to capacity do not involve a sustained commitment of public investment. It is incumbent on parties that raise capacity to commit themselves to the amount of funding to which Labour Members remain committed.

Gordon Prentice: I saved the taxpayer a fortune by getting a cheap ticket down here from Leeds. However, my connecting train was late and the guard told me that I would have to pay up. I refused point blank to leave the train or pay any more money.  [Interruption.] Indeed, direct action. What will we do about the confusing multiplicity of fares, which leads to people becoming victims without realising it?

Douglas Alexander: I know that my hon. Friend has a long history of direct action, although I would not recommend that he engage in such action on the railways now or in the years to come. However, he makes a fair point. Notwithstanding the significant uplift in passenger numbers in recent years, the Transport Committee has identified a genuine problem with the complexity of fares. When one considers, for example, the discount airline carriers, one realises that it is possible to have variable fares and simplicity for the customer. That is why it is important both that the Government reflect on the Transport Committee's report and, more directly, that the train operating companies recognise that they have a responsibility to tackle the problem, which is a genuine concern for passengers.

A5 (Hinckley)

David Tredinnick: What improvements to the A5 in the Hinckley area are proposed.

Stephen Ladyman: Several improvement schemes are under way on, or proposed for the A5 around Hinckley. They include: safety works at Stretton bends, including new lighting, surfacing and footways; anti-skid surfacing schemes at Nutts lane and Smockington hollow; the signalisation of the junction of the A5 and the M69; a scheme to improve the capacity of the Dodwell's island junction; improved warning signs at Hinckley rail bridge; improvements to the A5/A444 Red Gate junction, and changes to speed limits and associated signs.
	Additionally, preliminary design work is under way for improvements between Stretton house and the M69 junction.

David Tredinnick: I thank the Minister for that list but, given that the Hinckley and Bosworth area has to build 9,000 houses in the next 20 years, thanks to the local development framework, is not it time to put dualling the A5 between the M69 and the A47 back on the agenda? Although the Minister talks about improvements at Stretton bends, will he confirm that they will not take place in July, as promised, nor will the £5 million improvements at Dodwell's island, which the Government also promised? Will he confirm that the works to realign the M69 island will take place in January 2007, as promised, or is that another broken promise of the Government's?

Stephen Ladyman: The Government break no promises. We are delivering sustained improvements in the area around the A5 at Hinckley. There are safety problems on that road—that is why such a list of improvements has been made to it. On a major scheme such as dualling the A5, I advise the hon. Gentleman to work in his region to influence the prioritisation of major schemes when the regional funding allocation is reconsidered in two years.

David Taylor: The Minister has rightly given the House a long list of works scheduled to take place on the A5. However, he did not include the nearby project that has just been announced to bypass Earl Shilton on the A47 on the eastern fringes of Hinckley. Does he agree that this is a demonstration of the success of the tenacity, patience and energy of the people of Earl Shilton, led by the Labour councillors Dennis and John Bown in this Labour enclave in a Conservative and Liberal Democrat area? Does my hon. Friend also agree that, no matter how persuasive and effective the campaign, what was needed in the final analysis was the commitment of the resources to be allocated by the Government to achieve this long-delayed and much-welcomed bypass for Earl Shilton?

Stephen Ladyman: Humility prevented my hon. Friend from mentioning his own role in that campaign. He is absolutely right; it will provide a much-needed improvement. It has been included in the regional funding allocation, and that is because local people made the case locally to ensure that we received the necessary advice about the importance of the scheme. The advice that I would offer to Members on both sides of the House is that, if they want to influence major projects such as these, they should become active in their own region and their own local community to ensure that the regional funding advice that the Government receive reflects the true priorities of the local people.

Andrew Selous: The A5, which runs through my constituency south of Hinckley, is horrendously congested. The Comptroller and Auditor General wrote to me recently to say that the Highways Agency intended to put in a new junction, 11A, at the same time as widening the M1 to save £10 million. However, I learned from a letter from the Secretary of State yesterday that that is only a possibility. Will the Minister write to me to tell me exactly what the Highways Agency is doing?

Stephen Ladyman: The situation to which the hon. Gentleman refers has arisen because the region did not prioritise that particular piece of work. We want to stick as closely as possible to the advice that we receive from local people, local councils, regional assemblies and regional development agencies—people who know what the priorities are on the ground—and the road scheme to which the hon. Gentleman refers was not prioritised. However, we want to ensure that if the region changes its priorities, the work will be able to go ahead as expeditiously as possible. That is why we will continue with the work around that particular scheme, in case the region changes its mind in two years' time.

Andrew Robathan: Closer to Hinckley than the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous)—about five miles to the south-east on the A5—is the hamlet of Wibtoft. To the north and the south is a dual carriageway—the old Watling street—along which very heavy traffic thunders until it gets to Wibtoft, where a single carriageway snakes its way through the village. There is no speed limit; nor is there any proper visible traffic calming. The Highways Agency has refused to contemplate imposing a speed limit or laying a quieter road surface. Will the Minister ask the agency to reconsider its decision, and to impose a speed limit of, say, 30 mph through the residential area of Wibtoft? Many other places along the A5 have exactly that.

Stephen Ladyman: I will certainly pass on the hon. Gentleman's comments to the Highways Agency. I would also advise him to engage with his local road safety partnership to see whether it can make representations to the agency. If such villages need a speed limit, and if there is evidence of safety concerns, I will certainly do what I can to encourage the agency to be helpful.

Road Humps

John Mann: What advice he has given to local authorities about the use of road humps.

Stephen Ladyman: Advice on the design and implementation of road humps is given in the Department's traffic advisory leaflets, and a bibliography of these is available in the Library of the House. The Department also plans to publish a local transport note later this year. This will draw together all previous advice on traffic calming policy, including advice on the use of road humps.

John Mann: The evidence on the use of concrete cushion road humps over the past 10 years is not very good. People can drive motorbikes between them, they fail to take into account on-street parking, and 4x4s can straddle them at great speed. Would the Minister care to come to Market Warsop in my constituency to road test the concrete road humps there?

Stephen Ladyman: I am happy that I get to road test many things in my job, but so far a road hump has not been one of them. I am happy to come to my hon. Friend's constituency at some point, but I would point out to him that certain types of road calming measures are suitable in certain locations. It is for local authorities to decide which type of traffic calming is most appropriate, which type of road cushion is used, and whether it should have gaps in the middle of it for motorcycles. Local people should make decisions about improving those road humps, and I hope that the advisory note that we produce at the end of this year, to which my hon. Friend has contributed, will help them to make those decisions.

Julian Brazier: While road humps obviously have an important safety role, is the Minister aware of the study by the London Ambulance Service three years ago, which suggested that if one minute could be saved on ambulance times by removing unnecessary road humps, 500 lives a year would be saved in cases of stroke, heart attack and so on? Another issue is the reluctance of paramedics to fit drips to critically ill patients who must travel over road humps.

Stephen Ladyman: I am, of course, aware of that study. That is why, when local councils decide on traffic calming measures in a particular area, it is important that they consult the emergency services and take into account the advice of the ambulance service, fire brigade and police about what is appropriate. I remind the hon. Gentleman, however, that road safety is the reason why local authorities install traffic calming measures, and that road humps might avoid ambulances having to do quite so much work in future.

Stephen Pound: Further to the motorcycling Minister's last response, and in the interest of getting traffic moving, is he aware that the A406 was brought to a complete halt by an accident early this morning? Strong men wept behind the wheels of their cars and toddlers sobbed in the back seats as they saw the school day recede from them. What can the Government do to try to get traffic moving faster after accidents?

Stephen Ladyman: I was not aware of that particular problem this morning. One of the things that we are doing, however, is making available nearly 1,500 highways officers around the country to clear up after accidents, remove debris from the road and keep traffic moving as fast as possible. Those highways officers work with the police, relieving them to perform other more important duties, and concentrate particularly on keeping the traffic moving. That is one practical way in which the Government are keeping the traffic moving on the trunk road network.

Anne McIntosh: In addition to the Minister's advice to local authorities on road humps, will he advise them to consider the cost and effectiveness of installing equipment that merely flashes the speed rather than taking a picture, as I think that they will find that that is both cheaper and more effective than road humps and speed cameras?

Stephen Ladyman: I entirely agree that those types of speed advisory sign have their place and can be very effective in the right location. I repeat, however, that it is for the local council and local people who know the area best to decide what is the right sort of traffic calming. The sort of signs to which she is referring can be very effective, and I would always ask local councils to consider them.

Reading Railway Station

Martin Salter: What progress has been made in bringing forward plans to upgrade Reading railway station; and if he will make a statement.

Derek Twigg: A business case for upgrading Reading station has been prepared by the borough council working with the region and rail industry partners. The plans include additional platforms and improved passenger facilities. We are working with the council, its partners and Network Rail to explore how the plans can best be progressed.

Martin Salter: Does the Minister accept that upgrading Reading station to improve track and platform capacity from 23 to 60 trains an hour is vital to removing the bottleneck from the Great Western main line? Does he also acknowledge the importance of the partnership working between Reading borough council, the local business community and other stakeholders in making such a powerful case for a 21st century station for Reading?

Derek Twigg: We do recognise the need for work at Reading station. I praise my hon. Friend again for his help in developing the good partnership working with Reading borough council. As he knows, Network Rail's progress plans for resignalling work for 2011-2014 include Reading, and its business plan base case submission last week included Reading as part of the high-level output specification.

Robert Wilson: I hope that the Minister has been made aware that I have been working for some time with all interested parties—both public and private-sector organisations—on the Reading station development. As a result, there is now a major opportunity to bring about a transformation of the entire area which will create jobs, regenerate part of the town centre and give Reading one of the best station developments in Europe. That can be done through a Government contribution of about £80 million to start it off. Will the Minister now offer his support for that further ambitious project and will he meet me and other interested parties to take it forward?

Derek Twigg: A great deal of good work has been done in partnership and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, West (Martin Salter) has been working for some years on taking these developments at Reading station forward. It is important that such partnership working takes place. The programme has already been set out by Network Rail in its progress plans, and its business case has been made about what it would like to see included in the high-level output specification. We will consider that. As I have always said, if Members seek a meeting with me, I will do my very best to ensure that it happens.

William McCrea: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. May I tell the hon. Gentleman that Reading station is some distance from the green hills of Antrim, but I may be able to do something for him when we move on to other questions?

Railways (Vandalism)

Ann Winterton: What action he is taking to combat vandalism on railways and at railway stations.

Derek Twigg: The primary responsibility for combating vandalism on the national rail network lies with Network Rail, which works closely with the British Transport police, train operators, local authorities and, of course, the wider community. The cross-industry national route crime group steers the industry's efforts to reduce the risks posed by trespass and vandalism.

Ann Winterton: The Government's 10-year transport plan promised that people would be able to travel safely and feel secure, yet only about a third of stations have CCTV. The Minister may think that I am a big toughie, but I have to tell him that even I do not feel at ease at Congleton station on a cold winter's night with the wind whistling down a poorly lit platform, with nowhere to shelter because of vandalism, no CCTV and no information to reassure one that the train that is already late is actually coming. Will he knock together the heads of the train operating companies and Network Rail and ensure that passengers indeed feel secure, especially when they are waiting for that train?

Derek Twigg: I of course accept that vandalism and trespass are serious problems on the railways and we need to deal with them in the best way possible. That includes making sure that we have a good partnership approach to finding solutions to deal with those problems. It is also important to deal with the wider community. The British Transport police are also involved and we have seen a significant increase in their number, as well as a significant increase in the number of CCTV cameras on stations. In respect of the south-west franchise, we are looking to improve the accredited secure station status in terms of 80 per cent. of the footfall. There are therefore a number of areas that we can seek to improve. The industry needs to take that forward and address those problems.

Gwyneth Dunwoody: The Minister knows that I am not even a little toughie. I hope that he will agree that the British Transport police in the north-west have not only followed the programme that he mentioned, but put forward imaginative schemes to involve children and schoolchildren in protecting non-manned stations. Will he pay tribute to that work and ensure that the specialised knowledge of the British Transport police is not in any way dissipated in the future?

Derek Twigg: I will not comment on her toughness, but my hon. Friend always makes a very important point. She is absolutely right that one of the approaches of Network Rail and others is to work with schools and young people at a variety of community events or to provide information through websites. It is important to get home to young people the dangers of trespass and vandalism on the railways—dangers not only to themselves, but to those who work on the railways and those who use them. It is important for the industry to take that sort of community work forward. It is right to work with schools and young people to reduce the amount of trespass and vandalism on the railways.

William McCrea: I am sure that the Minister will agree that combating vandalism on railways and at railway stations is a problem not only in England and Scotland, but throughout the United Kingdom. May I therefore encourage him to speak to his colleagues in the Northern Ireland Office, to ensure that the problem is dealt with in Northern Ireland as well, because there is no other forum by which we can deal with the situation and ensure that our passengers feel safe at railway stations?

Derek Twigg: I am happy, of course, to bring the hon. Gentleman's comments to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

The Minister of State was asked—

Mesothelioma

Iain Wright: What steps she has taken to ensure that people with mesothelioma are able to claim compensation.

Bridget Prentice: I intend to table an amendment to the Compensation Bill, which is due to be debated in the House next Monday, to provide that negligent persons should be jointly and severally liable in mesothelioma cases, so that the claimant can recover full compensation from any relevant person.

Iain Wright: I thank the Government for what they are doing and I pay tribute to other hon. Members and organisations, such as the GMB union and Thompsons solicitors, in helping to bring about this change. On Saturday, I attended the Durham miners gala, which is a celebration of traditional industries in the north-east; but because of that industrial legacy, up to 5,000 people die from asbestos-related diseases each year in the north-east. Will my hon. Friend ensure that the proposed changes to the law are retrospective, so that people who lost out under the Barker decision can claim their full original compensation, so that what may well be their final days are dignified and comfortable?

Bridget Prentice: My hon. Friend makes a very important point and I have every sympathy with all he says. I want to put on record my thanks to my right hon. and hon. Friends who have been campaigning on this issue for some time—in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone (Mr. Clapham). The Government also realise that the Barker decision makes claims much more difficult, and I am hopeful that the amendment will enable us to achieve the retrospectivity that my hon. Friend seeks.

Oliver Heald: Does not the Minister recognise that the Barker  v. Corus case, which she mentions, was brought by the Government and therefore that she is seeking to overturn with that amendment what the Government argued for in court? We welcome that, but does not she accept that that is hardly joined-up government? Many victims of this crippling disease still cannot trace an employer or an insurer, so they will not be able to make a claim at the moment. Will she examine my new clause 6 to the Compensation Bill and the proposals of the Association of British Insurers and others to consider whether it is feasible to set up an independent body to assess claims and pay out compensation speedily to all those who contracted mesothelioma in the workplace, and then to recover the money from all those who should, in fairness, share liability?

Bridget Prentice: Of course the hon. Gentleman is right that all those who are responsible should share liability where it is possible to trace them. That is why we have been working very closely with all relevant stakeholders, including the ABI, to find a scheme that will be fast, efficient and fair and will reach the people who, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Wright) rightly said, are in incredible pain and in the last days of their lives in some cases, so that we can secure some comfort for them and their families.

Michael Clapham: I thank my hon. Friend for all the work that she has done in introducing the amendment. May I tell her that retrospectivity is very important? I received an e-mail from the Liverpool asbestos group yesterday, to say that a request for deferment had been made in a certain case until such time as Parliament had sorted out the Barker decision. The judge would not allow a deferment. The case went ahead, and the person suffered a substantial reduction in the compensation received. I hope that there is a way—perhaps in the Appeal Court—to review that case.

Bridget Prentice: I understand exactly my hon. Friend's point, and it was of course entirely up to the judge to make that decision; it would not be right for me to intervene. Judicial process can still obtain in that case, but we are aware of the gap that might now exist in terms of ongoing cases, which is why we are looking carefully at getting a proper scheme in place that will ensure that everyone involved in this terrible, harrowing disease is properly compensated.

Peter Bone: A few weeks ago, Councillor David Childs died of this terrible disease and Rushden lost a dedicated person who looked after the interests of the town. His death was a great tragedy. I welcome what the Minister has said, but despite all the words, what many sufferers are looking for is fast action to relieve the problem. I urge the Government to act quickly.

Bridget Prentice: I convey my deepest sympathy to the family of Councillor Childs and to the town of Rushden, which has lost such a dedicated and public-spirited person. We are very aware that the big issue is making sure that we get as fast a response as possible, and we are ensuring that that will happen.

David Anderson: I congratulate the Minister on the great work that has been done. As one of the people who raised this issue when it first became clear how bad the problem was, I am very proud and pleased that my party and my Government have put it right. But can we go a step further by introducing what I, as somebody who always wants more, shall call the Oliver Twist clause? Will the Minister ask the Secretary of State for Health to request that the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence lift the limits on the use of the drug Alimta, so that people can have not only proper financial compensation but their lives extended?

Bridget Prentice: I again congratulate my hon. Friend on the work that he has done in this area. I will of course express his concerns relating to the drug and NICE to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health, and if his suggestion is a suitable and helpful solution, I hope that it will be progressed.

Andrew Dismore: I welcome what my hon. Friend has said, but there are two other issues that need to be looked at. One is the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987, which forbids claims by members of the armed forces exposed to asbestos before 1987 who only now exhibit the symptoms of the disease; that is a manifest injustice. The second issue is pleural plaques. The Court of Appeal recently indicated that no claims could be brought for asymptomatic pleural plaques, despite the risk of mesothelioma, which might well occur later. Perhaps my hon. Friend will look sympathetically on the new clauses to the Compensation Bill that I have tabled today, so that we can take this opportunity to ensure that we address the issue of mesothelioma compensation claims properly and comprehensively.

Bridget Prentice: My hon. Friend warned me that he would table amendments to the Compensation Bill and I will take a careful look at them. I should point out to him and to the House that pleural plaques is a significantly different disease in terms of how it manifests itself; diagnosis is not as straightforward as it is for mesothelioma. I do not want to go into that issue any further as I am not a medical expert, but that is my understanding. However, I will of course look at his amendments to see whether they can ensure that the principle that we are setting out today can be carried through.

Court Buildings

Henry Bellingham: When she next expects to meet representatives of the lay magistracy to discuss improvements to court buildings.

Harriet Harman: I meet magistrates on a continuous basis and discuss a wide range of issues with them, including improvements to court buildings.

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Lady for that reply, but when looking at improvements to magistrates courts, will she ensure that her Department always makes a priority of ensuring that justice is kept close to local communities? Does she agree that local hooligans and vandals need to be tried as close to their homes as possible, so that they learn to respect the administration of justice? Does she also agree that it is important that there be no further court closures in East Anglia?

Harriet Harman: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about the need for people to see justice happening in their local area. In addition, we want to ensure that the courts in which people are tried have proper facilities for victims and witnesses, and disabled access. If possible, we also want to ensure—certainly on the civil side—that people can get disputes resolved without having to go to court. We must balance all those issues and get good value for money out of the courts estate—including judges' lodgings.

Jonathan Djanogly: What impact will the significant cuts in the Courts Service budget have on the court building and refurbishment programme?

Harriet Harman: Obviously the courts estate budget is part of the Courts Service budget as a whole. People want value for money from all public services. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the Government have invested across the piece in public services such as health, education, law and order and indeed the justice system, but we must make absolutely sure that we secure value for money, and that is what the Courts Service will try to do.

Verbal Testimony

Claire Curtis-Thomas: When she last met Court of Appeal judges to discuss verbal testimony.

Vera Baird: I have met a good many Court of Appeal judges in my time, two of them very recently, but I have not met any to discuss verbal testimony, and I have no plans to do so in the immediate future.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: Every day many prisoners who witnessed serious crimes are interviewed by the police in prisons up and down the country. I am immensely concerned about the integrity and transparency of the procedure, as many of those prisoners subsequently claim compensation. Having discussed the matter with many senior members of the judiciary, I share their view that such interviews should be video-recorded. Does my hon. and learned Friend agree?

Vera Baird: Matters relating to the way in which police procedures are carried out are for the Home Office, and of course my hon. Friend's suggestion has resource implications. However, when it comes to the hearing of such evidence in court, I can only agree with her, and with the senior members of the judiciary to whom she has spoken, that taped or even video-recorded interviews with witnesses in serious cases who are vulnerable or whose evidence is likely to be strongly contested would provide better protection for all parties.

Asylum and Immigration Tribunal

Paul Rowen: What the backlog of appeals is at the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal; and if she will make a statement.

Bridget Prentice: The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal did accrue a sizeable backlog between April and October 2005, which has caused delays in some appeals. We expect all those appeals to have been heard by the end of the year.

Paul Rowen: I thank the Minister for her answer, and for a letter that she sent me earlier in the week. Does she agree that part of the problem lies outside the AIT—in some embassies' delays in sending information and in the quality of judgment elsewhere, which the Court of Appeal then reverses? What steps can she take to ensure that information is given to the tribunal speedily so that it can set a date, and also to ensure that decisions made elsewhere do not necessitate the hearing of appeals?

Bridget Prentice: I have a great deal of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman has said. I can tell him two things. First, last month we began trying to streamline the entry clearance process. We hope that that will reduce the period that elapses between bundles being received and being sent out by seven weeks, which I believe would make a substantial difference. Secondly, it is expected that 100 new judges will be recruited this year. That will also help to reduce waiting times.
	I intend to visit some of our high commissions to see what problems entry clearance officers face, and to establish whether we can take direct action to improve their procedures.

Keith Vaz: I appreciate the enormous efforts that the Minister has made personally to deal with the backlog at the AIT, but the hon. Member for Rochdale (Paul Rowen) is right. Part of the problem is the decision-making process in posts abroad—I welcome the Minister's proposed visit to the subcontinent—but there is also the fact that documents are being lodged at Loughborough and Leicester, photocopied, sent back to the posts abroad and then returned. That means a 56-day period at the beginning of the process which adds to the delay.
	Will the Minister undertake to examine the appeal process and ensure that it is revised so that cases, once lodged, can be dealt with as quickly as possible? Then constituents of ours who want to attend weddings here will be able to do so, and the appeal process will not be taking place when the wedding has already happened.

Bridget Prentice: I congratulate my hon. Friend on his recent appointment to the Privy Council. He is right, in that the system he describes has existed in the past; but we are trying to persuade posts abroad to stop engaging in the lengthy photocopying procedure and to use slightly more modern techniques such as e-mail so that the information reaches us more quickly. The listing times for entry clearance and family visitor appeals currently average 11 weeks across the AIT, which is down from the 16 weeks that it was earlier this year.

Simon Hughes: The Minister's replies to the previous two questions were helpful, but if appeals are submitted at foreign missions, they can take only six weeks—and that is good. Can she direct that such times should also be achieved if appeals are submitted here in London? On some occasions, the tribunal has allowed entry clearance officers to take 11 weeks or even up to 17 weeks just to get their papers ready. That means that the service can be up to three times worse. If an appeal is successful, but the Home Office wants to challenge it, can it be required to do so promptly, not six or nine months later? That sort of delay is disgraceful.

Bridget Prentice: The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point and I understand the problem as I, too, have many constituents making such appeals. We are continually looking for ways to reduce the time taken, and he will know that I have held forums with MPs to discuss some ideas, many of which have now been incorporated in the system. I understand that my hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality will visit the tribunal here in Britain and I hope that, through co-operation, we will be able to achieve a better standard across the piece.

Coroners

Mary Creagh: What powers coroners have to investigate deaths abroad.

Harriet Harman: A coroner has the duty to investigate a death abroad where the death was violent, unnatural, sudden or of unknown cause.

Mary Creagh: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for that reply. In July 2000, my constituent, Alison Miller, lost her son, Matthew, when he was knocked over and killed by a speeding driver on the island of Minorca. In Spain, when a death is accidental, prosecution has to be requested by the injured party, but because of a clerical error between the Foreign Office and the British consulate, the time limit expired before Ms Miller could file for a prosecution and she could not get access to justice for her son. What contact have my right hon. and learned Friend and her officials had with the Support Abroad for Equal Justice Foundation, which my constituent set up to ensure that other bereaved British families get access to justice abroad when they lose loved ones in such tragic circumstances?

Harriet Harman: As it turns out, before my hon. Friend tabled her question, I had already arranged to meet Alison Miller as part of a group of families who were coming to see me about the coroner system and about how we can ensure that those who are bereaved by a sudden death get answers to their questions. Relatives want answers to sudden deaths when they happen in this country, but it is especially difficult for people to get information when it happens abroad. If a local coroner cannot get information from Spain or another country that they need to complete an inquest, our new proposed chief coroner—part of the reform of the coroner system that we will put before the House—will be able to ensure that they get the information instead of struggling to do so or failing, as they often do at present.

Vincent Cable: Will the Minister investigate the extreme staffing crisis in some coroners' courts, especially south-west London, which has resulted in prolonged delays in the hearing of cases and great distress to the families concerned?

Harriet Harman: I will look into the staffing situation in south-west London. As the hon. Gentleman will know, we plan through the coroner system reform to have national standards so that we do not have delays in certain areas. We want to have proper training and we need an overview of what resources there are to support coroners' offices in their work. At the moment, we do not have a proper national picture and we cannot monitor the situation, but I will look into his particular concerns. Bereaved relatives need to know that there will be a prompt inquiry and that their questions will be answered.

Court Facilities

Jessica Morden: How many courts have separate facilities for victims and witnesses.

Harriet Harman: There are 93 Crown courts, 88 of which of have dedicated witness facilities. Of the 355 magistrates courts, 302 can provide dedicated facilities for witnesses and victims.

Jessica Morden: One of the successes of the domestic violence court pilots was that better facilities for witnesses and victims improved people's experience of the system. Will my right hon. and learned Friend elaborate on any plans that the Department might have to roll the provision out further and to invest in more facilities throughout the court system?

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend makes an important point. In the past, no one was surprised that many domestic violence cases did not stay the course. Abused wives and girlfriends did not give evidence because that meant that they had to sit in the court waiting area, opposite the defendant and all his friends and relatives. The introduction of proper facilities for victims and witnesses is long overdue, especially as they are often intimidated. We are therefore planning to roll out the provision across England and Wales.

David Kidney: Is my right hon. and learned Friend planning to admit journalists to family courts? If so, will she assure the House that victims and witnesses waiting for their cases to come up will not face unwanted approaches from journalists?

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend will know that we are consulting on how to ensure not only that justice is done in family courts, but that it is seen to be done. We want those courts to be more open and accountable, and we are proposing to allow the press in, subject to reporting restrictions. Hon. Members are welcome to engage in the consultation, but we are concerned to ensure that people waiting to give evidence in family courts are property protected, and not hassled by journalists.

LEARNING DISABILITY SERVICES (CORNWALL)

Julia Goldsworthy: To ask the Secretary of State for Health if she will make a statement, pursuant to her written statement of 6 July, on the timetable for implementing the national recommendations contained in the joint inquiry into the position of learning disabled services at Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust by the Healthcare Commission and the Commission for Social Care Inspection.

Patricia Hewitt: Let me begin by apologising, on behalf of the NHS, to the vulnerable people in east Cornwall who have suffered from individual and institutional abuse, and to their families, who have shared their distress.
	As I told the House in my written statement on 6 July, the Healthcare Commission and the Commission for Social Care Inspection recently published a report of their investigation into abuse at the Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust. I fully accept the conclusions and recommendations of their report, and have already agreed to the immediate application of special measures.
	The failings identified by the two commissions are horrifying. People with learning disabilities are entitled to be treated with the same dignity and respect as every other member of the community. Abuse of those particularly vulnerable people is absolutely unacceptable and I am determined both that matters should be put right in Cornwall and that lessons should be learned nationwide, where necessary.
	In 2001, our White Paper "Valuing People" set out the principles of rights, independence, choice and inclusion for people with learning disabilities. Had those principles been followed in practice in Cornwall, then of course the abuse would never have happened.
	Action has already been taken in Cornwall. An external team was appointed in October 2005 to start improving services. Disciplinary action was initiated against seven members of staff, five of whom have been dismissed. More than 200 community care assessments have now been completed for everyone using the trust's services. However, more is still required.
	The special measures now being taken include an external independent review of the board's membership and workings. They also require the external team to remain in place in the trust for a further 12 months to oversee the necessary transformation of the service.
	It is not only Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust that needs to take action. The North and East Cornwall primary care trust is shortly to be joined with the West of Cornwall and Central Cornwall PCTs to become the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly PCT. Along with Cornwall county council, those PCTs are responsible, as commissioners of the services involved, for ensuring the highest possible standards of care. They signally failed to do that.
	As we said in the White Paper "Our health, our care, our say" in January:
	"We expect PCTs to be robust in their management of services that do not deliver the necessary quality. Where there are deficiencies in service quality, PCTs will be required to set out a clear improvement plan",
	which
	"may include tendering for the service where standards fall below those expected."
	Let me make it clear that unless, in the very near future, fundamental improvements are seen in those services in Cornwall, I expect the new PCT and the county council to look to other providers, in line with the White Paper principles, to ensure that they discharge their responsibility to those vulnerable people.
	We are also considering the implications for learning disability services across the country. The commissions say in their report:
	"While we accept that there may be other pockets of poor practice found elsewhere in the country, this does not excuse poor practice at the trust and, in our view, the extent of unacceptably poor practice in Cornwall is unusual."
	None the less, I strongly welcome and endorse the Healthcare Commission's decision to conduct a national audit of services for people with learning disabilities. My Department is working with the Healthcare Commission and the Commission for Social Care Inspection in developing that national audit, which will assist in addressing national recommendations; for example, it will check that services are properly registered under the Care Standards Act 2000, where required by law. The audit process will be tested on three sites in September this year and will then be implemented nationally from January 2007.
	Let me stress, however, that there is no need to wait for the conclusions of the national audit, necessary though it is. If any service user or their family, any professional or member of the public believes that abuse is going on in any setting elsewhere, they should come forward now. Any allegations will be fully and properly investigated.
	I shall be asking strategic health authority chief executives to take immediate action to ensure that NHS bodies that provide services in a housing association, voluntary or charitable sector are registered with CSCI and, if they are not, that they apply for registration immediately.
	As I said in my written statement, my Department is already taking other steps to provide additional safeguards for the protection of vulnerable adults. The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill is currently going through Parliament, and will assist in responding to the national recommendations for safeguarding vulnerable adults. In particular, it will ensure that unsuitable people are not employed by the NHS in future. We have also issued statutory guidance to directors of adult social services, stressing their responsibility for ensuring that local arrangements for safeguarding vulnerable adults are working effectively. We will have further discussions with the Healthcare Commission and CSCI to ensure that, if necessary, regulatory arrangements are strengthened so that that learning disability services are properly inspected everywhere in future.
	What happened in Cornwall was shameful and must not be allowed to happen again. But the situation in Cornwall should not be allowed to cast a shadow over the excellent services provided for many adults with learning disabilities by thousands of staff—in the NHS itself, in social care services and in the private and voluntary sectors. Many people and their families are immensely grateful to those staff for the care and support they provide. While thanking those staff for the services they provide, I underline to the House our determination to take the necessary steps, both locally in Cornwall and nationally, on the basis of the reports that have been presented.

Julia Goldsworthy: I thank the Secretary of State for her statement, and on behalf of my constituents, particularly those affected, I thank her for her apology on behalf of the NHS.
	People all over the country, as well as many of my constituents and the House, will be deeply concerned to learn of the unacceptable treatment of individuals with learning disabilities, and to learn that although those abuses were reported, action was not taken by the trust management in response. It is entirely right that we have the opportunity to discuss these matters on the Floor of the House, and I am sorry that the Secretary of State did not choose to do so of her own volition, bearing in mind the seriousness of the findings.
	It is important that every effort is made to ensure that the physical, mental and financial abuse of vulnerable adults with learning disabilities, such as has been reported at the Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust, can never be allowed to happen again—in Cornwall or anywhere else in the country. The national recommendations in the report will go only part of the way to achieving that—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I granted the hon. Lady an urgent question, so she must now put questions to the Secretary of State rather than making a statement to the House.

Julia Goldsworthy: Has the Secretary of State assessed how many NHS bodies will be affected by the national recommendations contained in the report? How long will they take to implement? What proportion of those providing services for the learning disabled are currently not in compliance with the recommendations? What are the cost implications of the recommendations for NHS bodies and local authorities? Despite existing budgetary pressures, both Cornwall county council and the primary care trust are facing additional unanticipated expenditure of roughly £2 million each this financial year.
	In addition, will the Secretary of State please look again at the inspection system? The Healthcare Commission found terrible levels of abuse in its inquiry, but failed to pick up any of those problems in its two previous inspections of the trust, which covered the same period and which resulted in the trust being awarded three stars and two stars respectively. Does she agree that that points to failings in the inspection system that are not covered in the report's recommendations? They must be urgently addressed. How could the management failings go unnoticed in those inspections, and why was the widespread abuse and mismanagement not dealt with on those occasions? Although registering with CSCI will ensure that minimum standards are met in relation to homes and domiciliary care, without performance indicators, the treatment of adults with learning disabilities will not be integrated into the strategy—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We have to bear it in mind that the House has other business. I agree that this is an important matter— I would not have agreed to the urgent question otherwise. However, if there are any other supplementary questions, the hon. Lady must write to the Secretary of State.

Patricia Hewitt: On the first group of questions that the hon. Lady asked, the Healthcare Commission said that it believed that the situation was unusual—not only in relation to the extent of the outrageous abuse that was taking place, but in the sense that, although the NHS trust claimed to be offering treatment and assessment services, it was actually providing something in the nature of a long-stay residential home that, if it was going to provide services, should have been registered with CSCI. We will not know until we have conducted the national audit whether there are other organisations in that unusual position or others not in compliance with the national recommendations. At this stage, we have no reason whatsoever to think that the situation in Cornwall is replicated in large numbers of organisations in other parts of the country.
	The hon. Lady asked why the failings were not picked up earlier in inspections by either the Healthcare Commission or CSCI. That matter is addressed, in part, in the report of the two organisations. In part, there is the rather unusual structure of the trust and the fact that, after the earlier merger of the provider trusts, responsibility for learning disability services was not passed to the social services department of the county council, as it was in most other parts of the country. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health will discuss that matter further with the two commissions.
	As for why the management failings went unnoticed and the complaints in 2001 and 2003 were so inadequately dealt with, that comes down to issues about board governance. In line with the Healthcare Commission recommendation, we will now review that matter by means of the external independent review of the board's operation that we will be commissioning very shortly.

Claire Curtis-Thomas: If there is sufficient evidence to dismiss five people, is there sufficient evidence to start criminal proceedings against them?

Patricia Hewitt: The police are involved in looking at the cases. The cases of 40 vulnerable adults have now been referred to the team responsible for protecting vulnerable adults. The police are part of that team and therefore they will make the necessary investigations. Other cases involving irregularities in the handling of service users' money have already also been referred to the police. At this stage, obviously, I cannot say whether proceedings will follow, but certainly the police are involved.

Andrew Lansley: I share the Secretary of State's sense of concern and outrage at the extent of the abuse disclosed at the Cornwall Partnership NHS Trust, particularly given that in so many places across the country—such as Meldreth Manor in my constituency, where Scope is looking after young people with profound learning disabilities—such considerable care and quality of care is given to those with learning disabilities. She responded to a number of questions. The report made some particular recommendations that bear on the national circumstances and were designed not simply to buttress the process of inspection and the audit that is to come next year, to which she referred, but to try to build some of the principles of valuing people into the care that is given to those with learning disabilities. May I just ask a few questions about those?
	First, one of the things that are rather disturbing is quite how far away from home people with learning disabilities live, which is on average 74 miles, but in some cases up to 300 miles. What steps can be taken soon to try to reduce how far people with learning disabilities are from home?
	Secondly, the debate on the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill has disclosed that whereas it was originally intended that the IMPACT computer system to enable the exchange of data between agencies would be in place by 2007, it will not be in place in full until 2010. Will the Secretary of State say whether she, or indeed the Home Office, which leads on this, will be able to improve on that, because the delay might have serious implications?
	Thirdly, one of the important recommendations in "Valuing People" back in March 2001 was that everyone with a learning disability should have received a
	"Health Action Plan by June 2005."
	Will the Secretary of State say whether that has indeed happened? If it has not happened yet, when will it have happened?
	Finally, a recommendation in the latest report was that the supported living fund should be paid to individuals and managed locally. The Secretary of State said that she accepted all the recommendations, but that had no timetable attached to it. Will she thus attach a timetable to that important recommendation as well?

Patricia Hewitt: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point about the distance that many people with learning disabilities live away from home. That is very much a matter for commissioners. As primary care trusts and social services authorities review services, in accordance with the White Paper principles, they should take that into account. In some cases, there might be good reasons why people are living a considerable distance from home—for instance, so that they can get the services that they need—but clearly being so far away from their home and family is likely to increase their vulnerability to poor services, or even abuse. I would expect commissioners to take that issue into account when considering whether more services need to be provided locally for this particular group of people.
	The hon. Gentleman asks about the exchange of data between agencies. I am aware that there are various difficulties in ensuring that the barriers to exchanging data are removed. I will write to him with further details of the progress that we are making on that point.
	The hon. Gentleman asks about health action plans for people with learning disabilities. I understand that some areas have put those in place for all people covered by the recommendation. However, that is not the case universally, and, again, it is something that commissioners and health providers need to consider.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to the recommendation about the supported living fund. I would add to that the work that we are already doing following the January White Paper on extending individual budgets and direct payments, which is already giving many adults with learning disabilities much more choice about, and control over, where they live, what kind of support services they have, and who provides those services. Those features were almost wholly absent from the experiences of the people in Cornwall. All those issues and others will be considered in more detail by the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury, South (Mr. Lewis), who will be leading a high-level group in the Department of Health to ensure that the recommendations are implemented and that we follow up to ensure that this does not happen again.

Sandra Gidley: We must all be concerned when we become aware of widespread institutional abuse. Part of the problem was that the Healthcare Commission realised that it had to involve CSCI. Does the Secretary of State agree that the sooner the two bodies are merged, the better, so that other people will not fall through the gaps in inspection? Does she also agree that it would probably be a good idea to increase the number of unannounced inspections because that could more easily pick up some of these problems? Most importantly, will she ensure that those who are accused of malpractice are not placed in a situation in which they are investigating themselves, because that happens far too frequently?
	Finally, it took five families working with the help of Mencap to highlight the situation. What chance does she have of reassuring a single family that its voice will be heard and that we will not be in a similar position in the years and months to come?

Patricia Hewitt: We have announced our intention to merge the Healthcare Commission and CSCI by 2008. In the meantime, however, the two organisations are working together much more closely, and we will continue to ensure that they do so in anticipation of the merger and, indeed, even before that takes place. The hon. Lady is quite right about the desirability of unannounced inspections. As the Healthcare Commission and CSCI operate on the principle of better regulation, they have already ensured that their inspections are based on a proper risk assessment, complemented by both random and unannounced inspections to pick up problems.
	The hon. Lady referred to the problem, which was particularly prominent in Cornwall, of people investigating complaints about matters for which they were responsible or in which they had colluded. That is completely unacceptable, and it should be standard good practice for the board of any trust that provides services to ensure that complaints are investigated. When they are investigated internally, that should be done by someone who is not implicated in the matters to which the complaint relates. As for ensuring that proper attention is given to complaints even from a single user or family, we have already taken steps to strengthen the NHS complaints procedure. From my own constituency experience, I have been impressed by CSCI's response to concerns—for example, about the treatment of a vulnerable elderly person—raised by one family, and by the way in which it has looked at the situation in the care home or whatever is the subject of complaint. We certainly need to ensure that the voice of the most vulnerable people in our community is heard by the staff who look after them, by the board responsible for the organisation that employs those staff, by commissioning organisations and by the regulators. As Members of Parliament, we can assist with that process, but we must ensure, too, that the regulatory and complaints system is as it should be, and that is what we are doing.

Matthew Taylor: People both inside and outside the House will be shocked by those appalling events, none more so than people in Cornwall. While there were terrible shortcomings at a local level, the Minister will accept that the inspection regime, which should have guaranteed that those individuals' interests were well protected, failed. Can she confirm that there will be an immediate step up in unannounced inspections so that that can never happen again for such a long time without it being picked up? Finally, will she reflect on the fact that while appalling events have taken place, nationally and, indeed, in Cornwall, many people caring for individuals with learning disabilities do not treat their patients that way. An enormous amount of good work is done by many people, not least in the NHS in Cornwall, but they may believe that their efforts are unappreciated.

Patricia Hewitt: I have made it clear that the Healthcare Commission and CSCI, in particular, have changed their inspection regime, both to ensure that they look at organisations when there is reason to believe that people may be at risk and to use unannounced inspections. In Cornwall, the problem was not an absence of unannounced inspections but the fact that the inspections did not look at what was happening in learning disability services, partly because of a curious arrangement for services provided in what appeared to be a health service establishment. The regulators are looking at that problem. As for the excellent services provided by many staff and organisations in different parts of the country, I entirely concur with the hon. Gentleman and stressed that point earlier.

Daniel Rogerson: Further to the Secretary of State's comments on the good work that is being done, many families in Cornwall who have experienced the care provided by the trust are far more positive about smaller establishments. They are particularly nervous about change, so can the Secretary of State provide reassurance that the needs of those clients and the preferences of their families will be taken into account as we move forward?

Patricia Hewitt: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. In its report the Healthcare Commission stressed that most of the staff to whom it talked were warm, kind and committed to doing their best for the people in their care, but did not have the training, support and the proper systems in place to enable them to do that. Of course, it is a central principle of good care for vulnerable people that they and their families are fully consulted about any changes that may need to be made in the services that are provided. That is part of the purpose of the care assessments that have already taken place.

Energy Review

Alistair Darling: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the energy review which was announced by the Prime Minister last November. Today I am publishing a report setting out the conclusions of that review. Copies will available in the Vote Office in the usual way. The report is extensive, and of necessity my statement has to cover proposals in some detail.
	We face two major long-term challenges—first, along with other countries, to tackle climate change and the need to cut damaging carbon emissions, and secondly, to deliver secure supplies of cleaner energy at affordable prices. Increasingly, we will come to depend upon imported gas and oil as our own plentiful but harder to exploit North sea oil reserves decline. The proposals that I am announcing set out our approach to meeting our energy needs over the next 30 to 40 years. Many of the proposals contained in the report will need further consultation. Thereafter, the Government intend to publish a White Paper around the turn of the year.
	The starting point for reducing carbon emissions must be to save energy. If we are to meet our goals of a 60 per cent. reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050, we need not just to reduce carbon intensity through low energy sources such as renewables, but also to save energy. We therefore make a number of proposals to encourage greater energy efficiency.
	For consumers, we need better information about the amount of energy used, smart metering, real-time energy use displays, better and clearer energy bills, and more information for new buyers and tenants on energy efficiency in homes. It is estimated that leaving electric appliances on standby uses about 7 per cent. of all electricity generated in the UK, so we will work with industry and others to improve the efficiency of domestic appliances and to phase out inefficient goods, thus limiting the amount of standby energy wasted.
	We also propose a range of measures to take us towards a long-term goal of carbon-neutral developments. New homes can use around a quarter of the energy to heat, compared with the average home. We aim to make the Government estate carbon- neutral by 2012. We will also provide strong support for the use of on-site electricity generation, such as solar panels. Energy efficiency will help people on low incomes especially. The review sets out our approach.
	If we are to make a real difference to reducing energy demand, we need a radically different approach. We need a stronger obligation on energy companies to provide energy saving measures and a radical plan to change the way in which they sell their services. Yes, we will encourage Britain's 27 million homes to become more energy efficient, but it is also essential that we incentivise Britain's big six energy suppliers to work with homeowners to make their houses more energy efficient. Today, companies have the incentive to sell as much as they can. Instead, we need to give energy producers incentives to make homes more energy efficient and to sell them more insulation products. We are consulting on the most effective way of doing that.
	The European Union emissions trading scheme, which covers 11,000 high intensity users of energy, and the climate change levy are key to encourage businesses such as power stations or steelworks to save energy and to cut emissions, but there are in addition around 5,000 large businesses and public services in the UK that are not covered by the scheme. We want to reduce energy inefficiency for those companies too. One supermarket chain in the UK alone is one of the biggest single users of energy in the country. Those businesses should be incentivised to reduce their emissions, so we shall consult on a proposal for an emissions trading scheme for them, along with other options to cut the amount of carbon produced—something they support. That makes economic and environmental sense.
	Saving energy in businesses and homes is essential, but so too is the need to cut emissions from road transport. Fuel efficiency in transport continues to improve. We will encourage the use of lower carbon fuels, especially biofuels, and there will be more cost-effective opportunities to save carbon as new technologies are developed. Company car tax and vehicle excise duty have been reformed to encourage energy efficiency, and we will continue to press the European Union to consider the inclusion of surface transport in the emissions trading scheme as well as aviation.
	Last November, we announced the renewable transport fuel obligation—5 per cent. of all fuels to be from renewable sources by 2010. Today, we propose that that obligation, after consultation, should be extended after 2010, provided that some important conditions are met. That could provide a further carbon reduction of 2 million tonnes, which is equivalent to taking another million cars off the road, once it is fully implemented.
	Providing the right incentives to reduce energy is critical, but we also need to do more to make the energy that we use cleaner. We have a number of proposals. Most of our electricity is generated in large power stations, and around three quarters of our heat comes from gas fed through a national network, which delivers economies of scale, safety and—crucially—reliability. However, the Government believe that we can do more to encourage the generation of electricity on a smaller scale near to where it is used. Today, less than 0.5 per cent. of our electricity comes from microgeneration, while combined heat and power provides about 7 per cent. We need to do more.
	There are technical and other obstacles to overcome, but we want to remove barriers to the development of what is known as distributed generation. We can do more to make microgeneration more attractive and to make it easier to set up combined heat and power schemes. The Government believe that this is a major opportunity for the United Kingdom to invest in renewable energy and other low carbon technologies. The environmental transformation fund, which was announced recently, will provide investment for energy funding services. Details of the scale and scope of that fund will be announced in the spending review in 2008. We will also encourage low carbon alternatives such as biomass, solar and heat pumps.
	Over the next two decades, it is likely that we will need substantial new electricity generation capacity as power stations, principally coal and nuclear plants, reach the end of their lives—their output is equivalent to about a third of today's generating capacity. Power stations are long-term investments, and we need to implement the right framework to incentivise investment decisions to limit carbon emissions. We remain committed to carbon pricing in the UK through the operation of the emissions trading scheme, and it is essential that there is a carbon price to encourage us to use less of it. Today, around 90 per cent. of the UK's energy needs are met by fossil fuels, so we need to do more to encourage the renewable generation of electricity.
	The renewable obligation is key to support the expansion of renewables. It has resulted in major developments, particularly in onshore wind power generation, landfill gas and the use of biomass in coal stations. Far from getting rid of the renewables obligation, as some have proposed, we intend to increase it from 15 to 20 per cent. We also want to give a boost to offshore wind energy generation and other emerging technologies—for example, tidal—to encourage growth. We will consult on banding the obligations to encourage those developments.
	The Government also see a continuing role for both gas and coal-fired generation. We will convene a coal forum to bring together UK coal producers and suppliers to help them find solutions to some of the long-term problems of UK coal-fired power generation and UK coal production. Coal-fired generation continues to meet around one third of electricity demand, and last winter it met as much as half, which shows the important role that coal can play in UK energy security.
	If coal-fired generation is to have a long-term future, however, we need to tackle its heavy carbon emissions. Carbon capture and storage could cut emissions by 80 to 90 per cent., and we have some natural and commercial advantages such as a strong oil industry and old oil fields where CO2 can be stored. The next step is a commercial demonstration, if the technology proves to be cost-effective. We are working with the Norwegian Government and the industry on development, and a further announcement will be made in the pre-Budget report. Carbon capture could lead to our saving several million tonnes of carbon by 2020.
	The Government believe that a mix of energy supply remains essential and that we should not be over-dependent on one source, which is especially true if we are to maintain security of supply in the future. We will continue to do everything that we can to promote more open and competitive markets, which is why we are backing the Commission in securing the effective implementation of the energy market. We will also take steps to secure gas supplies, maximising the exploitation of oil and gas from the UK continental shelf. Last month, we saw a record number of applications for further development in the North sea. We also need to facilitate the construction of sufficient storage and import infrastructure.
	Against a background where Britain's nuclear power stations are ageing, decisions will have to be taken on their replacement in the next few years. If we do nothing, the proportion of electricity generated by nuclear could fall from just under 20 per cent. today to just 6 per cent. in 15 years' time. Moreover, nuclear has provided much of the electricity base load, contributing to consistency of supply as well as security of supply. While some of that capacity can and should be replaced by renewables, it is more likely than not that some of it will be replaced by gas, which would increasingly have to be imported. The Government have concluded that new nuclear power stations could make a significant contribution to meeting our energy policy goals. It will be for the private sector to initiate, fund, construct and operate new nuclear plants and cover the cost of decommissioning and their full share of long-term waste management costs.
	The review makes a number of proposals to address barriers to new build, and the Health and Safety Executive is developing guidance for providers of new stations. For nuclear new build, considerations of safety and security will be paramount, as they are now. We are setting out a proposed framework for the way in which the relevant issues on nuclear should be handled in the planning process, and we will consult on that before the publication of the White Paper. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management—CoRWM—published its interim recommendations in April, confirming its preference for geological disposal of nuclear waste. The committee is to be congratulated on the open and transparent way in which it has conducted its work and the broad consensus that it has developed for securing the future long-term management of the UK's nuclear waste. It will publish its final report this month, and the Government will respond thereafter.
	If we are to see any of these developments, whether they be renewables or conventional power stations, we believe that we need to change the planning laws in this country. We will work with the devolved Administrations to ensure that we have an effective planning regime. We can make some changes now—for example, bringing together the planning process and consents on the Electricity Act 1989—but the Government believe that the current planning regime needs fundamental reform, and we will consult on proposals to do that later this year.
	The proposals that I have set out will result in a reduction of between 19 million and 25 million tonnes of carbon by 2020, over and above the measures already announced in the climate change review programme. We are on course to achieve real progress in cutting emissions by 2020 and on the right path to attaining our goal of cutting the UK's carbon emissions by 60 per cent. by about 2050. The proposals will help us to meet our twin objectives of tackling climate change and providing security of supply. The scale of the challenge is great. The proposals show how we can overcome them to secure our prosperity and the health of our planet. I commend the statement to the House.

Alan Duncan: First, I thank the Secretary of State for his courtesy in giving us advance sight of his statement.
	This review has been much heralded, but sadly we find today that it amounts to almost nothing. After six months' work, 2,000 submissions, and hundreds of thousands of civil service hours, the conclusion is that nuclear power
	"could make a significant contribution"
	to meeting our energy supply goals. This statement is not carbon-free but content-free. We have been told for months that urgent decisions must be made now. We have been told that delaying those decisions would risk the lights going out and that this is the most fundamental review of our energy needs ever undertaken—and then all we get today is this statement.
	The statement proposes six new consultations—[ Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Let the hon. Gentleman speak.

Alan Duncan: The statement proposes six new consultations and the convening of a new forum, and says that there is much to consider, yet there are no real policies, no real action, no real decisions, and no real energy review at all. There is nothing here. Everybody believed that the Prime Minister had made a decision to build new nuclear power stations and that this review followed to provide the air cover for that decision. Instead, the Secretary of State announced at the end of his statement that the Government believe that
	"new nuclear power stations could make a significant contribution".
	Did the Prime Minister realise that he was so out on a limb that his views are not shared even in his own Cabinet, and that the Secretary of State for Wales agrees with us rather than with his Prime Minister?
	Last week, we set out our findings. We said that the key aims are reducing carbon emissions and securing supplies—exactly what the Secretary of State echoed on the radio this morning.
	We proposed a tougher carbon regime to tackle emissions; a capacity payment scheme to build security; a long-term framework to encourage investment, and a change in market structures to encourage decentralised energy and efficiency measures. Those combined proposals will spark a green revolution and guarantee reductions in carbon emissions. Almost everybody, even Stephen Hale, who used to be special adviser at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, welcomed our proposals.
	The subject is very important. Does not the Secretary of State believe, like us, that political consensus is essential if we are to build the climate for investment in the energy sector that is badly needed? Even the Liberal Democrats announced today that they were not against nuclear power in principle.
	Where there is agreement, we welcome it. The Government attacked our position on nuclear power, but now they seem to have changed their stance. They attacked us for saying that the renewables obligation was not working, but now they agree with us and say that they will consider—only "consider"—reforming it. They claim that they want to streamline the planning system—we agree. They say that there should be no subsidies for nuclear—we also agree. If they say that the costs must be transparent and a solution for waste must be found, we agree with that, too.
	The Government say that they want to promote energy efficiency—we agree. They say that they approve of the EU emissions trading scheme—we do, too. Indeed, we went further because we made proposals for extending carbon trading. However, where is Government action? Perhaps we will have to conduct another energy review.
	We do not agree that Nirex and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority should be joined up. Independent bodies are better placed to ensure that safety remains paramount in the nuclear industry. Will the Secretary of State therefore confirm that those bodies will remain separate?
	What are the proposals in the statement for increased gas storage? Where are the exact proposals for supporting decentralised energy? When will genuine action be taken to amend Ofgem's remit? We have to wait until paragraph 55 out of 60 to reach the words,
	"There are some changes we can make now".
	Even that means simply a further period of consultation on the planning process. The review is vague even about the future of nuclear power.
	Far from being back on the agenda with a vengeance, as the Prime Minister told us, the Secretary of State now says that nuclear power
	"could make a significant contribution to meeting our energy policy goals."
	Is not it the truth that the Prime Minister's rhetoric is only rhetoric? That applies to the announcement of the Franco-British nuclear forum last month. In response to my questions, the Secretary of State was unable to say what it would do, who would pay for it, what its remit would be or even if it exists after all.
	The Prime Minister says that he wants new nuclear power stations. However, the review does not tell us how he will make that happen. What exactly will the Government's role be in ensuring that new nuclear power stations are built? Is it their intention, as reported today, to take existing nuclear sites away from British Energy and place them under Government control? To what extent will there be Government interference to get new nuclear power stations built? What deals have the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State done, about which they have not told us? How many power stations does the Prime Minister expect? Does the Department of Trade and Industry have a target—six, 12, any more bids? Will a number be set? Does the statement contain anything to match the Prime Minister's macho, pro-nuclear rhetoric?
	We need to spark a revolution in energy and we need green security. After nine years, six Secretaries of States, three energy reviews and God knows how many Ministers for Energy, carbon emissions continue to rise. The review could have done so much more. Three years ago, we were promised final decisions. Today, we have not got them. The review appears to have done almost nothing. It is a grave and perilous let-down.

Alistair Darling: Let me start with the hon. Gentleman's first point—the desirability of political consensus. It would be highly desirable, given the long-term nature of the planning required for energy, for such a consensus to exist.

Alan Duncan: Get on with it.

Alistair Darling: The hon. Gentleman says, "Get on with it", but I suggest that he start in his own backyard. In January, he said in the Chamber:
	"I have... an instinctive hostility to nuclear power."—[ Official Report, 17 January 2006; Vol. 441, c.779.]
	Only two or three months later, the shadow Chancellor said:
	"I am happy to see nuclear power."
	Then, last week, the Leader of the Opposition gave the impression that he was for nuclear power, but maybe not yet. Once the Conservatives manage to get a consensus on what their policy is, I will happily talk to them about what we might do in the future.
	The Government believe that nuclear power could provide— [ Interruption.] Yes, I use the word advisedly. It is for the generators to come forward with proposals, whether they are for nuclear, renewable, oil or gas. The Government believe that some of the barriers that make it difficult for such developments to proceed ought to be removed. Yes, there needs to be consultation in some cases. Apart from anything else, if we are to provide a clear statement of need for planning inspectors, there will need to be a White Paper, and that will require some consultation before we produce it. However, we have a very clear sense of direction. We need a mix of energy supplies. We are quite clear about that. That mix has served this country well over the past few decades, and it will continue to do so.
	The hon. Gentleman seems to have some difficulty with renewables. In the policy announcement that the Conservatives made last week, they made it clear that, under the Tories, the renewables obligation would go. The Leader of the Opposition made a classic statement on this, saying:
	"There must be a level playing field for renewable and decentralised energy to compete on equal terms with nuclear power."
	Is he saying that nuclear should be subject to the renewables obligation, or that nothing should be subject to it? If there were no renewables obligation, even the renewable development that we have seen so far would simply disappear, because it needs that incentive. Anyone who is contemplating a future with more renewable energy, not only onshore but offshore, as we are, should be in no doubt that there would be no renewables obligation under the Tories. They would throw that whole industry into uncertainty. All their green talk is completely undermined by their actual policy.
	We have set out a clear sense of direction, and a framework that will allow development to take place. As I said, nearly a third of our generating capacity will need to be replaced over the next 20 to 30 years. There is now a clear sense of direction to allow industry to plan, and there are measures to ensure that we reduce our demand for energy and become more energy efficient. It is no wonder that the hon. Gentleman is so embarrassed.

Edward Davey: I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and for making an early copy available to me. Three years ago, the Government had an energy review, which the Prime Minister described as a "milestone in energy policy". The then Secretary of State said that her White Paper established an energy policy "for the long term". What went wrong? Will the Secretary of State tell us, for example, why the Government are not on track to meet either their renewable energy targets or their energy efficiency targets, which were set only three years ago, and why carbon dioxide emissions are increasing, not falling?
	On energy efficiency and conservation, I welcome much of what the Government are now promising, but is it not possible to go further and faster on energy efficiency? Why, for example, after this review, will our building regulations still be weaker than those in Scandinavia? The Secretary of State has said some very sensible things on renewables, but he must be aware of the range of major renewable energy projects such as harnessing tidal power from a lagoon-based Severn barrage, the proposed 10 GW North sea wind farm, and the massive potential for marine energy in the Pentland firth. What sort of leadership and encouragement will his policy give to the market for such ideas? Is not there a huge danger that, by going nuclear as well, the Government will undermine and crowd out investment in energy efficiency and renewables?
	The right hon. Gentleman's predecessor told the House in 2003:
	"It would have been foolish to announce...a new generation of nuclear power stations because that would have guaranteed that we would not make the necessary investment and effort in both energy efficiency and in renewables."—[ Official Report, 24 February 2003; Vol. 400, c. 32.]
	What has changed? Is not there also a danger that nuclear energy could crowd out investment in clean-coal technology and carbon capture and storage? Surely we should instead be finding new ways of bringing forward major investment in those technologies, as they have the potential to deliver faster than nuclear. The Secretary of State talks about security of supply, but will he confirm that, under his plans, it will not be possible to build any nuclear power station within the next 10 years? Will he also confirm that the difference between a nuclear and a non-nuclear strategy in terms of gas supplies is actually not very large?
	The Secretary of State has laid out an attractive future for decentralised energy generation. Does he not accept, however, that nuclear power would tie us into a centralised grid infrastructure that would minimise the potential for microgeneration and local combined heat and power? He said in recent interviews that he is a late convert to nuclear. He said today that, under his plans, nuclear power will get no subsidies or financial favours. Will he now answer the question that he failed to answer at last week's Trade and Industry questions, when he could not name a single nuclear power station in the UK or abroad that had been built on time, on budget and without public subsidy? Is he prepared to guarantee, for the entire life of the nuclear plants, that there will be no hidden subsidy, no super-long unfair price contract, no cap liabilities, no Government support for nuclear waste decommissioning, no assistance with waste disposal and no stealth nuclear tax for consumers? If business does not build nuclear plants as he proposes, what happens to his policy?
	On nuclear waste, can the Secretary of State confirm that the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management's interim report only dealt with existing old waste? It only offers a solution over several decades for past waste, which still needs yet more billions of taxpayer's money. Will he admit that the committee's interim report was not a green light for nuclear, especially when it talks of the need to consider
	"the social, political and ethical issues of a deliberate decision to create new nuclear wastes."
	As for Nirex, surely merging it and NDA would threaten independence in waste disposal, which would be a disaster.
	The Government have put forward some sensible ideas today on energy efficiency and renewables. By caving in to the nuclear industry lobby, however, they have destroyed the potential for cross-party consensus. I regret to say that that means much greater uncertainty in future energy policy.

Alistair Darling: If the Conservatives have problems with consensus within their party, so do the Liberals. I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to what his hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable), who is in his place, said:
	"Dogma about new nuclear power is unhelpful, for and against".
	One would not know that to listen to the Liberal spokesman today.
	In relation to renewable energy, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for saying that he supports renewable electricity. In particular, he refers to renewable generation in the north of Scotland. Perhaps he will have a word with those Liberal Democrat Members who say that they are in favour of renewable energy and then object to wind farms when they are planned, and object to the power lines to take electricity from wind farms to where it is needed. If the Liberals are serious about those things, they must face up to the difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions, as well as the populist decisions that he set out.
	When the hon. Gentleman talked about distributed energy, he gave the distinct impression that he was against having a national grid. I am in favour of distributed energy, and I think that we could do a lot more in that regard. However, having a national grid and being able to draw on such energy sources across the country, whether gas or electricity, serves us well. Apart from that, I more than happy to work with him on achieving whatever consensus is left between us.
	The hon. Gentleman made points about wave and tidal power and mentioned the Severn barrage. In relation to the renewables obligation—which I believe is essential, although I am not sure what the Liberals' position is—I said in my statement that we want to consult on banding that in future, so that it encourages newer and emerging technology. I think that we can do an awful lot more on that.
	It is important that, when we consider our energy requirements, we have a mix of energy. I said to the hon. Gentleman that nuclear currently provides about 20 per cent. of electricity generation. If we do not do anything, that will decrease to 6 per cent., and the risk is that gas will be a bigger percentage, which would be deeply regrettable.
	I totally reject the argument that if we go for nuclear, nothing else will happen. I remind the hon. Gentleman that, under the renewables obligation, the renewables industry will get the equivalent of about £1 billion a year subsidy by 2010.

Several hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are now into Back Benchers' time. I remind all hon. Members that they must put only one supplementary to the Secretary of State.

David Chaytor: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on delivering a measured statement this afternoon. Will he clarify, however, the point in paragraph 49 of his statement that nuclear generators will be required to pay their full share of long-term waste management costs? Does that mean 100 per cent. of waste management costs, and how can we guarantee that, as we do not yet know what the waste management costs will be?

Alistair Darling: The statement does mean that they are expected to meet the full share of those costs, which I would have thought was self-evident. My hon. Friend will no doubt be aware that, following the CoRWM proposals, it will be necessary to make provision for existing waste, but the cost of any new waste generated by any new plants would have to be met by the generators.

Peter Luff: I hope that the House will be given an early opportunity to debate the report at great length, as it relates to a very complex subject. In deference to your ruling, Mr. Speaker, I shall concentrate on one issue. Does the Secretary of State understand that while his analysis of valuing carbon is very good, his policy conclusions are, I fear, inadequate? He clings to the climate change levy and complex climate change agreements, which do nothing for the long-term market-based costing of carbon emissions and he invests too much hope in the EU emissions trading scheme. I do not believe that he is creating the stable market for carbon that will bring forward investment in clean-coal technology, renewables or, indeed, new nuclear power stations.

Alistair Darling: The EU emissions trading scheme is, at the moment, the only scheme, so I believe that we should invest substantial time and effort on trying to make it work. Given the nature of the problems that we have to deal with, it is important that any action is Europe-wide. I know that the hon. Gentleman has only recently got a copy of our proposals, but the Government have made it clear that they believe that there must be a long-term carbon price; otherwise, investors cannot make a sensible decision about whether to go ahead with proposals for new plant.
	As to carbon capture, I believe that it is essential to do as much as we can. Britain can not only benefit itself from this technology, but benefit other parts of the world such as India and China, where they are building coal-fired power stations. Unless we take steps to capture that carbon, those power stations will be extremely damaging to the environment.
	Finally, on the climate change levy, I know that the Conservative policy is to abolish it, but the fact is that, so far, it has made a major contribution to reducing the amount of carbon generated and I believe that it would be a big mistake to abolish it.

Don Touhig: My right hon. Friend's statement recognises that there is no single solution to our energy requirements. In welcoming the prospect of further investment in renewable energy, I am pleased that he also recognises the contribution that deep-mined coal can yet make to our energy needs. Research has shown that clean-coal carbon capture technology can deliver sustained and large-scale reductions in CO2 emissions.
	My right hon. Friend has announced today that he plans to set up a coal forum, bringing together producers and suppliers. Would it not also be valuable to include Members of the House who represent former coal-mining areas and have experience of mining and mining communities, and also representatives of operations such as the hugely successful Tower colliery in south Wales, who would hugely benefit the discussions in the forum?

Alistair Darling: My hon. Friend is quite right that coal has made a substantial contribution. We relied on it very heavily last winter. The model we have in mind is similar to the system set up to bring together the oil industry and the Government, which is known as "pilot" and has been working quite well since 1998. That arrangement allows both sides of industry, suppliers and producers, to talk to each other and to the Government. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister for Energy will be happy to meet hon. Members who have coal mines in their constituencies and have further discussions with them. It is important to do whatever we can to encourage the coal industry and the point about carbon capture is equally important if we are to remove the harmful effects of CO2.

John Maples: Can the Secretary of State foresee any circumstances in which he could meet his carbon dioxide reduction commitment without at least replacing, if not increasing, the share of nuclear generation in our overall generating capacity?

Alistair Darling: Without that generation it would certainly make it more difficult to meet that commitment, which is why I believe that nuclear should be part of the mix. The Government are not specifying that people should come forward with proposals for nuclear, but we have tried to set a framework—we have started the process today—that will encourage generators to consider that option. Nuclear does mean that we can generate electricity without carbon emissions and it has the further advantage that I mentioned earlier of providing a consistency or base load in electricity that wind power, by its very nature, cannot provide.

Michael Meacher: When the energy gap left by phasing out Magnox and advanced gas-cooled reactor nuclear power stations by 2020 is reckoned by the Government to be about 14 per cent. of electricity generated and when even the nuclear industry itself, no less, in the form of AEA Technology, has recently acknowledged in a comprehensive study that 25 per cent. of Britain's electricity needs could be readily met by offshore wind power capacity within the time scale required, up from 4 per cent. today—in other words, far more than meeting the necessary gap—why are we going down the nuclear route at all? Nuclear power is far more expensive and hopelessly uneconomic. Decommissioning costs are enormous. There are mountains of nuclear waste, which we do not know where to put, and it will increase our risk of terrorism—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must be fair to other hon. Members.

Alistair Darling: I think that I know where my right hon. Friend is coming from in this argument. As I said, in the light of the fact that we are likely to have a dramatic reduction in nuclear power generation, I believe that nuclear power ought to be part of the mix. I know that he does not. I said earlier that I want us to give a major boost to renewables, because they can do a lot, but I do not think that they can take the place of all the capacity that would otherwise go. I would add that my right hon. Friend has said—I know that he believes this—that we want more offshore electricity generation. I do too. However, those plants are equally as prone to planning objections as onshore plants. That is why the planning system needs to be changed as well.

John Gummer: The Secretary of State will know that hydrofluorocarbons will produce about 4 per cent. of our emissions. Why have the Government allowed the Home Office and almost every subsequent Government building to use HFCs, whereas the private sector is moving away from doing so? Why did they vote with the non-green group in the European Union not to put a date on banning HFCs? When will they actually do something about that essential issue and why has he not even mentioned it in the document?

Alistair Darling: I know of the right hon. Gentleman's concern about these things. The Government took the view that the date was not practical, but I agree with him that we should do everything that we possibly can to try to make buildings as environmentally friendly as possible. I mentioned that we want to make the Government estate carbon-neutral by 2012; other measures are necessary as well.

Gavin Strang: If economic changes were to make nuclear power significantly more costly—for example, because of continued rises in uranium import prices—can my right hon. Friend advise the House whether, under the policy that he has announced this afternoon, the possibility remains that no new nuclear power stations would be constructed?

Alistair Darling: As I told the House earlier, the Government's policy on all electricity generation is that it is for the generators to come forward with proposals. Generators, looking at what the Government policy is, at the carbon price and at the prospects in relation to fuel and so on, will form a judgment on whether or not it is economic to build a nuclear power station, the life of which might be 20 or 40 years. The generators say to us, "You set out the framework, so that we can make these plans. You tell us what the parameters are." The Government are not going to build a nuclear power station or, indeed, any other sort of power station. We are setting out a clear direction so that generators can make their decisions on investment in nuclear and other plant as well.

Michael Jack: The nuclear fuel workers in my constituency will welcome the Secretary of State's remarks today on the future of their industry, but does he recognise that, if their skills are to be retained for the benefit of new nuclear build, the legislative and regulatory framework decisions must be made in the very near future? Can he assure me that those changes will be introduced for the House to decide upon before the end of this Parliament?

Alistair Darling: As the review document says, there are a number of things that we need to change, some of which may require primary legislation and some secondary legislation, but I very much agree with the right hon. Gentleman: we want to provide as much certainty for the industry as possible, including for those who work in it.

Elliot Morley: There is a great deal to welcome in the review, particularly the emphasis on energy efficiency, renewables and new technologies and the structures to encourage them. On the nuclear question, I very much welcome my right hon. Friend's very clear statement that there will be no public subsidies, but he will know, as I do, that there has been a history in the nuclear sector of bankruptcies over the years. What guarantees will there be? For example, would he consider asking for a bond on new investment to cover decommissioning and nuclear waste charges?

Alistair Darling: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his welcome for much of what is in the review. During his nine years as a Minister, he substantially contributed to the Government's thinking, particularly on energy efficiency. In relation to nuclear, I refer him to what I said a short while ago about the costs, and about the contributions to be made by the industry. He mentioned the difficulties in the past. Quite simply, that is a classic case of something that happened to successive Governments too often: people did not make the right calculations and, in the case of the nuclear industry, they did not factor in all the costs that they would have to meet. I am clear that, if generators come forward with a proposal, they must meet the costs of the construction, running and decommissioning of a nuclear power station.

Robert Smith: I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State did at least say on this occasion that we should maximise our oil and gas production as part of meeting our energy needs. As we have them on our own doorstep, it makes sense for us to get the best out of them, but how does he expect to deliver that? We are at a crucial stage in the North sea, in which, if anything goes wrong now, the oil and gas will be locked in forever, and investors will not return if we lose the infrastructure. Therefore, will he ensure that the Treasury has bought into the statement and that it will deliver a stable and reliable fiscal regime to encourage investment?

Alistair Darling: I think that the hon. Gentleman will find that the Treasury is in complete agreement with anything that I say this afternoon, and with anything I stated in the report.
	I recognise the point that the hon. Gentleman makes about North sea oil. We need to ensure that we have the right fiscal regime, so that we can exploit the resources that remain in the North sea. There is a lot of oil and gas still to be got out there and we want to encourage that. He may be aware that, despite the fact that last autumn many people—including a Member sitting right behind him—predicted gloom and doom after the tax changes made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor, last month there was a record number of applications for exploration in the North sea. That just goes to show what a vibrant sector this is.

Jeremy Corbyn: Will the Secretary of State assure the House that there will be no subsidy whatever to the nuclear industry in construction, operation or waste management or disposal as a result of the White Paper?

Alistair Darling: I have answered that point, and in view of the fact that so many Members still wish to speak, I do not want to labour it. The position is clearly set out in the review and I suggest that my hon. Friend take a look at it.

Ian Taylor: The Secretary of State is right to say that there would not be renewable energy use if there were not some subsidy, largely because the unit cost of such energy has to be driven down to the level on the grid. However, although I accept that he is not proposing to introduce a subsidy for nuclear, will he make sure that the rules for nuclear investors are clear and that his remark about planning is rapidly clarified, because there can be no investment if there is uncertainty about the planning process?

Alistair Darling: I agree. It is evident that, without the renewables obligation, there would not have been even the comparatively modest development of renewables that there has so far been; everybody in the industry is clear about that. That subsidy will be worth about £1 billion a year by 2010. That is why we want to increase the obligation, not abolish it, as the hon. Gentleman's Front-Bench team has suggested.
	Nuclear will not be subject to a renewables obligation. What the industry needs is a clear framework that will allow it to make sensible investment decisions. It wants a carbon price—it wants the certainty of that, as the hon. Member for Mid-Worcestershire (Peter Luff), who chairs the Trade and Industry Committee, has said. It also wants a planning framework, so that it can get a sensible decision—a yes or a no—within a reasonable time. I hope that the official Opposition—indeed, the whole House and the other place—will support us when we make proposals to reform fundamentally the planning system. Without such reform, I find it difficult to see how we will get any large infrastructure in this country—for energy, transport or anything else.

Joan Ruddock: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the boost that he has today given to energy efficiency and renewables, although I believe that he is sending the wrong signals to the financial institutions by bringing new nuclear back on to the agenda. He said in his statement that, by 2020, the proportion of nuclear generation of electricity would be down to 6 per cent. What contribution would new nuclear generation of electricity make by 2020? What proportion of electricity would come from nuclear and what carbon savings would result?

Alistair Darling: I acknowledge my hon. Friend's strongly felt opposition to new nuclear plant and I acknowledge that, on any view, nuclear power stations cannot be brought on-stream instantly. Given the planning process and the time taken to commission and construct such stations, they are bound to be some time down the line, but with respect, I do not think that that is a particularly good point. We are dealing with energy policy and generation over the next 20 to 40 years, which is why I believe that setting out a framework now that allows people to take long-term decisions, including in relation to nuclear, is the right thing to do.

Julie Kirkbride: The Secretary of State said today that he is giving the green light to the nuclear industry, that he wants companies to come forward with plans for new build, and that, to achieve that, there should be a price for carbon. I agree, so can he tell the House when we will have detailed and robust plans for carbon pricing? Without it, no companies will produce robust financial plans for building the nuclear power stations that he and I would like to see.

Alistair Darling: I congratulate the hon. Lady on adopting a slightly clearer position than did the Conservative Front-Bench spokesman. I agree that there needs to be a carbon price and the Government are clear that the best carbon price is the one that is fixed and Europe-wide. However, we have said that if, for one reason or another, that does not happen, the need for a carbon price remains very clear. We are working with the European Union, and there is a carbon price in Europe, which affects us. We should seek to maintain and build on that system, which is the best way to ensure consistency.

Rob Marris: I welcome much of the statement, particularly what was said about reducing energy demand, but of course, nuclear is a contentious issue. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that there will be no indirect subsidies to the nuclear industry, such as guaranteed prices, guaranteed purchases or insurance cover?

Alistair Darling: On guaranteed prices, no. My hon. Friend will of course be aware of the European directive on insurance, which requires all states to carry a certain amount of insurance. I do not know where he stands on nuclear, and I know that there are many Members—in all parts of the House—who are against it, but I have tried to make the position as clear as possible. If people come forward with proposals to build nuclear, they have got to consider meeting all the costs that I referred to.

David Heathcoat-Amory: The limp and tentative language on nuclear power in the Secretary of State's statement is a major disappointment. Will he be assured that, if the forthcoming White Paper firms up this commitment, he will receive the support of those who want to do something serious about the threat of climate change, and of those who are worried about security of national supply—a consideration not adequately captured by any purely market solution? Given the urgency of the situation, what is his target for reducing the presently long period between proposal and completion of a nuclear power station?

Alistair Darling: I can see now that the right hon. Gentleman must have been one of those whom the hon. Member for New Forest, West (Mr. Swayne) had in mind when drafting his e-mails on the conflict within the Conservative party. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there needs to be a degree of certainty for anyone considering making a long-term investment. On our consulting on the planning processes, the time that can elapse between first application and the ultimate conclusion of a planning inquiry is important. I want that to be reduced, so that we can have certainty, and it also helps objectors to know what the position is—yes or no—regarding a particular planning application. However, I disagree with him in that the Government's position is now clear. We have a clear direction of travel not just on nuclear, but on renewables and other forms of generation.

Jamie Reed: I welcome the Secretary of State's announcement, in particular on behalf of the 40,000 nuclear workers in the UK and the 17,000 in my constituency; indeed, I welcome the nuclear element. Where the Government have shown courage on nuclear, the Liberal Democrats have shown confusion and the Conservatives have shown cowardice. May I suggest a new slogan: "Vote blue, go yellow"? The Secretary of State will of course be aware that time is of the essence. May I volunteer Copeland as a site for new nuclear reactors—at least one, but we will take more? May I also say that, as probably the only—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has asked one question. If he wasted some words in his preface, that is too bad.

Alistair Darling: I think that that constituted a general welcome for our proposals and I accept it in that spirit. The whole House will be aware of my hon. Friend's interest, and that of his constituents, in the nuclear industry.

Michael Weir: My colleagues and I are pleased that the Government are to encourage the use of electricity near where it is generated, especially as Scotland produces six times as much electricity as we actually use, and there is no need for new nuclear power stations. However, will the Secretary of State give a clear, unequivocal answer to this question? Does a full share of the long-term waste cost mean 100 per cent.—yes or no?

Alistair Darling: The internationalist tendency of the Scottish National party is there for all to see. The SNP is saying, "We do not need any more electricity, so we do not need any more power generation." I am glad that the hon. Gentleman welcomed what I said about renewables. Let me tell him what I told the Liberal Democrats: that is fine, but let us now see a bit of support for some of these wind farms rather than the pretence that they can be built in someone else's constituency. As for nuclear power, I have nothing to add to what I have already said.

Michael Connarty: I welcome what the Secretary of State said about facing up to responsibilities to the United Kingdom people and not being blinded by ideology, which seems to inform many of the arguments against nuclear power. I am sure he has considered the fact that since we began to run down Magnox, there has been an increase—between 2000 and 2004—of 3 million tonnes in the amount of carbon used just for electricity generation. Can he assure me that the carbon price will be set at a level that will allow people who wish to invest in nuclear power and other forms of carbon-reducing energy to be rewarded adequately for their efforts and their investments?

Alistair Darling: My hon. Friend is right: there has been an increase in the amount of gas and coal burnt. That was especially the case last winter, and it is likely to be the case next winter as well. We want to avoid precisely that problem in years to come. We do not want the gap between demand and supply to become so narrow that there is not enough capacity in the system. As for the carbon price, the motive behind it is to ensure that there is certainty. The European trading scheme is designed to reward those who are more energy efficient than others. By any reckoning, the present system needs to be tightened and improved, and we are working with the European Commission and others to ensure that that happens.

Bernard Jenkin: Does the Secretary of State welcome the fact that "consensus" seems to be the word on the lips of many Members? I certainly welcome the new consensus on the Government Front Bench and the chucking out of the old consensus. We are seeing a welcome U-turn.
	Does the Secretary of State recognise that the consensus in the industry and beyond is that this debate is five years late? A good deal of urgency attaches to the Government's discussions. The framework he described must be established as soon as possible to secure our long-term energy supplies.

Alistair Darling: I agree that the framework needs to be completed and consensus is highly desirable, but we shall have to wait and see. What I am clear about is that the review represents an important step towards providing a framework that will encourage people to make the long-term investments that the country needs.

Brian Iddon: Yesterday, representatives of the heavy energy using industries came to a meeting in the House organised by Amicus. They strongly expressed the view that the high gas prices that they face at present are due to a rigged gas market, and they pointed fingers at the owners of the interconnector. What hope can my right hon. Friend give those important industries that they will be in business next year, the year after and well into the future?

Alistair Darling: Along with the Minister for Energy, my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon, North (Malcolm Wicks), I met some high energy users last week. There is understandable concern about high energy prices and about the fact that the market in Europe is not operating as it should. That is why we strongly back the European Commission's action against some companies. We need an open, transparent system. There should be a market that functions properly across Europe so that we can obtain the gas that we need. If anything is preventing that, the Commission must take firm action to ensure that it stops immediately.

Nick Hurd: One of the greatest risks to climate stability is the degree to which we allow dirty coal to be burned in both the developed and developing world over the next 15 years. I put it to the Secretary of State that simply announcing today a talking shop for UK coal producers and reheating an old announcement about a demonstration project is a wholly inadequate response to the risk and opportunity of clean coal.

Alistair Darling: I thought that the hon. Gentleman was going to make a further proposal, but there we are. It is important that we develop carbon capture: I said that in my statement and repeated it in several exchanges this afternoon. However, as the hon. Gentleman will know—at least, I assume that he knows—the technology is comparatively young and much development work will be necessary to ensure that it is technically possible and cost effective. The Government recently announced an agreement with the Norwegian Government to do some further work on it and, if it is successful, we want to see it proceed. We have huge potential in this country to ensure that that happens.
	I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on the coal forum. The oil industry and the Government entered into a similar arrangement seven years ago, which has been very successful, with both sides understanding the problems and the Government playing their part in encouraging the oil industry. As for the coal industry, I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman represents a coal mining constituency—I have my doubts—but he may find that those hon. Members who do take a different view.

John Mann: As a matter of urgency, will the Secretary of State encourage EDF Energy and UK Coal to resolve their current contractual disputes so that we may have a coal industry that could participate in the coal forum?

Alistair Darling: My hon. Friend makes a sensible suggestion. Part of the rationale behind the coal forum is to try to ensure that more regular discussions take place. I hope that the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Hurd), who is no longer in his place, has heard what my hon. Friend said.

Vincent Cable: Will the Secretary of State spell out the Government's responsibilities when the market price of electricity falls below the cost of privately generated nuclear power, making the company insolvent? Is it not inevitable that the taxpayer will have to subsume the liabilities, as it did with British Energy in the past?

Alistair Darling: The system that we have in place should ensure that we have viable generating companies. The hon. Gentleman referred to problems in the past that, as I said earlier, largely stemmed from the fact that successive Governments did not pay enough attention to the true economic costs of generation, especially nuclear power. The system that we have now is far more robust than the system we had then.

Ian Lucas: I warmly welcome the Government's statement that they will provide strong support for on-site electricity generation, including solar panels. That will be warmly welcomed in Wrexham and by Sharp, which manufactures solar panels. Some £50 million was made available by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor in the Budget for microgeneration, but when will the detailed roll-out of that scheme be clarified by my right hon. Friend's Department?

Alistair Darling: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his support. He is right that solar panels have made a contribution, and I hope that they will make a greater contribution, to providing energy for households. We should be in a position to make some further proposals in the not-too-distant future.

Henry Bellingham: Is the Secretary of State aware of how disruptive offshore wind farms are to inshore fisheries? Is he aware that there are no proper compensation arrangements in place for fishermen, especially those who fish in the Wash? Will he look carefully at that issue before the offshore wind farm programme is further rolled out?

Alistair Darling: I noticed that the e-mail from the hon. Member for New Forest, West said that wind power did not get a good review. He obviously had the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) in mind. I am well aware that many people find offshore wind farms visually intrusive and fishermen have expressed concerns. However, it is possible to reach a compromise on all those matters. I visited a wind farm off the north Kent coast this morning. It generates a substantial amount of electricity, enough for about 100,000 houses. The hon. Gentleman perhaps illustrates the problem that, whatever form of generation we decide on, there will always be people prepared to object to it. I happen to think that offshore wind generation should be encouraged, provided that we get the arrangements right in each case.

Gordon Prentice: Will the private sector bear the whole cost of providing security at nuclear plants? Would another Chernobyl mean another energy review?

Alistair Darling: I have said that people coming forward with proposals to build a nuclear power station will be responsible for meeting the costs of building, operating and maintaining the plant, and of decommissioning it. I appreciate where my hon. Friend is coming from, but I happen to disagree with him as I think that it will be important to have a mix of energy generation in the future.

Richard Ottaway: Given what Labour Members on the Benches behind the Secretary of State have had to say, I do not think that he is in a position to lecture anyone about consensus. I welcome his nod towards nuclear, but his statement leaves more questions than answers. A few months ago, the Minister for Energy announced that co-firing would be included in the energy review. I assume that the right hon. Gentleman knows what that process is—

Alistair Darling: indicated assent.

Richard Ottaway: I see that the right hon. Gentleman understands. Will he explain what his conclusions are?

Alistair Darling: Of course I understand what co-firing is. It is referred to in the energy review, and it is something that we ought to encourage. It is useful in the disposal of waste, and it also means that less coal is burned.

David Taylor: Approximately 800 million tonnes of coal lie under my county of Leicestershire—part of which I represent—and under the constituency of the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Mr. Duncan), who speaks for the Opposition on these matters. I therefore welcome the references that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made to the role of coal in future energy policy, but within what time frame does he expect the investment in clean-coal and carbon-capture technology to bear fruit? There is a real risk that a continued and expanded role for coal will be met only through higher coal imports and more open-cast coal extraction, in England and elsewhere.

Alistair Darling: I agree that we need to press ahead as fast we can, but the answer to my hon. Friend's question depends on how quickly we can solve the remaining technical problems. However, I assure him that I feel very strongly about the matter and that I want to make progress. A bigger role for coal would benefit this country and the industry right across the world. It represents a huge opportunity, if we can only get it right.

Several hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am afraid that we must move on. No doubt we will come back to this subject in due course.

Tax Credits

Dawn Primarolo: Tax credits today provide support to 20 million people, including 6 million families and 10.1 million children. Tax credits take-up is at unprecedented levels, with 93 per cent. of families on incomes below £10,000 claiming their entitlement to the child tax credit. That compares with the 57 per cent. take-up in the first year of family credit.
	Tax credits have improved work incentives, reduced the tax burden on low-to middle-income families, and helped to reduce child poverty dramatically. Tax credits and economic stability have helped to increase the number of people in work by more than 2 million since spring 1997, and since 1997, long-term unemployment has been reduced by 450,000. Tax credits have also ensured that the Government have implemented our commitment to ensure that work pays over welfare. For example, the changes that we are making mean that, from October 2006, a couple with two children moving into full-time work on the national minimum wage will be £41 per week better off in work.
	The tax credit system has also played a key role in tackling child poverty. Since 1996-97, 700,000 children have been lifted out of relative poverty, whereas child poverty had doubled in the previous 20 years. In addition, there are now more than 1.8 million fewer children in absolute poverty, before housing costs are taken into account, than was the case in 1996-97.
	A figure of £2.2 billion is often referred to for adjustments leading to overpayments, with the suggestion that that represents the amount lost to the Exchequer. However, that total includes moneys that have been recovered or are still to be recovered. Once error, fraud and adjustments leading to overpayment are taken into account, the net total estimated not to be recovered for 2003-04 is between £1.24 billion and £1.74 billion, as reported to the House in the documents that have been laid before the House today. That figure takes into account Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs estimates of claimant error and fraud through the random inquiry programme, and which are being published today.
	I remind the House that those figures relate to three years ago, when claimants were unfamiliar with the new rules and processes and the Inland Revenue was experiencing initial IT problems. The HMRC is today publishing a detailed account of what it is doing, and will do, to tackle error and fraud in tax credits, setting out the detailed programme of action that is in place to ensure that claimants receive the tax credits to which they are entitled, at the right time.
	To help reduce claimant error, the HMRC is pursuing a number of measures, such as targeted advertising, including the current campaign to encourage claimants to renew their tax credit claim in good time, an improved claim form to reduce claimant error and redesigned award notices that include a clearer summary of the tax credit award and how it has been calculated. The HMRC is improving the information given with award notices—for example, by providing a ready reckoner—and improving access to contact centres.
	Identity theft is a serious and growing problem for the United Kingdom. It is increasingly linked to organised crime and is the source of significant amounts of financial fraud in both the public and private sectors. The Home Office estimates that the cost of identity fraud is £1.7 billion a year, of which tax credit-related fraud is a small proportion. A separate statement will be issued today announcing that Sir James Crosby is to head a public-private forum on identity to explore issues relating to identity management and associated technologies. Our aim is to do everything that we can, at all levels, to prevent identity fraud.
	To tackle fraud, the HMRC is pursuing a range of measures, which include further refining of its risk assessment, putting compliance specialists in contact centres and increasing pre-payment checks on claims where fraud or non-compliance is suspected. In addition, the HMRC will continue to use the information it holds, as well as data held by other Departments and third parties, to support and enhance its compliance operations.
	Tax credits and economic stability have helped to increase the number of people in work by more than 2 million since spring 1997, and since 1997 long-term unemployment has reduced by 450,000. Tax credits have improved work incentives, reduced the tax burden on low-to-middle-income families and helped dramatically to reduce child poverty.

Mark Francois: I thank the Paymaster General for her statement and for providing me with a copy in advance.
	About 6 million families claim tax credits, at a cost of about £16 billion a year, which is equivalent to 5p in the pound on the standard rate of income tax. As we pointed out in our recent Opposition-inspired debate on the subject, according to the latest available figures about 2 million families were overpaid, while just under 1 million families were underpaid, so nearly half of all payments in the system were wrong.
	According to the figures in the statement, more than £1.2 billion a year is going astray in error and fraud. Is not it embarrassing beyond belief that the Treasury—of all Departments—has to have the accounts of one its principal arms qualified by the National Audit Office because it has failed to control fraud and error in a system that the Chancellor personally introduced? Given that situation, I have four specific points to put the Paymaster General. First, when did she realise the true scale of fraud in the tax credits system? She announced last December that she was closing the e-portal because of fraud via the tax credits website, but the amount concerned was miniscule compared with today's figures. When did she really know how bad the problem was and why has the Treasury not done more actively to combat it?
	Secondly, the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field), who is in his place, previously warned publicly that the system was open to fraud and recommended additional counter-fraud measures, but, as he knows and has put on the record, they were not adopted. Will the Paymaster General confirm that although the fraud now appears to be much greater than previously admitted, the Government's recent response has been to reduce the number of qualified anti-fraud officers within the anti-fraud compliance organisation and to replace them with less qualified administrative staff? I have here a copy of an internal HMRC plan to do exactly that. It is entitled, "Claimant Compliance Restructuring Project" and it was recently leaked to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Mr. Bacon). It confirms the plan in considerable detail. How on earth does it make sense to let go experienced anti-fraud officers, most of whom recover many times their own salary, when the degree of fraud in the system appears to be spiralling out of control?
	Thirdly, will the Paymaster General now concede that the current tax credits system is increasingly discredited and urgently needs to be reformed? When the House debated the problems with the system in our Opposition day debate on 7 June, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who is in his place, called for a consensus across the House on the operation of tax credits. We remember it well. As part of that, given the scale of the fraud and error that has been revealed today, will Ministers finally admit that the current system is now discredited and has to be reformed, as we on these Benches have argued for quite some time?
	Fourthly, although we welcome the presence of the Chancellor this afternoon, why did he not deliver the statement to the House? Tax credits are his personal creation, but for the past year he has not answered a single oral question about them. When will the Chancellor stand at the Dispatch Box and explain why his overcomplicated and increasingly discredited system is now causing so much misery to exactly the low-income families that it was introduced to help in the first place?
	Today's figures relate only to 2003-04 and we are now in financial year 2006-07, so we suspect that the problem of fraud in the tax credits system remains much greater than the Government are currently willing to admit. Indeed, the Comptroller and Auditor General says in his accompanying report, which was published today:
	"There is currently no evidence to justify a lower estimate for 2005-06. Consequently I have qualified my opinion on the Trust statement."
	If it proves to be the case that the fraud and error on this scale continues to persist at these levels, or if it transpires that the right hon. Lady knew about all of this much earlier than she is letting on, her position must surely become untenable.
	The Prime Minister told the House a few weeks ago at Prime Minister's questions that the working families tax credit was working well. The Working families tax credit was abolished three years ago. The Chancellor has created a system that is so complicated that even the Prime Minister does not understand it. The Chancellor is the real culprit in this whole fiasco. The Paymaster General mentioned 1997. The Labour manifesto in that year said:
	"we must crack down on dishonesty in the benefit system."
	This is not a crackdown; it is a meltdown—and it is the Chancellor's personal meltdown. It is he, more than anyone else, who has let down low-income families and it is he who should ultimately be held to account for this fiasco.

Dawn Primarolo: The hon. Gentleman clearly has not read the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. I will address each of his points in turn, but I also say to him that there are 6 million families—10 million children—in the tax credits system. Progress is being made on reducing child poverty, which increased and doubled under family credit and his Government. We are helping 6 million families, while his Government helped 600,000—there is no comparison. The hon. Gentleman cannot get away from the fact that his party is not committed to eradicating child poverty.
	Let us deal with the hon. Gentleman's points. First, I remind him that since 1997, the number of families with children paying no net tax has risen from just fewer than 2.5 million to more than 3 million in 2006-07, which is a result of tax credits and benefits reform. On the point about error and fraud in the system, regrettably, most of the error is on behalf of the claimant—we must remember that this is the first year. The figures on error and fraud in tax credits that were published today show an incident range of 8.8 to 10.6 per cent. The range for the working families tax credit was 10 to 14 per cent., while the figure for jobseeker's allowance was 13.2 per cent. The figure for income support was 9.2 per cent. Those are based on figures from when the Government first collated data on a comparable basis. The hon. Gentleman is simply not concentrating.
	The hon. Gentleman asked about the e-portal. I refer him to paragraphs 2.31 and 2.33 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report. That report clearly sets out the period of the attack on the portal and confirms the information that has been repeatedly provided to the House. The hon. Gentleman also said that staff are being cut, but there is absolutely no substantiation of that point. In fact, in paragraph 2.27, the Comptroller and Auditor General refers to the fact that more staff are being employed in tax credit compliance, not fewer.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to reform. We know the reform that the official Opposition wish to undertake—they want to undermine tax credits and, if they ever get the chance, to abolish them. That is the message to take out to tens of thousands of families in every constituency in the country. The hon. Gentleman should read the report before he stands up and makes accusations.

John McFall: I represent a constituency with traditionally and historically high unemployment. Tax credits have played a significant role in providing families with incentives to work, as well as reducing child poverty. Will the Paymaster General comment on fraud and the work that she is doing with companies such as Network Rail to ensure that fraud is closed down? Will she break down the causes of overpayment into those that are the responsibility of the HMRC and those that are the responsibility of the claimants?

Dawn Primarolo: If my right hon. Friend looks at the documents that were published today on the error and fraud statistics for 2003-04, he will see that there is a breakdown of error between claimants and fraud. The difference is that in order to ascertain that there has been fraud, an investigating officer must be utterly convinced that the intent of the claimant was to defraud, as opposed to an error having occurred when the application was returned. The figures show that fraud is put at £70 million.
	I concur with the points of the Comptroller and Auditor General with regard to the work that needs to go forward. We now have the base year for figures, and there must be improvement and development on those figures. As I set out in my statement, there are steps in place, including the changes that were announced in the pre-Budget report in 2005. The CAG also acknowledges that there is improvement in the system, and we are continuing to build on that.

David Laws: Is not the truth that we have just heard an extraordinarily complacent statement from a Minister in denial about a system that is clearly in a mess? A moment ago, the Paymaster General referred to the National Audit Office report. I am delighted that she has read it, because she did not refer to it or any of the information that it cites in her statement. Can she confirm some facts that were not in her statement? The original estimate for fraud for the first year of operation was £460 million, but it may now be as high as £1.28 billion. Will she confirm that the figure for the second year of the operation of the system is expected to be as high again? She suggested that fraud is falling, but will she confirm that it is likely to rise in the system and that, in the past year alone, £131 million was lost to organised fraud by criminal gangs? Can she confirm that tax credit fraud and error account for more fraud and error than any other benefit and that the error and fraud rates in tax credits are higher than in any other welfare benefit? Can she confirm, too, something that her Department has clearly told the Comptroller and Auditor General, but not the House? For the third year of operation, the Department expects overpayment on tax credits of £1.8 billion, and it estimates that there will be overpayments of £5.8 billion in the first three years, and £2.4 billion in fraud. Can she confirm those figures, which she left out of her statement?
	Can the Paymaster General confirm something that her Majesty's Revenue and Customs staff told us—that there has not been a proper anti-fraud culture in the tax credits department, and that it is so obsessed by take-up that it has left the stable doors open to fraud? She implied that problems arose with the e-portal shortly before she closed it in December 2005, but can she confirm that the document by the Comptroller and Auditor General says that those problems were known about at the end of 2004, and that the number of suspected organised fraud cases gradually increased throughout 2005? Why, therefore, did it take so long to do anything about the problem and why were claimants using the e-portal not required to produce documentary evidence of their identity and address?
	The Paymaster General did not say anything about payments to individuals subject to immigration control, which were written off by the Inland Revenue because they should not have been made. Why were the verification procedures, specifically rule 12, suspended for 18 months after April 2003? Was she aware of the decision at the time, and did she approve it? Why has it taken her so long to implement the recommendations in the ombudsman's report? The Chancellor and the Paymaster General know that many Liberal Democrat Members want the system to work rather than abolish it, but the Government's complacency about fraud, error and overpayment is undermining the very system designed to help people on low incomes, and has affected people on lower incomes in particular. The Government are in a persistent state of denial, but is it not time not only for new ministerial leadership on the issue in the Department, but for a Minister who will seek solutions instead of making excuses?

Dawn Primarolo: The hon. Gentleman never misses an opportunity to try to spread innuendo and undermine the tax credits system. If he read paragraph 2.28 of the report, he would see, far from his accusation that the compliance strategy is not working, that the Comptroller and Auditor General details the amount that was prevented from going to people who made fraudulent attempts to claim tax credits. It shows that the HMRC prevented payments of £447 million, so the majority of attempts were dealt with. The hon. Gentleman touched on the e-portal, but if he continues to read paragraph 2.28, he will see that all the figures are provided, including those on the questions of suspected organised fraud and the specific attack on the e-portal.
	If the hon. Gentleman still needs convincing, he should refer to tables 10 and 11 in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, which detail how the HMRC dealt successfully with attacks on the tax credit system. He has been provided with that information, but he persists with innuendo. He should present the House with proof or stop trying to undermine the system.

Frank Field: Does the Paymaster General accept that there is a natural tension in a radical Government who want to redistribute large sums of money to the poorest people in society, while making sure that taxpayers' money is spent properly? Historically, we have done that through one Department paying the benefit and the Treasury watching over the Department that pays out that money. Given that the Treasury now pays out the benefits and watches the taxpayers' interests, will she reflect further on whether the Treasury has the balance right between helping poor families and protecting taxpayers?
	Although the statement today is about fraud and the associated problems, is there not also a problem of take-up? Even those of us who are not enamoured by tax credits ought to admit that the poorest families have gained more help through this measure than through any other measure that any other Government have introduced. I have noticed in my constituency that mothers who might be eligible for the first time claim child benefit, but are not aware of the tax credit side. May I suggest that my right hon. Friend considers combining the form for applying for child benefit with tax credits? When applying for child benefit, that person has to produce a genuine birth certificate. That might stop some of the fraud in the system.

Dawn Primarolo: My right hon. Friend makes a series of important points. Surely the test of the policy is whether it is successfully lifting children out of poverty, and it is. All the independent reports indicate the substantial contribution that tax credits are making to the delivery of the Government's target of lifting children out of poverty. A careful balance needs to be struck, but the huge benefits that we can see as a result of the tax credits, the fact that more people are returning to work, the fact that lone parents are being supported into work, the fact that take-up among the poorest—under £10,000 a year per family—is at 93 per cent. and rising, and the fact the child care element is at record levels and rising, all address his first point.
	On my right hon. Friend's second point, paragraph 2.10 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report shows that as a result of the flexible system being run through the tax credits, in 2004-05 some £700 million went to families, which would not have happened without the disregard and the way the present system operates. In the previous year, £800 million more went to families than would have done under a fixed system. Although he is right to press the Government to focus on take-up and make the system better, which we have been doing—the figures are from the first year—I still believe that the direction of travel is correct and that we are delivering our policy objectives.

Michael Fallon: Why does the Paymaster General again blame claimants, instead of apologising to the 2 million families who have been wrongly paid? Given that she and the Chancellor are entirely responsible for designing a system that has become a fraudsters charter, will she reflect on the fact that if the two of them worked in the private sector and lost £1.5 billion, they would not simply be sacked—they would probably both be prosecuted?

Dawn Primarolo: I am surprised at the hon. Gentleman, who is experienced in the House. It is rubbish to suggest that the tax credits system is a fraudsters charter. He knows that because he is the Chairman of the Treasury Sub-Committee, which produced an excellent report saying how much it valued the contribution that tax credits make to lifting children out of poverty and helping families back into work. He knows full well from comparisons of benefits in their first year of operation that the issue is always challenging. There were particular problems with the computer system in 2003-04, but he knows full well that since that period the improvements that I have announced in this Chamber and that the Chancellor announced in the 2005 pre-Budget report have made significant inroads into improving tax credits. The hon. Gentleman should be honest: he does not want to help the poor, because he wants to abolish tax credits.

George Mudie: As a member of the Treasury Committee, I urge on the Paymaster General in the battle against fraud; as a Back-Bench inner-city constituency MP, however, I urge her to continue her efforts. The tax credit policy has pulled thousands of kids out of absolute poverty in my constituency and it has put single parents who have been on benefit for the whole time that I have been an MP into work, which allows them to earn for their families, for the community and for the economy and to give their kids a better standard of living. I hope that the Paymaster General will not be disheartened by the Opposition's petulant carping.

Dawn Primarolo: I assure my hon. Friend that I am not disheartened. Indeed, I am encouraged by the excellent communications that have been sent to me and to other hon. Members describing how tax credits have helped single parents and families. Tax credits also help the Government in our historic challenge of eradicating child poverty. At some point, the Opposition parties must decide whether they are going to continue to oppose tax credits. If they are, what will they say to the tens of thousands of families in their constituencies who will lose hundreds of pounds a month?

David Gauke: The Paymaster General has referred to the excellent Treasury Committee report, which criticised her and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs for failing
	"to establish a complete picture of patterns of claimant error and fraud in 2003-04".
	Assuming that she has finally established a complete picture—one wonders what the Chancellor of the Exchequer and she have been doing for the past three years—will she set a target to improve those appalling figures?

Dawn Primarolo: While we are discussing the Treasury Committee report, I shall remind the House of what it said:
	"the regime...enjoys a great deal of support and goodwill...We agree that the policy underpinning tax credits of taking people, and especially children, out of poverty, is laudable, and that the programme has had considerable success... We welcome the fact that the Government is seeking to improve the operation of the tax credits regime by introducing a package of reforms".
	If the hon. Gentleman examines the report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, he will see the continued improvements, which have been monitored, and how the Treasury is developing tax credits to ensure their smooth operation.

Sally Keeble: I welcome the measures to tackle identity fraud announced this afternoon. I, too, am a member of the Treasury Committee, and I underline the fact that the report welcomes the way in which tax credits have targeted child poverty, and so it should. The system helps 9.9 million children, whereas the old family credit helped only 1.6 million children. In moving forward with the tax credit system, will my right hon. Friend make sure that the child care element is protected, because it allows women to go out to work, which ultimately improves living standards for children in this country?

Dawn Primarolo: My hon. Friend regularly discusses child care payments in this House because she is an absolute champion for making sure that such payments not only operate properly, but reach more and more families, and I am considering how we can ensure that that happens. On identity fraud, I remind her and the House that the Treasury identified the stolen identities, that it stopped the majority of those claims and that it is now working with banks, the Home Office and other Departments to take forward a strategy. The creation of bank accounts caused the difficulties in the tax credits system.What I announced today, in referring to the written statement as regards Sir James Crosby and the public-private forum on identity, is how we can all learn, in the private and public sectors, how to eradicate identity fraud.

George Young: There is widespread support among Members on both sides of the House for policies that help low-income families in work. However, it is clear not only from today's statement but from the endless debates that we have had in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall over the past nine years that the present system is not fit for purpose. Will the Paymaster General now answer the question that has been put to her twice: has not the time come to devise a better interface between the low-paid citizen and the state?

Dawn Primarolo: The evidence clearly demonstrates that tax credits are working, particularly in getting resources to those who are lower paid or unemployed and want to return to work, including women who need to pay for child care arrangements. None of that was available under the previous Government. The right hon. Gentleman is right in his assessment that the Government should be redoubling their efforts to eradicate child poverty and to ensure that tax credits play their proper role. When he has an opportunity to read the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, he will see that it clearly sets out how Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs is going about that.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I recently spoke to a single parent in my constituency who has two young children. She told me that without tax credits she would find it difficult, if not impossible, to carry on working, and therefore would be forced back on to benefits and unable to give her children the standard of living they had been used to. Last year, the shadow Chancellor refused to acknowledge the part that our tax credits have played in reducing child poverty. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that shows how out of touch the Conservatives are with ordinary people's lives?

Dawn Primarolo: I agree with my hon. Friend. Opposition Members have become so obsessed with attacking elements of the tax credits system in the House that they are not listening to thousands of their constituents who are benefiting from the presence of tax credits and support them. As the Treasury Committee report says, tax credits enjoy widespread support within our communities. Opposition Members are foolish to ignore that point.

Richard Bacon: I have a constituent who has had to give up work because of tax credits. HMRC keeps telling her that she is disabled, but she is in fact a dance teacher. The Paymaster General should know that the system is not working for many hundreds of thousands of people.
	What is the Government's estimate of the amount of money lost through eastern European nationals who have come to the UK, set up tax credit claims, and then headed home while the Government continue to pay taxpayers' money into their bank accounts?

Dawn Primarolo: I should remind the hon. Gentleman that the rules that are followed with regard to European nationals are those laid down by the European Union. Provided that they are registered with the Home Office workers registration scheme, nationals from the new member states who are working in the UK are entitled to tax credits on the same basis as other European economic area nationals working here—for example, French or German nationals. If the hon. Gentleman has proof of the allegations that he makes, he should bring them forward. I have made it clear today that, as is demonstrated by the National Audit Office report and the other publications that I have put before the House, the Department takes seriously any attempt at tax credit fraud and is dealing with it.

Gordon Prentice: My question is about recovering overpayments. Many claimants report changed circumstances to the tax credit people in a phone call, and a great dispute often subsequently takes place about who said what. What point have we reached with keeping a record of—and perhaps digitising—telephone calls so that there is an accurate record of what happened?

Dawn Primarolo: That has always been part of the tax credit system. All calls to the contact centres are recorded and, when the content of the call is disputed, it can be recalled and presented to the claimants so that they can hear exactly what was said and when.

Stewart Hosie: Last year, the parliamentary ombudsman said in "Tax Credits: Putting Things Right" that
	"recovery of overpayment... of tax credits can be challenged if the overpayment was due to official error and in circumstances where a customer thought they were being paid the correct amount."
	In the statement, the Paymaster General said that HMRC would pursue "a number of measures", including "improving the information given with the award notice such as providing a ready reckoner." Given that tax credits can be complex, especially for those on low and variable incomes, does the Paymaster General seriously believe that a ready reckoner is all that is required? Several of my constituents receive numerous letters—sometimes on the same day—from HMRC, detailing different amounts. Does not the proposal constitute complacency? Is not it simply a sticking plaster covering a gaping hole?

Dawn Primarolo: A series of statements have been made to the House about the improvements in the award notice, the guidance notes of two pages and explaining exactly what claimants should check on receiving the award notice and the facts that are presented to them. I suggested today that we could take those attempts to reassure the claimants further by adding a ready reckoner. I did not offer it as a solution. If the hon. Gentleman cares to read any of the tax credit literature, he will realise that it clearly sets out the basis on which claimants should check the information that HMRC confirms has been supplied to them.
	Active constituency Member of Parliament though the hon. Gentleman may be, I doubt whether he has personally spoken to the many thousands of families in his constituency who benefit from tax credits and are grateful for them.

Ann McKechin: Since the introduction of tax credits, which has benefited the largest income group in Glasgow, the number of occupied shop units in the poorest areas of the city has rapidly increased. It would be greatly beneficial if the Treasury could, in future, make some assessment of the economic regeneration effects of the introduction of tax credits.

Dawn Primarolo: I agree with my hon. Friend. Surely all hon. Members agree that we would all be better off if child poverty were eradicated from our society. It is about time that Opposition parties started to support that aspiration instead of constantly trying to undermine it.

Alistair Burt: The individual learning account scandal of four or five years ago exposed the dangers of trying to encourage take-up while disregarding basic security checks in pursuing a political commitment. We could all have done so much more with that money for the people whom we want to help. Why did not the Treasury learn any lessons from that previous fraud scandal?

Dawn Primarolo: The Department had security checks in the system. If the hon. Gentleman examines the report, he will realise that the Comptroller and Auditor General specifically refers to them and how well they worked. Paragraph 2.35 contains a specific statement to the effect that the arrangements were adequate and have worked. The lessons that the hon. Gentleman claims that we need to draw are predicated on his belief that the system did not contain preventions to squeeze out fraud. He is wrong about that, and there is no proof of it.

Ian Davidson: Does the Paymaster General accept that tax credits have been enormously beneficial to large numbers of my constituents and a great help to many poor families? However, does she also accept that the scheme is not perfect? A recruitment company in my area reported to the Treasury that some employees from the accession countries have made false claims. Although that has been drawn to the Treasury's attention, it has told the company to go ahead and pay them. The problem applies especially to seasonal workers, who come here for a time, return home and continue to claim tax credit throughout that period. That undermines the credibility of the whole system.

Dawn Primarolo: What undermines credibility is the continual assertion of allegations without the support of facts. Whenever an allegation is made to the Department, there is an investigation into the facts. I have explained to my hon. Friend before how the rules work with regard to the A8 accession countries. If he is asking me to admit that I am not perfect, of course I would agree with that. The system that is operating now might be able to be improved, but if it were eradicated, child poverty would rise again, which would be a disaster for our constituents.

Richard Spring: In her statement, the Paymaster General referred to a fraud and overpayment situation in 2003-04 of between £1.24 billion and £1.74 billion. It would be very helpful if she could give us the cumulative total since the inception of the scheme.

Dawn Primarolo: There is not a cumulative total. We are looking at the scheme's first year of operation and putting together all the figures that we now have available for that year. What confuses Conservative Members is that they are trying to mix figures from 2003-04 with those from 2004-05, and they are all saying slightly different things. That leads them to draw the wrong conclusions.

Greg Clark: The Paymaster General has made an astonishing statement today. A year ago, the National Audit Office said that a fraud and error rate of 3.4 per cent. was unacceptable, yet the right hon. Lady has just announced that that rate has doubled in a year. When the new tax credits came in, Ministers promised that fraud and error would halve. Who is going to take responsibility for this failing policy? Will it be the Paymaster General or her ever-gallant Chancellor?

Dawn Primarolo: The fraud figure is £70 million. That is the figure that is in the report, and the hon. Gentleman will know that because I expect that he has taken the time to read it. He is trying to blur the lines. The fact is that, when compared with the comparable figures for the first year of operation of the working families tax credit, income support or jobseeker's allowance, the fraud and error rates for tax credits are better, although of course they have to be improved. He mentioned the rate of 3.4 per cent., but he knows full well that that was an interim figure that was given with huge health warnings pointing out that the exercise was only 30 per cent. complete and that it would be necessary to wait for the full figures. The full figures are now here, and the facts are before the House.

Peter Luff: Did the Paymaster General by any chance watch "Doctor Who" on Saturday? If she did, she might understand why her statement today reminds me of a cyberman coming, appropriately, through a portal from a parallel universe and insisting that its purpose was to upgrade humanity to achieve perfection. I freely acknowledge that the tax credit system has done much good, but in the universe in which I live, I hear of another case of despair and misery caused by the malfunctions in the system virtually every day. Unlike the heartless cybermen in "Doctor Who", will the right hon. Lady at least acknowledge that harm has been done and apologise to the families who have suffered so much?

Dawn Primarolo: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to travel back in the Tardis and experience the despair and destitution that existed when his party was in government and child poverty doubled. That was a disgrace, and it is about time that he joined the real world and supported the Government's objective to eradicate child poverty, and of reaching our first target of halving it as soon as we can.

US-UK Extradition Treaty

Nicholas Clegg: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 24, to debate an important matter that requires specific and urgent consideration, namely,
	the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.
	The Prime Minister's defence of this lop-sided treaty in the House last week posed more questions than it answered. The British people simply do not understand why we are stringently enforcing a treaty that has still not been ratified in Washington, why three British citizens will be extradited on Thursday when our own judicial authorities saw no reason to prosecute them here in Britain, and why there appears to be such an imbalance between the minimal information required to extradite a UK citizen to the US and the more substantive justification required to extradite US citizens to the UK.
	This is an issue of overwhelming public interest, yet it has been a real struggle to get the Government to acknowledge its significance. A letter placed in the Library of the House last month reveals that the extradition treaty was not even raised during the last visit of the US Secretary of State to the UK at the end of March, despite the then Foreign Secretary's assurances on 21 March that he would write to her prior to her visit.
	This comes at a time when extradition from the US to the UK has dropped from six cases in 2003, before the Extradition Act 2003 came into force, to two last year. Extradition from the UK to the US, however, has more than doubled to 13 cases. The treaty was negotiated in secret and was granted only cursory scrutiny in the House in December 2003, when the only Members who signalled their objections were my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and my hon. Friends the Members for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and for Southport (Dr. Pugh). I am sure that the House will wish to applaud their foresight. There is now a strong feeling on both sides of the House that we should make up for the absence of scrutiny then with a full debate in the House today, not least in view of the controversy surrounding the fate of the three former NatWest employees.
	I understand from contacts with US officials that there is some disagreement over whether the terms of the treaty are reciprocal. Even if there is a debate to be had on those legal details, it is difficult to understand why the Government should enact such important legislation without also exercising the political pressure in Washington, which is only this week belatedly being brought to bear, to encourage the US Congress to enact its side of the bargain.
	In keeping with Standing Order No. 24, I hope that I have demonstrated that this is a specific and important matter that merits the full and urgent attention of the House.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman seeks leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 24 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter, which he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely the extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. I am satisfied that the matter is proper to be discussed under the Standing Order.
	 The leave of the House having been given, the motion stood over under Standing Order No. 24 (Adjournment on specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration) until the commencement of public business tomorrow.

Points of Order

Jacqui Lait: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. This morning, I learned that the Mayor of London has announced that on Thursday he will hold a joint press conference with a Minister from the Department for Communities and Local Government on the transfer of further powers over Londoners to him. As this transfer of powers will involve the legislative process in the House, have you had a request from any Minister from that Department to come to the House to inform us of what is proposed, as is only right and proper?

Mr. Speaker: If legislation is involved, which the House is required to pass, the House will obviously get an opportunity to discuss the matter in full.

Andrew MacKinlay: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On behalf of Back Benchers, may I have your support in relation to our next item of business, which is the discussion of the Intelligence and Security Committee's annual report? As at 11 o'clock today, the Government's response to the report was not available in the Vote Office. I do not regard that as dealing from the top of the pack. The notion that we have simultaneously discussed the report and the response is a fiction. It is only by accident that I know of the existence of the response. I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, that very few Back Benchers and just a few Opposition Privy Councillors are aware that it was available, yet history will show that, apparently, we took its contents into account this afternoon. That is unacceptable, and I hope that you, Mr. Speaker, will admonish the Government on this occasion.

Mr. Speaker: I have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's case, but, as he has stated, that matter can be debated in the business after the ten-minute Bill, and there is nothing to prevent him from raising it when the Home Secretary makes his opening remarks. I hope that is helpful.

Accidents Involving Animals (Strict Liability)

Laurence Robertson: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Animals Act 1971 to make it a defence in law for the owner of an animal involved in an accident to show that he took all reasonable steps to keep the animal in a secure enclosure; and for connected purposes.
	I should first of all declare that I am chairman of the all-party horse group, and, although I am not required to register the following interest, I declare that my partner is the proprietor of a riding school.
	In introducing the Bill, I seek to remove an inequity that can see, and has seen, blameless people being held liable for damages, following accidents that no person could have prevented. Members will know that there are very few strict liability offences under English law—when an instance occurs, it is overwhelmingly so that people can mitigate the case against them by showing that they took all reasonable steps to avoid an incident taking place.
	Further, in English criminal law, a guilty action amounts to an offence only if the person involved has a guilty mind—in legal speak, mens rea—meaning that the person must have had intent to cause the incident or must have been reckless as to its likely occurrence. That, I am sure, is how the House would want the situation to be, under both the civil and criminal law. The alternative—that one can be held liable for an event about which one knew nothing, and, indeed, that one had taken all reasonable steps to prevent—is a chilling scenario, much more suited to the worst totalitarian states than to democracies.
	On 12 April 2006, the Court of Appeal held that absolute offences, which may subject a person to conviction and punishment in circumstances where he had done nothing wrong, may well be an infringement of his human rights. Yet there are one or two provisions in English law that can lead to that very situation, and it is one of those that my Bill seeks to address today. It exists in section 2 of the Animals Act 1971.
	The wording of the Act, as might be expected, is a little tortuous and unclear, but it seems to suggest that the owner of an animal is always liable for damages if that animal is involved in an accident, regardless of the steps taken to avoid such an accident happening. Although the Act is somewhat ambiguous to a layman, it was interpreted in the House of Lords to mean precisely that—that someone can be held liable in all such cases. In the case of Mirvahedy  v. Henley in March 2003, the House of Lords held the defendants liable for damages for injuries caused to a motorist, Hossein Mirvahedy, in an accident after their horse had escaped from a field.
	I do not for one moment make light of the serious injuries sustained by Mr. Mirvahedy, who was a blameless individual whose misfortune it was to be involved in the accident. Nor do I say that, in all circumstances, animal owners should be relieved of all responsibility for their animals—not at all, as there may well be cases where they are liable—but I do question how any reasonable person could attach blame to Mr. and Mrs. Henley when they had taken all reasonable steps to avoid such an incident occurring.
	If that iniquity is not removed, the knock-on effect could be considerable. For example, given the new right to roam, would farmers be responsible for any accident that resulted from one of their sheep escaping on to a road if a rambler had crossed the farmer's field and left a gate open? Following the House of Lords ruling, presumably they would be held responsible, yet that would be manifestly unfair. What exactly is the farmer expected to do in those circumstances?
	Let us take the case of riding schools, which are a source of much enjoyment to people of all ages, especially children. If a horse escapes from a secure field, which horses do, and causes an accident, is the owner to be liable for damages even though there are no steps that he could reasonably have been expected to take to avoid such an occurrence? If a horse bolts when startled by a loud and sudden noise close to it, is the owner of the animal equally held liable for any damage? Again, apparently, yes: the owner of the horse would, following the House of Lords ruling, be liable. We could then reach the situation where riding schools close down, which benefits nobody, unless they can afford the increasingly expensive insurance polices that would cover them against such damage—policies that will surely become even more expensive following the ruling. We could reach a situation whereby farmers, who are struggling financially in any case, decide that it simply is not worth it any more. Where would we be then?
	Surely the best way to avoid those undesirable outcomes is to amend the Animals Act in that respect, which is what I seek to do. I should therefore like to insert a new clause into the Act, which states:
	"It shall be a defence to any action brought under this Act for the keeper of the animal to show that he took all reasonable care in the circumstances to avoid any accident or incident occurring, or damage being caused to a Third Party or their property".
	I am hopeful of making some progress because the Government are sympathetic to what I am saying. I tabled a parliamentary question in April, and the response from the Minister was as follows:
	"The Animals Act 1971 currently has the effect of placing strict liability on the owner of animals that cause harm whatever the circumstances. This appears to be inconsistent with current liability law in other areas which allow for a general defence of reasonable care. The Government have acknowledged that there may be a case for an amendment to the Animals Act and expects to launch a consultation shortly".—[ Official Report, 25 April 2006; Vol. 445, c.971W.]
	I am not sure whether that consultation has yet been launched, but the law certainly needs amending sooner rather than later, and I am pleased that the Government have acknowledged that.
	The Bill has support from Members of four political parties, and I am grateful to Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Democratic Unionist Members for their enthusiastic support. They realise that the present situation represents an anomaly in the law. I am also grateful to the British Horse Society for its support.
	I repeat that I have the utmost sympathy for anyone involved in an accident caused by an animal and I accept that animal owners have a responsibility to take all reasonable steps to avoid such accidents. However, the fact that someone has taken all reasonable steps to avoid such incidents should be a defence in law against litigation, and it is that balance in the law that the Bill seeks to strike. I commend it to the House.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Laurence Robertson, Mr. Mark Todd, Mr. Peter Atkinson, Philip Davies, Mr. Nigel Evans, Mr. Richard Benyon, Kate Hoey, Miss Anne McIntosh, Mr. Jeffrey M. Donaldson, Mr. David Anderson and Lembit Opik.

Accidents Involving Animals (Strict Liability)

Mr. Laurence Robertson accordingly presented a Bill to amend the Animals Act 1971 to make it a defence in law for the owner of an animal involved in an accident to show that he took all reasonable steps to keep the animal in a secure enclosure; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 20 October; and to be printed [Bill 214].

Intelligence and Security Committee (Annual Report)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Kevin Brennan.]

John Reid: I am pleased to have the opportunity to open this debate on intelligence and security with particular reference to the annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
	I regret the circumstances in which we have to debate the issue tonight: once again, of course, today we have seen the evil face of terrorism and its terrible consequences. I am sure that the whole House will join me in expressing our condolences to the families and friends of those who have lost their lives or been seriously injured in the bombings in Mumbai, India. The Government and I, and I am sure all hon. Members, unreservedly condemn the brutal murder of civilians in Mumbai. There can never be any justification for terrorism. Our thoughts and our prayers are with the victims and their families, and I am sure that I speak on behalf of the whole House when I say that we stand united with India, as the world's largest democracy, through our shared values and shared determination, to defeat terrorism in all its forms.
	Let me start our discussion tonight by placing on record my admiration and support for the extraordinary work and dedication of our intelligence and security agencies. For very good reasons, not least the danger of prejudicing cases that are before the courts, we cannot go into the details of their many successful operations, which, as I said yesterday, include the four terrorist attack plots that have been disrupted since last July alone.
	We should always remember that the success of the terrorists will be writ large in headlines and in human tragedy, as in this evening's news bulletins. The success of our intelligence and security services is, of necessity, very often murmured quietly in closed circles. So it is right on these occasions that we publicly record our thanks for their work. It is also fitting to thank, on behalf of the Government, the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee and its Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), for their valuable work over the past year. They also work in a very committed fashion away from the glare of publicity.
	The importance of the Committee's work and its independence should not be in any doubt to any hon. Member. My statement yesterday underlined how seriously the Government take its reports and recommendations, and we discussed, among other things, the 7 July commemorations last week. I do not want to dwell on the conclusions and recommendations in the ISC's annual report, which was published on Thursday 29 June, because our response as a Government has already been published today, and hon. Members can read it at their leisure.

Andrew MacKinlay: How can my right hon. Friend justify to the House of Commons the fact that the response to which he has just referred was not available in the Vote Office at 11 o'clock today? By such smoke and mirrors, the interference will be that, somehow, the House has taken cognisance of the response. It so happens that I raised the issue on a point of order 10 minutes ago, and a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House said that they had not the foggiest idea that that document existed. It really is a thundering disgrace. I do not blame the Home Secretary, because he has been moved in as a utility player to deal with it today, but the Government must explain why they are treating the House of Commons in this way. The document is not available; it has not been read; and it is a thundering disgrace.

John Reid: My hon. Friend makes two points: first, whether or not hon. Members were aware of a response; and, secondly, whether it was available.

Andrew MacKinlay: Well, it was not.

John Reid: I am just about to answer those points. If the second point is true, I certainly would be not only surprised, but deeply disappointed, and I undertake to look into it. I am not quite sure about my hon. Friend's reference to the utility player, but I play the role of Jamie Carragher. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what I take to be an accolade. I deeply regret it if that material was not available to hon. Members through some fault in the arrangements. That was exactly implicit in my remarks, as he said, and I made those comments without knowledge that the report was not available to hon. Members.
	As I said, I do not want to dwell on the conclusions reached in either report. Suffice it to say that the Government very much welcome the Committee's report and particularly the recognition it pays to the efforts that have been made to build counter-terrorist capacity since 9/11. Each agency has received additional funding and is undergoing expansion and modernisation. We have tried to respond in the document that we issued today—or rather ought to have issued and made available to hon. Members today—to the Committee's main points and recommendations, including some worries that it has expressed about certain things.
	I have mentioned something that we welcome: the expansion of the agencies' activities and the resources going into them. Similarly, we welcome the Committee's view that, despite the diversion of efforts in the wake of the July bombings, the agencies have continued essential work on all fronts. Although we rightly concentrate on counter-terrorism, we should never forget the importance of the agencies' work on, for example, espionage, counter-proliferation and serious crime. Indeed, the Committee's report makes it clear that the agencies are being both adaptive and innovative in dealing with the challenges that they face in what the Committee rightly describes as difficult times. In the context of such challenging times, I want to say a few words on the nature of intelligence, rather than to repeat what is in the Government's document.
	The House will be aware from the Committee's report on the 7/7 attacks that a failure of intelligence was not to blame for the London bombings in July last year. Despite the Committee's report, much of what is said and written about that attack continues to show, at best, a rather over-simplistic understanding of the nature of intelligence. It is absolutely crucial that we understand and convey to others the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the nature of intelligence, so that we can have a more informed dialogue.
	Of course we should expect, and we receive, 100 per cent. commitment and 100 per cent. effort from the men and women in the intelligence and security agencies and from the police. Although there may be 100 per cent. commitment and 100 per cent. professionalism and dedication, there can never be a 100 per cent. guarantee that we can prevent every terrorist attack. Intelligence work is not an exact science; it is an activity that is conducted by human beings and that is concerned with the possible actions of human beings and, however perverted or misguided they may be, with their motivations and actions. Whatever the success in importing technology or scientific methodology, it can never therefore attain the predictability of a physical science.
	Moreover, whether it comes from agent reporting or the interception of communications or from other types of surveillance, intelligence information is invariably fragmentary and partial, rather than a complete picture. It is information that is generally acquired against the wishes and usually without the knowledge of targets, and a complex combination of analysis, evaluation and validation is invariably required to make sense of it. Those difficulties were highlighted in the Government's response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's report on the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005.
	Intelligence is never an end in itself. It serves to inform our understanding of risks and threats, to provide warnings and to direct police investigations and/or disruptive action, and it plays a vital part in helping us to develop our counter-terrorism policies and strategies, as well as our operational and tactical direction.

Mark Pritchard: Is the Home Secretary still convinced today that Mohammed Siddique Khan was on the periphery of the intelligence services' radar screen? What are the key lessons for intelligence gathering and assessment that the Home Secretary thinks have been learned since 7/7?

John Reid: In the wake of 7/7, several lessons have been learned, and as I promised yesterday, we will publish later a document on the lessons learned from 7/7 itself. One such lesson about intelligence and the communication of intelligence to the public was to do with threat levels; I dealt with that yesterday. Another related to the difficulties and shortcomings in terms of co-ordination across services. That was always the case, but co-ordination is now more imperative than ever because it is increasingly the case that there is a seamless web of terrorism that must be addressed across domestic, foreign and defence policies. Some operational lessons have also been learned. However, although we have learned some lessons, we will continue to learn. Like all human agencies, the intelligence agencies are not infallible, so we will continue to make mistakes on occasions, but I hope that we minimise them.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to Mohammad Siddique Khan. On the information that I have as someone who is not an intelligence practitioner but who has some familiarity with that world, my judgment is that at the time when the intelligence service was looking into him as a shaded identity—he was known as a character on the fringes of a specifically directed investigation into others—he was peripheral to the inquiry in question. So far as I am aware, the information that we had on him at the time—without the benefit of hindsight—indicated a wish to participate abroad in some form of unspecified action but did not indicate a wish, a desire, a motivation or a plan to take part in any action in this country.
	The judgment was made to pursue the main characters in the operation, and not to pursue a number of contacts who were regarded as peripheral. He was one of them, but there were several others. When the ISC looked into this, it came to the conclusion that the decision taken was—I think that this was the word it used—an understandable judgment. Of course, with hindsight—which all of us are now blessed with—we would have identified among the peripheral characters the two whom we now know were connected with 7/7. But, as I have said, that judgment is reached with the benefit of hindsight.

Michael Mates: As the Home Secretary has just said, hindsight is a wonderful thing. But let me explain one of the problems that the security services—and, indeed, ourselves—have been coping with since 7 July. The so-called responsible press—I am not talking about the red tops—continually speculate and pick up little points, and then move on from that to come to conclusions. We have tried to put them to bed in the report, but the difficulty is that there have been occasions, one of which occurred two or three weeks ago, when the press were actually told that what they were about to print was untrue. But, of course, that spoiled the story, and it concerned Siddique Khan. I hope that the Home Secretary will condemn the press for that, as I do.
	There are two consequences of that action. The lesser of them is that the security services and the police, who are working very hard to try to solve such situations, get rather downcast about lies coming out in responsible newspapers. But much more important are the families, who get upset, and who believe as a result of what they read that perhaps the tragedy that affected them could have been avoided, when those of us who have spent the whole year looking into the matter know that it could not.

John Reid: Not for the first time, I agree with every single word that the right hon. Gentleman, who serves on the ISC, has uttered. It would be sufficient grounds on which to condemn such ill-informed speculation, particularly when it is contradicted in advance, were it merely confusing for the House or reflecting wrongly on the security services. However, the truth of the matter is that it deeply worries the families concerned, and causes them additional grieving. I say that as somebody who has met many such families, and who will continue to meet them, along with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, to attempt to answer some of their questions. I have to start most of those meetings by correcting the misrepresentations in the previous week's press.
	As the right hon. Gentleman said, there were two stories about Mohammad Siddique Khan. One was that he had been refused entry to the United States, and that our agencies had been informed of that as far back as 2003. The FBI has denied that categorically. Another was that a tracking device was put on his car before 7/7. That was, I think, specifically denied by the security services, but the newspaper involved—a broadsheet—went ahead and printed. There have been several other such stories.
	The right hon. Gentleman is right. Our concern should be to reach out to the families involved, and such stories cause them a lot of unnecessary agitation and grieving.

Mark Oaten: Before the Home Secretary moves off the question of the lessons learned from last year's bombings, are there any lessons to be learned about the level of resources that our intelligence services have, both in terms of the finances available to them and the number of staff that they have? Is he satisfied that they are currently working to the right level of resources?

John Reid: Yes, I think that there are lessons to be learned. The resources have been increased, fourfold on the policing side of counter-terrorism. They have also doubled in terms of counter-terrorism and resilience from around £900 million to almost £2 billion. In December, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that a further £85 million would be given, and in the past few days an additional £34 million and £5 million have been allocated. The security services have needed more resources and if asked, they would say—I can speak with particular detail only for MI5, but I think this is also the case in terms of other agencies—that in financial terms they have got everything that they have asked for.
	What is more difficult is converting the financial resources into capabilities in terms of manpower, because it takes time to recruit individuals from certain backgrounds, and to train people in languages such as Arabic and in other things. The hon. Gentleman is undoubtedly right that the demands on our intelligence services in terms of numbers and capabilities are greater than ever but, by and large—certainly with MI5, and certainly for other organisations on the figures available, with a fourfold spending increase on policing—requests for resources have been met when asked for.

Tobias Ellwood: I am a little concerned about whether there is enough co-ordination between agencies. Many agencies were established long ago, some as far back as 1909. The Home Secretary mentioned MI5, which answers to him along with the joint terrorism analysis centre, the Serious Organised Crime Agency and many police operations. But MI6 and GCHQ answer to the Foreign Secretary, and the Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for the Defence Intelligence Staff, and the security and intelligence co-ordinator answers directly to the Cabinet Office, along with the chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee. We then have a separate operation to deal with the ISC.
	Is the Home Secretary convinced that there is enough co-ordination between all the agencies? I am a little worried that they might not be able to share the necessary amounts of information speedily enough.

John Reid: Yes, I think that there is a need for co-ordination—and as we have approached that seamless web that I mentioned earlier, there has been closer co-ordination. There is a chain of command. There is now a co-ordinator, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, who is in fact answerable to me—although, of course, also to the Prime Minister. The co-ordinator operates out of the Cabinet Office precisely because he brings together MI5, MI6, GCHQ and defence. The hon. Gentleman asks for co-ordination; that is why we appointed a co-ordinator, and Sir Richard Mottram does that job very well.
	In terms of the JIC and JTAC, we have gone a considerable way towards achieving the co-ordination that the hon. Gentleman asks for. We keep such matters under review, and one of the lessons of 7/7 was that we needed more co-ordination. I am prepared to look into that, as are the services; they work much more closely together. I do not deny the general thrust of what the hon. Gentleman says, but if he is angling for a homeland security Minister, we are not persuaded that that is the answer to the problem. However, closer co-ordination certainly is.

Norman Baker: I am grateful to the Home Secretary for being so generous in giving way. He referred to the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of intelligence matters, and I agree with his comments on that. I also sympathise with those of the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates). However, the Home Secretary will know that the Butler report contained criticism of the way material was presented, not by the press, but by elements within the Government. The report said that the famous dossier
	"had the result that more weight was placed on the intelligence than it could bear."
	The report also referred to the dossier's going
	"to the outer limits of the intelligence available".
	Can the Home Secretary tell us what lessons have been learned from that episode, and what steps have been taken to ensure that never again can intelligence material that was, so far as we can tell, accurate, be misrepresented—inadvertently or otherwise—in order to make a particular case?

John Reid: A large number of things have been done on the basis of the Butler report's recommendations. One of them, as it happens, concerns who holds the co-ordination post—an issue that Butler commented on specifically. The former Cabinet Secretary placed a great deal of emphasis on the type of person who got that post. Incidentally, that recommendation is not necessarily one with which the ISC appears to agree; indeed, it raised this issue in the report, so there is room for debate.
	Of course, the truth is that we try to learn lessons, and there is a general problem in this regard. My personal opinion is that, the minute that one puts intelligence into the public domain, an associated problem arises. The hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) would be the first to demand the intelligence basis for any assertions that I made. I would then put that intelligence into the public domain to encourage him to trust me. If I put it into the public domain in its raw form, that would put at risk the operations and sources from which it came. If, however, I modified it, he would then accuse me of producing dodgy intelligence. If I said, "Better not to do it," he would then accuse me of covering up.
	I am not ascribing a personal view to the hon. Member for Lewes but rather pointing out to him that there has been an attempt to put information into the public domain in a way that enables it to be scrutinised by a number of people—not least himself and others in Parliament—but also by the independent work of the ISC. The ISC is independent of government. Although it is made up of Members of this House, even the most sceptical observer would not refer to everyone on it as an undying friend of the Labour Government, so a degree of independence can be attributed to the ISC. I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman.
	I want to make one final point to the hon. Gentleman. As I will say later, I believe that, because of the nature of intelligence, the ISC has a particular role to play. But there is also a particular obligation on us to be more scrutinising and self-critical inside this community than we would be in any other area, precisely because there is not that external validation of what we say. For instance, if the hon. Gentleman listens carefully to what I have to say on 7/7, he will realise that we have scrutinised these matters over the past period, particularly the narrative that we put into the public domain. We did that with one eye to saying that, if we find anything wrong after the public's questioning and probing of that narrative, we will report that to the House and to the families concerned. I will come back to that point later.

David Winnick: My right hon. Friend will know that a number of the survivors of 7/7 have called for a public inquiry. I understand the Government's arguments for not having one, but some of the stories that have appeared in the press concerning Khan, the ringleader of the mass murderers, are very misleading, to say the least. However, do not all the indications—including the latest, obscene video that appeared last week—now clearly show that Khan did have links with the international terrorist network and that the visits to Pakistan were not for holiday purposes? It would be useful if my right hon. Friend said now whether he agrees with that.

John Reid: The last time that we had a debate on this matter, I said, I think, that there was circumstantial evidence that some of the bombers were linked to al-Qaeda. That evidence is now stronger than ever, given the second video that has come out, so I agree on that point. I will not rehearse my arguments concerning a public inquiry, because the House knows them.
	Intelligence is sometimes used for tactical and operational reasons, but it is not used only for that; it is also used at a strategic level to inform decision making. In the case of intelligence on international terrorism, one example is the CONTEST strategy, which was published yesterday. At both tactical and strategic level, each piece of intelligence has to be constantly re-examined in the light of new information. That process goes on continuously, but normally, as I was saying to the hon. Member for Lewes, within the closed world of intelligence agency business. That is why we value so much the work of the ISC, an external and independent body whose aim is to provide maximum scrutiny, and which concluded that the 7/7 bombings could not have been prevented. But it is also why we—the Government, the agencies involved and those outside, and particularly those within, the intelligence and security community—should be prepared continually to scrutinise our methods, facts and conclusions.
	That is why I have assured the House in the past, and assured the families of the victims of the 7/7 tragedy, that we would inform if, at any point, new information on anything came to light. In that context, I tell the House tonight that, at the end of last week, I was told that a discrepancy had indeed come to light. The official account that we provided to the House states that the train on which the bombers travelled left Luton station at 7.40 am. The police have now told us that that is incorrect—the train in fact left Luton station at 7.25 am. It did, however, arrive at Kings Cross at 8.23 am, as recorded in the official account. Although that does not appear to affect anything else in the official account, it is nevertheless an error, which is why I report it to the House. I can understand why this may be of concern to some. I have asked the police, as Members would expect, for a full report on how that discrepancy came about. I will ensure that the official account is amended and will write to the survivors and to the families of the victims on this matter.

Dari Taylor: I want to take my right hon. Friend back to what he said about the lessons that we have learned from 7/7. Is he considering making one particular lesson an important part of the development of our relationship with our Muslim community and other ethnic communities in Great Britain: that we have for many years underestimated, and as a consequence under-used, their language capabilities? The Muslim community speak Farsi and Dari and other languages whose speakers are in scarce supply, and it could offer our security services a rich source of support.

John Reid: Our intelligence and security agencies are indeed looking at that issue. One difficulty in using our resources, however vastly they are expanding, is that they have to be converted into personnel with such skills.
	I return to the point that I was making, and making at some length. I do so because it is important that we ensure that everyone in this country understands that intelligence is not an exact science. It is not like reading a spy novel. Piecing together intelligence is more like trying to complete a jigsaw puzzle that has no picture, many pieces missing and no pieces with a straight edge, and without knowing how many pieces one should have or whether the existing pieces are all from the same puzzle. Just to complicate completing that puzzle, one has to do so against the clock, with additional pieces being thrown helpfully in one's direction by friends, and some intentionally misleading pieces being thrown by one's enemies. That is a fuller description of the process of constructing an assessment of threat and intelligence than would normally be gained from some reports in some of our popular press or from novels.
	That is the nature of the task that we set the dedicated and talented people who serve in our intelligence services. The most remarkable thing is that, more often than not, they succeed against all the odds in putting together significant parts of the puzzle in a way that makes sense of the bigger picture. That saves lives, for which we ought to be grateful. It has done so many times before the 7 July attacks, and will continue to do so. That is the most important return of all on the investments about which Opposition Members have asked me.
	All those difficulties have always existed, but they are now more challenging than ever. They have become larger and more difficult with the emergence of global terrorism. For nearly half a century after the end of the second world war, our intelligence agencies focused on fighting the cold war. From the late 1960s onwards, they played an important role in a conflict within the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland. Nowadays, their primary focus is on the international terrorism of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-inspired groups.
	As well as bearing in mind the normal difficulties affecting intelligence, we should recognise how much more challenging today's actions are than what went before. Today's enemy is unfettered by any sense of international convention, legality or even morality. Indeed, it is spurred on by a perverse perception of morality to achieve an even greater extent of civilian carnage. It uses methods of which we would not have conceived even a short time ago.
	Moreover, the form of today's enemy has changed. In the past, we faced a foe with a structure. We knew the structure of the Soviet infantry and we often knew the structure of an active service unit of the Provisional IRA, along with its commander. We either knew the names of those involved, or were aware of an intelligence gap that needed to be filled.
	Not only did our former foe have a structure, but that structure was fairly static and unchanging. When it comes to al-Qaeda and the like, we face an enemy that is structured only loosely, if at all, and comprises numerous largely autonomous groups acting outside any recognisable chain of command. Nor do those groups have a permanent base from which to operate. All that makes the job of our intelligence services much harder than it was before.
	Today's terrorist is also helped by the ease of modern transport and communications. The internet and cheap mass travel have created a global village that is home to the global terrorist. All that makes life easier for the terrorists and harder for those who seek to counter them.

David Tredinnick: The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the earlier threat during the cold war. Can he reassure us that he has the appropriate contacts with our former foes in the eastern bloc whom we now aspire to have as friends and that we are making good use of their extensive intelligence-gathering facilities? Can he establish those facts through whatever channels he considers appropriate?

John Reid: We have those contacts. Some, of course, are in the European Union. Some are in NATO. Others, such as Russia, are in partnership with NATO through partnership for peace or the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. As well as having those military links, we try—as far as is possible, practical and sensible—to maintain an interchange and co-operation on intelligence matters. There is a reason for that. As I said yesterday, the terrorist threat faces us all. It is not a clash of civilisations, but a clash of evil terrorists against civilisation. Whatever differences we have with most of the great powers of the world, they are overcome by the common threat that we face, and the common awareness that we must face it together. We certainly do that.

Tobias Ellwood: Will the Home Secretary give way?

John Reid: I have given way to the hon. Gentleman already. If he does not allow me to make some progress, Members will legitimately claim that I have spoken for too long.

David Davis: Never.

John Reid: I saw that coming.
	I was explaining all the elements that make the terrorist's unfettered intention of mass destruction more difficult too cope with than ever before. One essential element of threat is intention. To match that unfettered destructive intent, modern science has, tragically, also offered a potential for almost unlimited destructive capability, the other essential element of threat.
	The means of mass destruction have been around for quite a while, but when they are linked with unfettered intention, unconstrained by conventional legality and morality, and with unlimited destructive capacity, we begin to see the size of the new threat that we face. We do not face that threat alone, of course: attacks in places as far apart as Bali, New York, Egypt, east Africa, Madrid and—only this afternoon—Mumbai show, if any illustration is needed, that no community or city is immune. The director general of the Security Service, speaking to her counterparts in the Netherlands last year, pointed out that, as the threat is global, protecting our friends is also a way of protecting ourselves. That is, I think, the point made by the hon. Member for Bosworth (David Tredinnick).
	We must, and do, work closely with other countries, and with their intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in combating the terrorist threat. It is essential for us to think globally as well as acting locally. The plain fact is that a snippet of intelligence, whether it is gathered in Kirkuk or Kabul, can lead directly to action here on our streets to prevent an atrocity. That is the nature and extent of global terrorism, and that is the global response that we need.

Michael Ancram: The Home Secretary has spoken of our relationships with other Governments in the fight against al-Qaeda. How central to our fight against al-Qaeda is our current relationship with the Government of Pakistan?

John Reid: It is extremely important, because of our ties in history and Commonwealth, because of the number of people with a Pakistani background in this country and because of Pakistan's proximity to some of the most difficult parts of the world in which international terrorists are operating. Afghanistan sits next to the western and north-western territories of Pakistan. All that means that we must work internationally in Afghanistan. We must work closely with President Musharraf and his services there, and we must also deal with domestic problems here, or indeed in Pakistan. We have received a great deal of support from President Musharraf. I had the pleasure and privilege of meeting him last year to discuss a range of issues, and I cannot overestimate the importance of our relationship with Pakistan when it comes to these matters.
	I had several other pages to which to refer and several other issues to raise, but as I see that my right hon. Friend at the other Dispatch Box, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) is eager to speak, and as I may have spoken for a little longer than I should have yesterday, I am more than willing to end my speech now. Perhaps I can deal with the other matters by responding to questions later—and the Minister for the Middle East will wind up the debate.
	Let me end by saying that, however much we rely on our intelligence and security agencies, as we should, we ought to remember—as I am sure we do—that defeating terrorism is not simply a job for the Government, the security agencies or the police. Just as the intelligence and security agencies work on behalf of the whole community, the whole community must be involved in defeating terrorism. Given the unity and endurance that have seen our people through so many difficult times in the past, I believe that terrorism will ultimately be defeated. But the struggle will be long and hard and wide and deep, and in the midst of that we will rely more than ever on the men and women who work so hard and in such a dedicated fashion in our intelligence and security services.

ROYAL ASSENT

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Before I call the next speaker, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that Her Majesty the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts and Measures:
	Childcare Act 2006
	Electoral Administration Act 2006
	National Lottery Act 2006
	Leicester City Council Act 2006
	Liverpool City Council Act 2006
	Maidstone Borough Council Act 2006
	Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 2006
	Pastoral (Amendment) Measure 2006

Intelligence and Security Committee (Annual Report)

Question again proposed, That this House do now adjourn.

David Davis: I join the Home Secretary in offering our condolences to the families and friends of the victims of the outrage in Mumbai.
	I am tempted to continue by referring to the Home Secretary as my right hon. Friend, as he just referred to me, but we would probably do each other equal harm. A cosy consensus may break out, but I think not. However, I do join him in welcoming the annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a thorough and wide-ranging report that raises several crucial issues. It is a fair reflection of the objective and serious manner in which the Committee, led by the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), approached its scrutiny of the intelligence and security communities.
	The House knows that I have some trenchant views—although I am probably in a minority in the Chamber—on the structure and powers of the Committee, and I shall say more about that later. However, I wish to put on the record that I do not, for one moment, accept the accusations made on "Newsnight" last night. The Committee is doing its job to the best of its very great ability.
	I also join the Home Secretary in paying tribute to the work of the intelligence and security agencies. As the Committee's report highlights, the threat from international terrorism remains serious and sustained. It comes not only from al-Qaeda, as the Home Secretary pointed out, but from its associated networks, dissident groups in Northern Ireland, Iranian state-sponsored terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and foreign espionage. We are all too familiar with the events of July last year—but it is thanks to the efforts of the security and intelligence services, as the Home Secretary said, in combating those diverse and complex threats that there have not been similar attacks both before and since then.
	I have to break the cosy consensus on the issue of the Government's response to the Committee's comments on the combination of the post of the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the security and intelligence co-ordinator. I defer to nobody in my admiration for Sir Richard Mottram, with whom I have worked on several occasions, but the ISC raised a substantive point and I hope that the Home Secretary will look at it again, in slow time, perhaps before the next Committee report arrives.
	The Committee also reports that the Government have recently concluded a study into the impact of new technology on interception of communications. The report was agreed between the Home Secretary's predecessor and the Opposition in response to our call for the use of intercepts. As the tragic events just over a year ago demonstrated, terrorists will stop at nothing to inflict death and destruction on their enemies and innocent members of the public alike in the name of their cause. In combating that threat, we must consider all possible measures to detect terrorist suspects and to bring them to justice.
	Two weeks ago, I wrote to the Home Secretary urging him to review the prohibition on the use of evidence from UK-warranted interception in our courts, as I also did with two of his predecessors. It is vital that our courts system has the tools to convict and lock up terrorists. Intercept evidence could also alleviate the need to lock up terror suspects arbitrarily or to impose control orders, by bringing them into the justice system on an evidence-based basis.
	The previous Home Secretary claimed that
	"the use of intercept will not result in our being able to prosecute more terrorists".
	He also said that it
	"would endanger sources, damage relationships with foreign intelligence agencies or expose highly sensitive techniques".
	I do not accept those arguments.
	From the briefings that the Homer Secretary's predecessor made available to me from representatives of GCHQ and other interested parties, I am convinced that the obstacles to the use of intercept in our courts are not insurmountable. I have come to the conclusion that every problem can be overcome. The Government's own terrorism adviser, Lord Carlile, says that intercept evidence would be "very useful". The Metropolitan police say that it makes us look
	"a little bit foolish that everywhere else in the world is using it to good effect"—
	but we are not. More than a year after the attacks in London, we are still in the absurd position in which intercept evidence from foreign jurisdictions is admissible in our courts, but evidence from our own agencies is not.
	The Home Affairs Committee has said that
	"outside the Government, there is universal support for the use of intercept evidence in the courts. The Home Office has not produced convincing evidence that the difficulties are insuperable".
	The last Government review—the fifth in 10 years—maintained the prohibition. Since 7 July last year, the Government have conducted another review, which the Committee tells us is now complete.

John Reid: The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point. My predecessor told the House on 2 February that the Government are committed to finding a possible legal model by which we could provide the necessary safeguards to allow intercept material to be used in evidence, and I have some sympathy with that point of view. The Home Office is carrying out work on two possible legal models. The right hon. Gentleman said that he understood that that work had been completed, but that is not my information. The two models are the so-called public immunity plus model and the examining magistrates model. My understanding is that the work is due to be reported to Ministers in November—I asked about the matter before I came to the House today—so it is too early to say whether a workable legal model can be devised. I accept the right hon. Gentleman's point that this is an important issue, but it is also very risky if we get it wrong. Although it sounds as though it is a lot of time to spend on the matter and even if we were disposed to look on it with an open mind, we would have to be certain that we were not opening up the service and its operations to risk.

David Davis: I thank the Home Secretary for that extremely useful intervention. The examining magistrates model was proposed in the first instance by the Newton committee and we supported that argument as it appeared to be the most robust. I agree entirely that we should not take risks in that area, but on the basis of legal advice from outside the Government—as well as the Government's commentary—it appears to be achievable. People as eminent and knowledgeable about the issue as Lord Lloyd, for example, think that it is a tenable and achievable aim. I look forward to the Home Secretary returning to the House at some time soon with a conclusive answer on the issue.
	The Committee's report has a section on the Serious Organised Crime Agency. One of the aspects of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 that many criticised at the time of its passage was the absence of a single UK border police force. What Lord Stevens referred to as our "porous" borders have an impact on all the targets dealt with by the agencies covered by the Committee—organised crime, espionage and terrorism.
	The Committee reports that
	"the threat from espionage remains...Several countries are actively seeking British information and material to advance their own military, technological, political and economic programmes".
	For almost a century, foreign intelligence services have used large movements of people, especially refugees, as cover for inserting their agents. There is also the now well understood threat of foreign terrorists entering the country illegally.
	The failure of the Government to get a grip on illegal immigration, the now famous admission by the immigration and nationality directorate head of removals that he does not have the faintest idea how many illegal immigrants are in this country and the Home Secretary's description of the IND as "not fit for purpose" demonstrate a serious weakness in the Government's strategy to keep out those who would do this country harm. As the example of one of the suspects wanted in connection with the attempted bombing on 21 July last year showed, there are also problems monitoring people leaving the country. Despite his photograph being distributed to ports and airports, he was able to escape to Paris and then to Rome.
	If the Home Secretary is really serious about protecting our borders, he will look again at introducing a single border police force. The Metropolitan police have called for one, the former head of the Association of Chief Police Officers has called for one and the Home Affairs Committee called for one more than five years ago—but just a few weeks ago, the Prime Minister rejected those calls. If there were a single force, combining the expertise of existing agencies to prevent foreign terrorists entering the country or to detect suspects leaving the country, the burden on the security services would be lower in the first place.
	Yesterday, the Home Secretary announced in his statement that a Cabinet-level Committee would work on measures to reduce alienation. However, the ISC reports that another ministerial Committee, the Intelligence Services Committee, has met just once in the past 10 years. That raises a serious problem about ministerial oversight of national security. Currently, a vast array of individuals, bodies and committees are involved in protecting the security of this country, but no single Minister is charged solely with overseeing those bodies and countering the terrorist threat.
	By virtue of his wide range of responsibilities, the Home Secretary always has a lot on his plate, and he has admitted as much himself. Much of that work is urgent, as the recent crises over foreign prisoners and other matters have shown. It is impossible for him, or for anyone in his position, to focus entirely on security issues. That is perfectly reasonable, and it is why we have long proposed that a single, Cabinet-level Minister should focus solely on counter-terrorism and national security. I understand that that proposal now has the support of the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee.
	The Prime Minister has rejected our proposals again, saying that the present arrangements work well, yet the simple truth is that they do not work well, or not well enough. The speed of progress in the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks is slower than we would like. That is not a reflection on the Home Secretary or his predecessors; it is more a reflection on the system that is in place. Until we have a single Minister whose sole focus is defeating the terrorist threat, improvements to the security services and to our resilience arrangements will not be as rapid as they could and should be.
	I have paid tribute already to the excellent work of the ISC, under the leadership of the right hon. Member for Torfaen. With limited resources, it performs its task admirably, but no one could imagine that its report on the events of 7/7 could match the 550-page report produced by the 9/11 commission. The time has come for the powers and remit of the ISC to be expanded, to match its task's heightened profile and difficulty. By increasing the ISC's powers, Parliament could ensure full scrutiny of the work of the intelligence and security services while maintaining the necessary secrecy that surrounds their operations.
	I last asked the Home Secretary about these matters in May, when he responded that the ISC's scope, remit and statute were defined by the previous Conservative Government. That is correct, and I am touched that the right hon. Gentleman values that Government's actions so highly that he wants to maintain the status quo. However, I think that the Government accept that we now face a new and more sophisticated threat. It is only right that the ISC's role should develop to ensure that that threat is met in the most effective way possible.
	The ISC was created in the mid-1990s. It was envisaged then that, as the Committee acquired the confidence of the intelligence and security communities, it would evolve towards being a Select Committee of this House, rather than an appointed Committee of the Prime Minister. I urge the Home Secretary to consider those proposals, to ensure that our security services perform their vital role to the best of their ability and under the best possible scrutiny.

David Winnick: The right hon. Gentleman will recall that I was present at the debates on the Bill setting up the ISC, and that the then Conservative Government strenuously opposed Opposition amendments that would have made it a Select Committee. It was made clear to us that under no circumstances would that happen. If he is departing from that position, that is something to be welcomed.
	The shadow Home Secretary is suggesting that the ISC's role should be extended, and no doubt the Government will wish to consider that, but would not that require greater parliamentary accountability than we have at present? Obviously, ongoing operations could not be considered, either in private or in public, by any Committee, but does he agree that there should be more parliamentary accountability than exists at the moment?

David Davis: I do agree, and I shall offer a model of how I think the Committee should be set up. The hon. Gentleman may remember that I was one of the Ministers on the Bill to which he referred. I recall that I said at the time that the then Government expected the Committee, and its relationship with Parliament, to evolve. I am sure that he can look that up if he wants to.
	Prior to the ISC's existence and, indeed, for the past decade or so, a great deal of oversight had been provided to the secret arm of Government by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee sitting as a Committee of one. From memory, that arrangement applied to various aspects of the operations undertaken by MI6, MI5 and GCHQ. If he casts his mind back, the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) will recall the publication of the report on the £150 million overrun on the cost of the buildings for MI5 and MI6. My predecessor in those days was Robert Sheldon, now Lord Sheldon. He tried to get that report published, but the agencies told him that the information was so secret that it could not be put in the public domain. Tom King, now Lord King, was the ISC Chairman at the time, and he also said that he would like to see the information in the public domain, but he, too, was told that it was too secret. In the end, all three of us ganged up on the Government—this Government—who were persuaded that information such as that could be put in the public domain.
	A redaction process then started, as I wanted to make the final report as accountable as possible. I received two documents—one each from MI5 and MI6—containing all their proposed deletions. The chapters that they wanted to redact looked almost identical, but the proposed redactions were different. I therefore wrote to the agencies. I asked MI5, "If MI6 allows us in, why can't MI5?" I also asked MI6, "If MI5 allows us in, why can't MI6?" The agencies' opposition to the report collapsed and it was published almost in its entirety. I do not think that any aspect of our security and intelligence operation was damaged—

Andrew MacKinlay: Did the western world collapse after that?

David Davis: No, the western world did not collapse—at least, not from that cause anyway. However, the hon. Member for Walsall, North is right: it is perfectly possible for a responsible Committee to carry out oversight in the way described.
	I do not entirely agree with how the Americans handle all their oversight arrangements, especially in respect of budget oversight, but the objective that has been set out is eminently achievable. I should like a Committee to be established along the lines of the PAC, with serious investigative resources. I do not mean this as an insult to the ISC's current Chairman, but it is possible that, as a matter of course, the proposed Committee should have an Opposition Chairman. That is what happens with the PAC, and if I am Home Secretary in two or three years I may be in a position to offer the right hon. Member for Torfaen another job.
	The mechanism that I envisage can be achieved. As we enhance the size and effectiveness of our security services, we owe it to the people of Britain to enhance the oversight that goes with that.

Malcolm Rifkind: I was Secretary of State for Defence when the ISC was formed, and it is easy to forget how revolutionary an innovation it was considered to be and how nervous the agencies were about any degree of scrutiny. However, I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend: the excellent work done by the ISC, and the nature of the security problems that it and the Government face at present, more than justifies the sort of reforms that he is recommending.

David Davis: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend, with whom I have worked on these matters before. I hope that we have a well-informed view of the needs of the security services, but we also have respect for the effectiveness of Parliament in this area.

Richard Ottaway: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

David Davis: I give way to another member of the ISC.

Richard Ottaway: I apologise to the House and to the Home Secretary for intervening, given that I was not present for the right hon. Gentleman's speech. I am interested in what my right hon. Friend is saying. I have served on a fairly high profile Select Committee and on the ISC, and I have an open mind about the proposal that he is making, but will he elaborate on how he sees a Select Committee working within the confines of the Official Secrets Act? By definition, a parliamentary Committee is open, whereas the Official Secrets Act is, of course, limiting.

David Davis: There is no doubt that the proposed Committee would be unique in that respect, but the American Senate has a very effective oversight committee. For instance, Pat Roberts' committee helped to produce the 9/11 report, and there are many other examples. What we propose is not impossible and there are various options, such as requiring all Committee members to be privy Councillors. We need to begin the debate on the matter, to ensure that we have the right level of scrutiny to match the security requirements.

Chris Mullin: The right hon. Gentleman is making some sensible and helpful proposals. I have pursued precisely these matters for a long time, and over the years I have become aware that people say things in opposition that melt away when they get into government. If he ever gets into government, will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that he will stick firmly by the idea that the security services should account to Parliament and not to the Prime Minister?

David Davis: There are two aspects for the hon. Gentleman to consider. First, I was a member of the Committee that put MI6—the SIS—on to an avower basis for the first time, so my enthusiasm was evident even as a junior Minister. Secondly, I am told that when people go into government they have 12 months of virtue, so when and if I am Home Secretary in three years' time, I recommend that the hon. Gentleman reminds me of that point. That is why I am making it now.

Mike Gapes: Perhaps I can help the right hon. Gentleman. From time to time, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs has received classified information, which it has never leaked; nor would it. Nevertheless the Committee has regularly been told by Ministers, in this and the previous Government, that certain information will not be given to us because it is being given to the ISC. The members of that Committee are good people, chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), whom I served as a Parliamentary Private Secretary, but the ISC is not a Committee of the House and it is not accountable to the House, so I am very interested in the proposal made by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), but it should go further.

David Davis: I am tempted to say, "Get thee behind me, Satan", but I shall leave that point right there. However, I encourage Members, especially the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin), to remind me in two and half years' time of what I said this evening.

Tobias Ellwood: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the ISC has limitations? The report it produced for the House on the Bali bombings in 2002 suggested that MI5 had got the threat level wrong and that it should have been raised from significant to high. The report was put to the House, but the House decided not to act on it. The consequences of not accepting its recommendation about travel advice from the Foreign Office were huge and affected all the people consulting the website when making plans to travel to Bali. The whole report, written by Ann Taylor, was dismissed by the Chamber, which shows how limited the powers of the ISC are.

David Davis: If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I think that he is blaming the wrong person. We cannot blame the Committee for the extent to which the House or the Government take action on the basis of its recommendations. That is purely the responsibility of the House and the Government. The Committee does the best job it can within the limits of its remit and my hon. Friend highlights a good example of one of the things that it illustrated.
	The burden of the ISC's work this year has been the report into the London terrorist attacks of 7 July, about which I do not intend to go into great detail as I suspect that the story will change over the coming year. When the Committee published its report, I paid tribute to it as "extremely insightful", but although the Committee is impartial, astute and of the highest integrity, as I have said before, there are limitations on what it can achieve. I shall read a quotation to the House:
	"No one wants to play the blame game. No one wants an investigation to find one person who was at fault and make them pay. But we need to fully understand what happened on July 7. And there is a very simple reason - it is the best way to stop it from ever happening again. The public need to know if there was anything that could have been done immediately before the attacks to prevent them. They need to know whether there were things the police or security services might have done which could have saved all those lives."
	Those are the words not of some wild revolutionary, but of the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham). So if the Home Secretary will not listen to me, perhaps he will listen to his right hon. Friend who, as the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee and a former Home Office Minister, has a good deal more experience in these matters than almost anybody else—even members of the Government.
	It is worth pointing out that almost every serious breach of security under previous Governments has resulted in an independent inquiry, generally led by a member of the judiciary, such as the Radcliffe inquiry in 1962, the Denning inquiry and the Franks inquiry. The least that the Government can do, to ensure that no stone is left unturned in learning the lessons from last July, is to order a full, independent inquiry. So far, the Home Secretary has shown himself willing to reconsider some of the decisions taken by his predecessors. I hope that this will be another issue on which he is prepared to be independently minded and to do what is best in the interests of the public.
	The ISC reports that the Home Secretary intends to toughen the Official Secrets Act. We hear that he intends to remove the common law defence of "duress of circumstance", or necessity, as a defence for so-called whistleblowers, and that the maximum penalty for breaching the Official Secrets Act could be doubled from two to four years in prison. I shall wait until the Bill is published and we have had a proper chance to examine it in detail before I comment on its contents and before the Opposition decide on their stance.
	It is surprising, however, that the Home Secretary wants to change the law when the Government have failed to test its operation in crucial cases, most recently in the case of Katharine Gun, which, I understand, led to the proposals. I should make it clear that I do not approve of what Ms Gun did, but if the Government believed that her actions represented a breach in security, or had endangered the interests of the United Kingdom, they had a duty to take the case to court in the national interest. However, the case was reportedly dropped just five hours after the defence sought the disclosure of the Attorney-General's advice to the Government about the Iraq war.
	Whether or not there is a public interest or similar defence in law, it is possible that a jury would still decide a case based on its own interpretation of the public interest. I hope that the Home Secretary will pay particular attention to this part of my argument, as that is an important test; for example, such an interpretation of the public interest may have been the reason for the acquittal of Clive Ponting, under a previous Government.
	The Government came to power with an admirable reputation and enthusiasm for freedom of information, for protecting whistleblowers and for civil rights—an apposite point given the issues that were raised with me earlier—which has, sadly, faded in recent years. The Government's behaviour towards legitimate—indeed, public spirited—whistleblowers has bordered on the disreputable. There will be a fear that the Official Secrets Act is being used to conceal embarrassing facts, rather than secrets that are essential to the security of the state. If the proposed measures represent the former, the whole House will resist them, but if they are really necessary for the defence of the state, they will receive our support. That distinction is vitally.

Norman Baker: I am interested in the right hon. Gentleman's comments. There were newspaper reports of considerable disquiet in the intelligence services about how the intelligence was presented during the run-up to the war with Iraq. If people feel that intelligence is being misused, there must be legitimate means, without endangering security, for them to represent that view to others who may have a legitimate interest—for instance, the ISC. There is a real fear that if the proposed measure goes through, there could be further oppression of people whose legitimate point of view would help the House.

David Davis: The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point, although the Committee's report covers in some detail the quite sensible arrangements for handling dissenting opinion. However, he is right in another respect: we have to be absolutely sure that the Bill is about protecting the interests of our state, not those of a particular Administration, or protecting from embarrassment somebody in the bureaucracy. That is the test that we shall apply to it when it comes before the House.
	One point not mentioned in the ISC report, but to which the Home Secretary alluded yesterday, is resilience—the measures taken to preserve public safety when a terrorist attack has happened. Resilience is a vital pillar in the fight against terrorism. Although the Home Secretary included it under the prepare strand of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, it is clear that more needs to be done. For example, simple measures, such as instructions about what to do in a case of emergency—as in a terrorist attack—have still not been placed in tube carriages. A whole year after 7/7, a series of safety measures have not been put in place. Those are small but vital measures, which should not normally occupy the time of the Home Secretary, but they could mean the difference between life and death to members of the public in the event of another attack.
	We all pay tribute to the bravery and commitment of those in our intelligence and security communities who protect our lives on a daily basis. However, they cannot win the fight against terrorism alone. I urge the Home Secretary and the Minister who winds up the debate to consider the proposals that I have set out: lifting the ban on intercept evidence; a single, border police force; a single, Cabinet-level Minister in charge of counter-terrorism and national security; an increase in the investigative powers of the ISC; an independent inquiry into the events of 7 July; and further attention to resilience measures.
	I repeat what I have said to the Home Secretary before. It is certainly our job on the Opposition Benches—and, in my view, on both sides of the House—to question and to scrutinise the actions of Government and, where necessary, to propose an alternative course of action—and no matter how the Home Secretary may describe it, that is not unpatriotic; it is our duty. However, where we believe that he is taking action in the interests of public security and in the national interest, he will have our unwavering support.

Paul Murphy: I share the revulsion of the shadow Home Secretary and of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary at the events in India today. It just proves that the terrorism that we now face is in a global form that we have never quite faced in the past. I put on the record my thanks to the Clerk, Emma-Louise Avery, and the staff of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and to the previous Clerk, Alistair Corbett. They work extremely hard. They are dedicated, committed and behave extremely independently in the work that they do. I would also like to thank the members of the Committee, from all parties and from both Houses. They, too, work with great diligence and commitment. They are extremely critical when necessary, but they operate entirely in a non-partisan and non-party political way, as they should.
	I was interested in the remarks made by the shadow Home Secretary about whether the Committee should be a Select Committee of the House. I am reminded of a former Welsh colleague of mine, whom many Members here would have known, Cledwyn Hughes, the former Member for Anglesey. When he faced such interesting and difficult issues, he would address the parliamentary Labour party, of which he was chairman, and say, "You see colleagues, there are pros and cons for, and pros and cons against." On the question of the Select Committee, that is probably precisely the case. I have no firm view on whether the Committee should be a Select Committee, but I am certain that it should be different from any other Committee that exists in Parliament.

Andrew MacKinlay: You'd get paid as Chairman.

Paul Murphy: Indeed. There are some advantages, then, in the Committee being transferred into a Select Committee.
	Let us look at the way in which the Committee is appointed. We know, of course, that the appointments are made by the Prime Minister. However, the Opposition Members on the Committee—remember that out of nine members, four are Opposition Members—are appointed on the recommendation of the leaders of their respective parties. To all intents and purposes, the appointment of the members is very similar to the appointment of Select Committee members. In addition, the way in which the Committee operates in its offices in Whitehall is exactly the same as the way in which Select Committees operate—by way of cross-examination and taking evidence, both written and oral.

Andrew MacKinlay: I think that my right hon. Friend said that the way in which the Committee is selected is known. I have to remind the House that I tabled parliamentary questions asking the Prime Minister about the manner in which the selections were made and he said that he would not tell me because it was a secret. I think that we should have revealed to us today what he understands is the method of selection.

Paul Murphy: I assume that my hon. Friend means me when he says "he". I do not make the selections. What I am telling the House is that the Prime Minister selects the Labour members on the basis of his own decision, having taken advice; other members are selected on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the Liberal Democrat party. That seems very similar to the way in which Select Committees are appointed.
	I do not want to go too far down this road, because, as I said, I am neutral on the issue of whether the Committee should be a Select Committee, in terms of the constitutional point, but I am certain that it ought to be a different type of Committee. It has to meet in private. It is clearly absurd for a Committee dealing with secret intelligence to meet in pubic. That cannot happen. Of course, we debate such matters—we are doing so today—in the Chamber of the House of Commons, and that is right, too. There are reports—at least one, usually two and sometimes three a year—from the Committee that are debated in public and that are in the public domain.
	It is also nonsense to suggest that the members of the Committee, in the words of some journalists, are the Prime Minister's stooges, or that we have a cosy relationship with the security services. How on earth can that be the case with a Committee that is drawn up on lines that give the Government a majority of only one—if that were ever to be used, which it is not—and that includes among its members a former deputy leader of the Conservative party and a former deputy leader of the Liberal Democrat party? As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated in his speech, by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that they are the Prime Minister's stooges.
	The accusation that the Committee is amateur and inexperienced is also clearly nonsense. Of the nine members of the Committee, one of whom comes from the House of Lords, four have been Ministers in Departments that have direct knowledge of and relationships with the security services. In terms of experience, although they might not want me to mention it, my colleagues and I have a combined service to Parliament of nearly 200 years. That is nearly 200 years of valuable experience.
	The point that I am trying to make to the House is that in no way is the Committee full of people who are there to give the Government a soft line or some sort of easy ride. That is not the purpose of the Committee. The purpose of the Committee is to scrutinise the intelligence services as effectively as it can, without fear and without favour. That is not an issue that divides us. All of us on the Committee, from whatever party and whichever House in this Parliament of ours, believe that that is the right thing to do.
	For example, in the annual report for 2005-06, which we are considering, there are three substantial criticisms that we believe should be dealt with. Some of them were touched on by the shadow Home Secretary. There is the fact that the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the security and intelligence co-ordinator ought not to be the same person. We are still unconvinced that that is the right thing to have happened. We also say that the emphasis by the Joint Intelligence Committee on trying to achieve a consensus in its reports could mean that it is missing, or failing to prioritise, key points. We had concerns about the new intelligence system, SCOPE, and the difficulties that GCHQ had with various staff disputes.
	At the same time, however, we are also very conscious of the fact that, where praise is appropriate, we give it to the intelligence services. That is something that any Select Committee in the House of Commons would do. For example, the staff problems at GCHQ seem to be in the process of being resolved and the IT project SCOPE will deliver next year. There is no question but that the agencies have faced a huge challenge during the past 12 months, given all the difficulties with regard to the problems of counter-terrorism and 7 July, and I think that they have met that challenge.
	There is now an opportunity for dissent and challenge in the Defence Intelligence Staff—an essential recommendation of the Butler review. We recognise that extra funding has gone into the agencies and we have emphasised on more than one occasion the need to ensure that there is good value for money. There is another issue that is completely misunderstood by so-called commentators. That point came out last night on "Newsnight". I am talking about how people are recruited into our intelligence agencies. I understand that one of the so-called experts said that it was done by means of an Oxford don and a bottle of sherry. I have nothing against the University of Oxford—I went there myself—and I certainly have nothing against a bottle of sherry, but these days that is not the way in which people are recruited to our security and intelligence agencies. If Members had looked at  The Times some months ago, they would have seen that it contained advertisements for MI6. If they turn on their computers and look at the websites of both our security services, they will see that jobs are being advertised in public in a way that is completely different from what has gone on in the past. It is right for the Committee, Parliament and the Government to put right such misconceptions. It was good that our campaign to see BBC monitoring continue was successful, and we commend the lead that the agencies are taking on European co-operation.
	It is fair to say that much of the Intelligence and Security Committee's work this year was concentrated on the appalling events of July last year. Obviously, this debate is taking place in the context of the anniversary of that dreadful occasion. We found that there was no prior warning of the attack and no culpable failure on the part of the agencies. We found that MI5 had come across two of the leading bombers before the attacks at the periphery of an earlier investigation, but that there was no evidence that they were planning attacks against our country.

Mark Pritchard: I welcome the provisions made by the right hon. Gentleman's Committee, especially regarding dissenting voices in the intelligence community. Did the Committee come across any dissenting voices in the intelligence community vis-à-vis the two gentlemen whom he mentioned, most notably regarding Mohammed Siddique Khan and any previous activities in which he may have been involved?

Paul Murphy: Our report was published on the basis of evidence given to us that was agreed by the agencies.
	We found that the extent of home-grown extremism was underestimated by the agencies. We also recommended several changes to the threat and alert systems, so I was pleased that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced the necessary changes to the House only yesterday.
	Some allegations have been made that material was withheld from the Committee during the course of our investigations into the events of July last year and, indeed, that we were misled by the agencies. We have examined each and every one of those claims, whether they were made verbally or in the media, and are satisfied that they are not true. Our report stands as an accurate representation of the facts as we saw them. Although we have investigated the claims over the past weeks, we are still of the opinion that the conclusions at which we arrived in our written report were right.

Mike Gapes: My right hon. Friend referred to domestic terrorism. Does he share my concern about the opinion poll that was published a few days ago indicating that 13 per cent. of British Muslims sympathised with, or actually supported, the aims of the people who carried out those terrible murders in London a year ago? Does that not indicate that we need to deal with not only intelligence, but the way in which we engage the Muslim communities in detecting, preventing and combating the ideology of al-Qaeda and its sympathisers?

Paul Murphy: Yes, I do, although that is not necessarily a job for the intelligence agencies or the Committee that I have the privilege to chair. However, it must be taken seriously into account. One thing that we can take from the poll is that although some people thought in the way in which my hon. Friend outlined, the people who live in our Muslim communities in this country overwhelmingly do not share that view. It is important that hon. Members understand that, especially those who represent constituencies in which large numbers of Muslim people live.

John Reid: My right hon. Friend mentioned misreporting in the press. Perhaps I should have taken the opportunity earlier to comment on reports in the press by reassuring him and the Committee, which is concerned with not only counter-terrorism and security, but organised crime and so on, that it is the Government's view that one of the essential elements of the fight is identity management and ID cards. I reaffirm our commitment to the introduction of those as rapidly as possible. I thought that it was as well to say that in view of several reports that have misleadingly suggested today that we are abandoning that commitment—we are certainly not.

Paul Murphy: I am grateful that I have given my right hon. Friend the opportunity to put that on record.
	When the Committee compiled its report on the events of 7 July, several matters caused us concern. We were worried that the agencies had not really recognised the speed with which young Muslim men, in particular, were becoming radicalised. Although that is no longer the case, the situation came as something of a surprise. We were also worried that we had all underestimated the possibility of suicide bombings happening in our own country. It is good that MI5 is now reaching out into the regions of our country, especially our great cities, so that we are in a position in which we can, we hope, avoid such problems in the future.

Stewart Hosie: On that point about reaching out, paragraph 107 of the report recognises the leading role of the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency on serious and organised crime in Scotland. Point Y in the summary of conclusions and recommendations says that the Committee
	"shall continue to examine progress and assess the effectiveness of co-operation between the Serious Organised Crime Agency ... Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs ... and the Agencies."
	Has the right hon. Gentleman given any consideration to how SCDEA may be linked directly to HMRC and the agencies, other than through the relationship with SOCA in England and Wales?

Paul Murphy: Yes, Scottish members of the Committee, or members representing constituencies close to the Scottish border, made us aware of the situation, so we are conscious of the Scottish dimension, as we are of the Welsh dimension. We thought that serious consideration needed to be given to the relationship between the special branches of our country's police forces and the security agencies themselves. We can learn from terrible disasters and what happened in July, as well, obviously, as ensuring that we thwart future terrorist attacks. I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated that at least four had been stopped in the past year.
	Our country faces a number of threats to our security from international terrorism, especially from al-Qaeda and its associated networks, from dissident groups in Northern Ireland, from increasing tension over Iran's nuclear programme and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and from international espionage, given that several countries are seeking British information and material. Good intelligence is not the only solution to countering those threats, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, indicated, but it can make a huge difference, as it did in Northern Ireland. If we had not had such superb intelligence over the past decade, we would not have achieved what we did there because of it.

Ben Wallace: One of the reasons we got great intelligence in Northern Ireland was the fact that the community was on side and thus presented a massive number of human sources. Has the Committee taken any evidence about, or inquired into, the impact of some of the draconian counter-terrorism legislation that the Government have introduced and the extent to which that has deterred people from Muslim communities from coming forward as sources?

Paul Murphy: No, not in that sense, but we had a look in some detail at how to deal with the problems in Muslim communities in which extremists live, work and plot. When we compiled our report, we cross-examined and interviewed many people, from Ministers down. We also went through hundreds of documents to find out whether we could get to the bottom of the issues that were causing concern. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated in his opening speech the difference between what happened in Northern Ireland and the situation that we face today. There was a structure to the terrorist activities in Northern Ireland that we faced. The situation was very much on our doorstep, and the people spoke the same language. We now face a disparate global terrorism that is completely different from what we faced in Northern Ireland, and I say that as someone who spent five years of his life as a Northern Ireland Minister. The way in which we deal with such terrorism is a huge challenge to the security services, this country and the world. I still believe, however, that intelligence can play a hugely important role in combating global terrorism, the effects of which we have seen today in India.
	Our agencies face new challenges, especially in counter-terrorism, but they are largely meeting those challenges. The ISC will continue to scrutinise their work; to suggest areas in which greater efficiency is possible; to look at issues that are controversial—

Chris Mullin: rose—

Paul Murphy: I know what my hon. Friend is going to say, and I am about to come on to the very point that he will make.

Chris Mullin: I note that at paragraph 104 my right hon. Friend proposes to conduct an inquiry into rendition. Can he assure the House that it will address the case of the two British residents—not citizens—who were arrested in Gambia and are now in limbo, because the British Government say that they cannot make representations on their behalf, although someone clearly made representations to make sure that they reached Guantanamo Bay in the first place? We ought to have some responsibility for them, not least because one has four young children under the age of eight.

Paul Murphy: The answer is yes, we will do so. When my hon. Friend intervened on me, I was about to say that our next investigation will be on the issue of extraordinary rendition, and it will look at the cases that he raised. We have already received correspondence from the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie), who chairs the all-party group on rendition. Those issues will be addressed, because they are important. People hold different views—rendition is controversial—but that does not stop us looking at the issue. We do all those things and carry out all those investigations, however difficult, controversial and unpopular, in the knowledge that our intelligence community is there to protect our country from the security threats of the 21st century.

Nicholas Clegg: On behalf of my party, I join other hon. Members in expressing condolences to everyone who was maimed or bereaved in the cold-blooded and callous bomb attacks in Mumbai today. I join other hon. Members, too, in welcoming the ISC's thorough, detailed and authoritative annual report for 2005-06. As it notes, it is especially timely as there is a
	"sustained threat from international terrorism",
	particularly from al-Qaeda. Only last Friday, we commemorated the tragic 7 July bombings in London, and I echo the tributes paid to those who make heroic efforts to secure our safety.
	The report should be read alongside the earlier ISC report on the 7 July bombings, as together they fill in important gaps in the jigsaw of events that led to those terrible attacks. It is worth reiterating that the jigsaw will be complete only if there is a full, independent, public inquiry into the 7 July attacks and the events that led up to them. On 11 May this year, the Home Secretary told me that an inquiry would be too costly and would divert resources from other work. The expense of the Bloody Sunday inquiry, running into hundreds of millions of pounds, is regularly cited by Ministers as a reason why an independent inquiry into 7/7 is not justified. I have looked up the costs of key public inquiries in recent years, and they are not as excessive as suggested. The Bichard inquiry, which made 31 important recommendations, cost £2 million; the inquiry into the Ladbroke Grove and Southall train crashes cost £1.2 million, and made 39 recommendations; and the inquiry into the awful death of Victoria Climbié cost £3.8 million, and made 17 recommendations. The Home Secretary may be reluctant to hold a public inquiry but, given the record of previous public inquiries, the issue of costs is not the most powerful reason for failing to do so.

John Reid: For the record, the hon. Gentleman is not comparing like with like. The official cost of the Bloody Sunday inquiry, in which a large number of families are involved and which has lasted six or seven years, is £185 million. However, that is not the point. When I use the word, "costs", I am referring to manpower, and the diversion of a huge amount of resources and efforts by men and women from the primary task of trying to protect us against another 7/7. That—and not financial cost—has always been the major consideration. In view of the challenges that we face—the massive threat to this country and the possibility of another tragedy—to divert a great deal of resources and manpower from our badly stretched security services for a prolonged period would result in a huge drain on our capability to fight terrorism, thus increasing the risk of another 7/7. In all conscience, I cannot do that, especially as I do not believe that there will be a commensurate reward in terms of questions answered, because there are some questions that we just cannot answer. I do not blame the hon. Gentleman for raising the issue, nor do I blame the families, because I understand that there are many questions to which they want answers, but against that we must weigh the protection of every family in Britain.

Nicholas Clegg: I am grateful to the Home Secretary. I merely make two observations. First, it is difficult for me to assess how many resources would be diverted. Given that much of the information is out there somewhere, I find it hard to believe that it would be beyond the means of an inquiry to allocate a small team from the security and intelligence services to make that information available. Secondly—and this is a much more important, substantive point—the Home Secretary implied that there are not a sufficient number of questions that need to be answered, as enough ground has already been covered by other inquiries and reports. It is difficult to judge with scientific accuracy whether that assertion is true. The week before last, a report was published on the death of Zahid Mubarek, who was killed in custody. That inquiry took place after full reports by the Prison Service and by the Commission for Racial Equality, yet it still identified 176 failings and made 88 recommendations. It would rest heavily on the Home Secretary's conscience, as it would on mine, if we failed to cover important ground and prevent future terrorist attacks because we omitted to hold an independent inquiry.

Dari Taylor: You are making a clear case that you believe that an independent—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order.

Dari Taylor: I beg your pardon, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The hon. Gentleman has made a clear case for an independent inquiry on the grounds that certain questions have not been asked and intelligence has not been looked at. Would he like to explore those gaps tonight?

Nicholas Clegg: I used the powerful example of the report on the death of Zahid Mubarek, which was published after two earlier investigations, to point out that its recommendations were made after it was claimed that all the lessons had been learned and all the information had been uncovered. I do not know the unknowable but, given the enormity of the 7 July attacks, I do not understand why the hon. Lady and others are reluctant to make a comparatively modest investment in an independent inquiry, which might uncover facts of which we have no knowledge at present.
	As for the ISC report, I welcome the wording on the regionalisation of the operation of the security and intelligence services, and the fact that the process of regionalisation was accelerated following the July bombings. I was struck by the passage in paragraph 40 which states:
	"A vital part of the regionalisation programme will be the Service's ability to work closely with local bodies, particularly the Regional Intelligence Cells within the police."
	I am surprised that the process of regionalisation does not appear to have happened earlier. It is arguable that excessive centralisation is as unwelcome in this matter as it is in so many other areas of Government policy.
	It is consistent with the observation made in the Intelligence and Security Committee's earlier report of the 7 July bombings that the regionalisation of the security and intelligence services helps improve policing at local level and helps the front-line intelligence-gathering function of our police forces. That takes on particular resonance in the week when the Government's ill-judged attempt to force through police force mergers seems to have hit the buffers. I note that the Home Secretary's predecessor today branded that development as weak and damaging, but I come to the Home Secretary's defence, even in his absence. It is a welcome wake-up call that the move towards forced regional police mergers was the wrong way to go. The report helps to emphasise the need to localise both the police and the work of the intelligence services.
	There was reference earlier to the Committee's observations on the SCOPE IT system and the serious delays in rolling it out, from April 2005 to autumn 2006, yet the capital cost of that delay has been blanked out in the report. I find it difficult to understand why that cost should not be quantified in the report. I understand entirely that there is plenty of delicate and sensitive information that one does not want to appear in such reports, but I wonder whether there is a security risk in revealing the figure. I do not understand why the security services appear to have sought not to release the costs incurred by yet another delay in a public information technology project.
	That is particularly apposite hot on the heels of the revelations in the Sunday newspapers, notwithstanding the Home Secretary's confirmation this evening that he wants to press ahead with the development of the much more ambitious and complex ID card database, that there are pronounced reservations among senior officials about whether that is possible. One official was quoted in the Sunday papers as stating:
	"Nobody expects this programme to work. It is basically on hold while ministers rethink their options. It's impossible to imagine the full scheme being brought in before 2026."
	Another official remarked:
	"I conclude that we are setting ourselves up to fail",
	and yet another referred to the possibility that the scheme could be "canned completely".
	The fact that there is so much that we do not know about the feasibility of implementing the ID card database affirms the need for much more detail about why the SCOPE IT system has been delayed and the cost that that delay has incurred.
	The report contains an important section on the work of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, and states that the Committee was told about the difficulties that could arise from the fact that SOCA will be competing with other agencies for new recruits. The Committee is to continue to examine progress and assess the effectiveness of co-operation between SOCA, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and other agencies.
	I endorse the Committee's observations that competition for resources between SOCA and other agencies needs to be kept under review. Vigilance is required to ensure the best possible operational relationship between SOCA and HMRC in pursuing serious drug investigations and criminal finance work, which are the two responsibilities that have been transferred from HMRC to SOCA.
	However, there is a quasi-constitutional issue on which the report is silent, and which perhaps lies beyond the remit of the Committee—the apparent lack of direct accountability for the work of SOCA to the House. I urge the Home Secretary and his colleagues on the Front Bench to look once again at improving in any way that they can the transparency of the important and sensitive work of SOCA and the way in which the agency can be held accountable to the House.
	Finally, in an important section of the report there is reference to the fact that the Home Secretary
	"told the Committee that he had commissioned a study into the impact of new technology on interception, including any evidential issues, and that the Committee would have early sight of its findings."
	Although, as I understand it, the study exists, it is a pity that the Committee has not been given early sight of it. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches look forward with some eagerness to hearing the results of the study, because for some time we have argued, as have many others, that the permissibility of intercept evidence in our courts would be an important additional weapon in the fight against terrorism.
	Earlier this year the senior anti-terror police officer at the Met, Andy Hayman, advocated the use of intercept evidence in terrorist cases. As we know, in 2004 the Newton committee proposed the removal of the bar on intercept evidence as a more "acceptable and sustainable" approach to the threat from terrorism than the arrogation of new executive powers to restrict liberty outside the normal operation of the judicial process.
	We are in a rather anomalous position. According to Liberty, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are the only countries worldwide that maintain a ban on the use of intercept evidence, yet we accept intercept evidence if it has been gained under the jurisdiction of other Governments. It seems odd that it is not permissible if it has been gained under our own authorisation, but is allowed if it has been obtained under the authorisation of Governments overseas. I hope the Home Secretary will use the study mentioned in the report as a launch-pad to have the debate once again. It has been rumbling on for a long time. I accept that there are a number of practical and legal difficulties, many of which we believe can be overcome.
	Like all good reports, the ISC report raises as many queries as it poses solutions—queries related to intercept evidence; the merits or otherwise of an independent inquiry into the events leading up to the bombings of 7 July; the importance of the further regionalisation and localisation of the operation of our security and intelligence services; the need to keep a vigilant eye on how the flaws, delays and unquantified costs of delayed IT systems can be remedied; and accountability for the operation of SOCA and other agencies. I repeat my gratitude to all members of the Committee for laying the report before us today.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. It is not quite 8 o'clock yet, but I remind the House that as from 8 o'clock, a 12-minute limit will be imposed on all Back-Bench speeches.

Ben Chapman: I speak as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, albeit of only one year's standing since the Committee was re-established after the election, and in the knowledge that there are Members in the Chamber tonight who have greater experience and who have served on the Committee before. It is a particular privilege to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), who leads the Committee with such great distinction.
	The report of the Committee for 2005-06 can be said to give the agencies a clean bill of health. That is as it should be. They serve us professionally, bravely and with distinction. But the report also expresses a number of concerns, some of which were raised earlier—concerns about the merging of the position of the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee with that of the security and intelligence co-ordinator, concerns that the rapid expansion of the services carries risks and needs careful management, and concerns about the overseas part of the SCOPE project.
	One notable feature of the report is the planned overall increase in the single intelligence account from a combined amount in terms of resources and capital of £1.1 billion in 2004-05 to £1.5 billion in 2006-07 and to £1.6 billion in 2007-08. That does not include the further £85 million announced by the Chancellor in the pre-Budget report to support the expansion of services, which will allow the earlier delivery of key elements of the expansion and which was initiated in the 2004 spending review.
	The significant additional funding made available since 9/11 has generally been accepted as essential to counter the enormous threat that we face from international terrorism and to provide an enhanced standard of coverage and assurance. However, it cannot be that, because an agency's operations are often secret, it should forgo normal management and financial disciplines—to be fair, no one has suggested that it should.
	Given that the current funding and anticipated funding represent an unprecedented level of new provision for the agencies, in the Committee's view, it is important that functioning mechanisms are implemented to ensure that the money is well spent, that it is appropriately controlled and monitored and that it serves as a driver for increased efficiency. We looked at that matter last year, we shall spend more time on it this year and it will be a key responsibility of the principal accounting officer of the single intelligence account.
	As has been said, the main focus of the Committee's work in 2005-06 was our inquiry into the 7 July bombings, which is not specifically covered in our annual report. Hon. Members have already referred to many aspects of the matter, but I want to mention the international dimension of the 7 July inquiry. Our report states that greater coverage in Pakistan or more resources in the UK might have alerted the agencies to the intentions of the 7 July group.
	I do not want to go beyond what was said in the report, but it is clear that Pakistan is an issue. As the report reveals, two of the group visited Pakistan, where it is likely that they had some training from or contact with al-Qaeda—indeed, the video which was recently released appears to make that explicit. The group's connections to Pakistan confirm the significance of overseas links and of travel to the development of terrorism in the UK. As has been said, the threat is unconstrained and global.

Kim Howells: I agree with the emphasis that my hon. Friend is placing on overseas contacts and travel. However, does he agree that people too often assume that everything that happens in Pakistan is bad? In fact, President Musharraf has made courageous decisions and taken helpful steps in trying to counteract the influence of dangerous people and trends in Pakistan.

Ben Chapman: Perhaps this goes beyond my brief, but it seems to me that President Musharraf faces many dichotomies, dilemmas and difficulties, which he strives, generally with good intent, to tackle as best he can—as we know, he is surrounded by problems. Earlier, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary mentioned the Commonwealth, which is also important. As today's sad events in Mumbai proved again, terrorism is a global issue, and it is no longer possible to separate the domestic and international parts of the problem. Terrorism comes from a range of groups, networks and individuals, which are sometimes linked and sometimes not.
	In a series of articles with headlines such as, "Spies hid bomber tape from MPs", some in the press have alleged that the Committee was not given all the information that it needed for its 7/7 inquiry, that it was not sufficiently critical and that it might have been misled. Although that is not the case in any respect, it is not surprising that such criticisms have been made, because disgruntled ex-staffers and so-called intelligence analysts combine with the press on the publication of the annual report to criticise the agencies and the oversight arrangements.
	Some, including hon. Members tonight, have questioned whether the Committee is constitutionally limited in what it can achieve, whether that is because of the limit on its investigative resources, its remit or its constitution, which makes it entirely dependent on the intelligence agencies for its information and on their willingness to disclose such information. As has been said, the Committee's form has its pros and cons, and I do not argue that, because it is currently so, it should necessarily remain so. The Committee was set up by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and appointments are made by the Prime Minister. Some have said that that gives it the appearance of being a creature of the Prime Minister and the Government, but it is not. We are independent of, not an instrument of, the Government. I believe that our reports confirm that, and, as has been said, members are drawn from all parties and both Houses.
	Some have said that out terms of reference to provide oversight of the agencies' administration, policy and finance are too limited and that we should operate as a Select Committee. We may not always report as the press or others want us to, but it is our job to try, as best we can, to tell it as it is, and I believe that we have achieved that. The Committee now considers and reports on matters that go wider than its statutory remit, and my time on it suggests to me that operating as a Select Committee is neither desirable nor, indeed, workable. There has been no occasion when we were unable to see those whom we wanted to see, when we were unable to obtain the information that we sought or when we did not ask the questions that we should have done, and I have seen no evidence to suggest otherwise.
	Our job is to provide parliamentary oversight.

Andrew MacKinlay: There is none.

Ben Chapman: If my hon. Friend allows me to proceed, I may persuade him otherwise.
	The Intelligence and Security Committee may not be a Committee of Parliament, but it is a parliamentary committee. We are responsible for oversight, not the day-to-day management of the agencies, so information about operations is often neither necessary nor helpful, and both sides have to conduct their work on a need-to-know basis. Where operations have become interlinked with policy or have policy implications, we have, in my view, always obtained the information that we need.
	It is noteworthy that so many other countries setting up their own parliamentary intelligence oversight arrangements draw on the experience of the ISC. Of course, I have no problem with increased powers—nobody likes a bit of power more than me—but the Committee, within its statutory establishment, performs well as it is.
	There are those who argue that the nature of the Committee, and the fact that we meet in private and operate within the ring of secrecy, means that there should, for the purposes of openness, be a public inquiry into the tragic events of 7 July, which are so much in our minds because of the recent anniversary. The call for a public inquiry is also made by the press, but often for their own reasons and often on flawed grounds. While I understand the deep concern of the victims and families involved in wanting to know that no stone has been left unturned and that they have got to the truth, it seems to me, even accepting the difficulty with the timing of the rail journey, that the findings of our report and those of the Home Office narrative, which were separately arrived at, are objective, workmanlike and mutually reinforcing.
	Prior to the establishment of the ISC, some inquiries took place precisely because of the absence of such a committee. The agency resources that would be needed to service a public inquiry—this is the point, rather than the cost—would be significant to massive. I am sure in my own mind that those resources are best deployed in trying to prevent future atrocities and tragedies. Of course, as the Home Secretary said, one can never entirely guarantee, as professional and committed as the agencies are, that we can never have such incidents again. Obviously, we can never have advance notice of terrorist acts. We can seek only to narrow the angle as far as possible, and in some cases manage to eliminate it altogether. As the Home Secretary has remarked, four potential attacks have been thwarted in the past year.
	The 90-day detention period has recently reappeared as an item for debate. That is not a matter specifically for our Committee. However, as a Member of Parliament, one is of course concerned that the law enforcement agencies should have the best tools at their disposal and that there is a legal framework and method for dealing with the terrorist threat—a terrorist threat of unprecedented awfulness and danger—as best they can. My first duty as a Member of Parliament is to do whatever I can to ensure that my constituents can go about their daily lives in safety. By extension, my duty as an MP among other MPs is to ensure that citizens of the United Kingdom have a similar freedom. People talk of 90 days detention, but it never was quite that—it was up to 90 days and then subject to judicial approval on a weekly basis.
	I appreciate that Parliament has already taken a view on the matter. However, I feel personally that there will be occasions when the current 28-day period proves inadequate: because of the need to intervene early; because intelligence is by its nature inexact, partial and fragmented and needs to be converted into evidence; because of the weight of the evidence that needs to be collected and analysed; because of the complexity of the inquiry and the need to trace data; and because of the difficulties arising in consulting other countries, interpretation and so on. The Home Affairs Committee recently commented on that, and it will continue to be an issue.
	Although during the year the agencies have rightly concentrated the bulk of their efforts on counter-terrorism, there remain issues of counter-espionage and the protection of our economic well-being. Although significant resources continue to be devoted to those, our companies' secrets and our intellectual property are vital to our prosperity. Espionage has not gone away with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and economic protection, including the crucial issue of energy security, will become increasingly important.

Andrew MacKinlay: I know that my hon. Friend takes a great interest in China. Did the Committee look into so-called patriotic hacking, whereby people from China, presumably with their Government's blessing, are accessing Government computers here, including, last year, in the House of Commons? When I asked the Foreign and Commonwealth about it, it did not want to get involved, but patriotic hacking is going on, it is coming from the People's Republic of China, and it is threatening intellectual property rights and national security. What does my hon. Friend say to that?

Ben Chapman: It is a fact that cyber-assaults on crucial institutions and organisations can be planned by individuals, by small and large groups or bodies, and, indeed, by nation states. If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will not comment on that particular example, but suffice it to say that the Committee is briefed on such issues.

Mark Pritchard: The hon. Gentleman is right to share his concerns about cyber-security. Does he share my concern that the Government Department tasked with co-ordinating cyber-security across Government—the Cabinet Office—has in recent months announced redundancies, yet is perhaps the very Department that should be expanded?

Ben Chapman: I have every confidence in the Cabinet Office's actions in this area. This issue will not only continue to be important but may become increasingly so, and it is something on which the Committee would wish to keep a weather eye.
	Finally, those who follow such matters will be interested to see that this year the asterisked items noting redacted passages are much reduced—not only, I hope, because of the Committee's robustness in challenging them, but as a sign of the times in that we have more openness.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I remind all right hon. and hon. Members that Mr. Speaker has now imposed a time limit of 12 minutes on Back-Bench speeches.

Malcolm Rifkind: I pay tribute to the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee over the past 12 years. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) said about the way in which the agencies can sometimes still be parodied. I recall my first visit to MI5 in the 1980s, when I was taken to a nondescript building somewhere behind Oxford street. The British public were not permitted to know that it housed MI5, although the Russians knew that perfectly well. Events have moved on, and we are slightly more grown-up about these matters.
	The hon. Member for Wirral, South (Ben Chapman) took comfort, rightly, in how few asterisks remain in the report. However, I wonder whether it is necessary in the public interest for Parliament and the public not to be aware of the distinction made on page 12 between resources and capital for the individual agencies. Would it really make Mr. bin Laden's task that much easier if that information were shared with him? Is not it time to realise that matters of public expenditure, in particular, can be safely shared with Parliament and with the public?
	We have heard about the merger of the posts of security and intelligence co-ordinator and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Like others, I know Sir Richard Mottram and have worked with him. I have no doubt that he, as an individual, will be able to combine those two tasks very satisfactorily. However, I do say to the Government that it is not appropriate to use this as a precedent in saying that the debate is now over and those two posts can sensibly be merged. That would be unwise and foolish.
	I pay tribute to the Committee for being about to consider rendition as its next major task. The United States sometimes protests to the effect that as rendition has been going on for many years, what is all the fuss? I hope that the Committee will draw attention to the fact that there are two kinds of rendition. There is the kind that takes place when Carlos the Jackal was kidnapped in Sudan and taken to France so that, for the first time, he could face a proper trial before a proper court of law, or when the Israelis kidnapped Adolf Eichmann in Argentina because he would never otherwise have come to justice. It may have been somewhat irregular, but at least it happened so that proper justice could be done. The rendition about which we are worried today is different. People in the custody of Governments such as that of the United States may be sent to countries where the last thing they would receive is a fair trial and where they might be subjected to improper treatment. That is different and it would be right for Parliament and the Committee to examine the matter in the greatest detail.
	I want to concentrate my brief comments on the Butler review and the Committee's reaction to it. Let me begin with a welcome. I noted with pleasure that the Committee welcomed the decision to provide a confidential guide in future to enable
	"specialist and lay readers of intelligence, including Ministers, to understand better the information in a source-based context."
	I wish that the Prime Minister had had access to such a document some years ago. If he had, the history of the past few years might have been different.
	I acknowledge the need for such a document. My introduction to the intelligence agencies was on my first day as a junior Minister in the Foreign Office. I was informed that a gentleman from MI6 wished to see me. He came into my office and I asked him what he wanted. With an unsmiling face, he said, "Minister, it's my job to indoctrinate you." I made some flippant remark such as, "I thought it was the Russians who were meant to be doing that", and he replied that it meant explaining the Official Secrets Act, which I would then be required to sign and be bound by. We have come a considerable way since then. It is important that Ministers in particular know not only how intelligence is obtained, but the use to which it can properly be put.
	In that context, I must strongly criticise not only the Butler review but the Committee, which has not properly held the Government to account for the way in which, in the run-up to the Iraq war, the intelligence agencies were misused and allowed themselves to be seriously misused. I could give several examples, but I refer in particular to the so-called "dodgy dossier" and I must emphasise my concern.
	There is nothing improper about the production of a document in public if the Government believe it appropriate to show the intelligence that supports their case. I have no objection to that or to the intelligence agencies' involvement in the preparation of such a document because that would obviously increase its reliability. However, my fundamental objection is that, as the Prime Minister admitted in the foreword, it was the first time in this country's history that a document had been produced in the name of the intelligence agencies to try to assist the Government of the day.
	Those who work in our intelligence agencies are non-political civil servants and it is inappropriate to bring them into a highly charged issue that, in the case of Iraq, divided not only political parties but the nation. I know that the official line of the Butler review and others, including the Government, is that the purpose of the document was not to argue for war. I acknowledge that. However, the Butler review concluded that the purpose of the Joint Intelligence Committee producing the document was to
	"gain support for the general direction in which Government policy had been moving"
	to get support for
	"a more proactive approach to enforcing Iraqi disarmament."
	That was a political objective and no business of the JIC. It should not have been asked to produce such a document and it should not have agreed to do so.
	The Butler report spells out the purpose of the document, although it fails to condemn it. Paragraph 323 states:
	"The advantage it gave to the Government of associating the JIC's name with the dossier was the badge of objectivity that it brought with it and the credibility which this would give to the document."
	That shows the Prime Minister's sad assumption that he could not achieve objectivity or credibility by himself, but required the JIC to do it for him. The chairman of the JIC was gravely at fault. When he was asked to produce the document, he should have resisted the request and, if the task was imposed on him, he should have resigned in the best interests of the country and the civil service. Instead, he has been promoted to be head of the Secret Intelligence Service. That is most unfortunate.
	It is unacceptable to use the JIC in that way, and not necessarily because the document was inaccurate. Even if it had been 100 per cent. accurate and the intelligence had been 100 per cent. reliable, it would have been improper for civil servants, who happen to be intelligence agency officials, to be used in such a politicised fashion. I hope that the Minister for the Middle East will say in his winding-up speech that the Government will never again contemplate using the intelligence agencies in that role. The Home Secretary made some good comments in his opening remarks about the dangers of relying on intelligence information. However, that factor did not appear to weigh heavily in the run-up to the Iraq war.
	The document contained grave problems. Apart from the failure to provide health warnings, which was spelled out on several occasions, it included the 45-minute claim. I could understand that, through some error, the document did not point out that it referred only to battleground weapons and that the Prime Minister was not aware of the distinction until many months after the end of the war. However, when the "Today" programme and all the newspapers publicised the 45-minute claim the following day, implying that it meant that British bases in Cyprus could be hit and other major international targets could be destroyed, I cannot understand why those who were most intimately involved in preparing the document did not immediately issue a statement to explain that there had been a misunderstanding and that they had not intended to make such a claim. Their failure to do that was due either to total incompetence or to the fact that it served the Government's purpose for the public to be alarmed, as they were at the time.

Norman Baker: The right hon. and learned Member is making a helpful speech. However, is not the position even worse? Is not it the case that the original intelligence was presented neutrally, with caveats, but that, as a consequence of memos from Alastair Campbell to John Scarlett, the caveats were removed and certainty included in the document?

Malcolm Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman is right. For five years, as Defence Secretary and then as Foreign Secretary, I saw such raw material. I saw the reports that came to me every day during that period. They were invariably accompanied by health warnings, not only because the information might be inaccurate, but because the person providing the information was sometimes being paid for it. Sometimes the informant was a defector from a regime who had his own agenda and wanted to spread information for his own reasons. Intelligence agencies understand that. However, I condemn the Government for not spelling out those matters to the nation when the media, perhaps inadvertently, misrepresented the JIC document.
	Although the Butler review did much good work, it failed the country in its comments on the matters that I have considered. However, I am saddened that the Committee, which in every other respect I greatly admire, has not taken as robust a position as it might have done, unless I have missed something—doubtless, I shall be corrected if I have—in protecting the interests of Parliament and the nation when the intelligence agencies operate in such a fashion. Many hon. Members of all parties wish the Intelligence and Security Committee to be given a greater role, but it must be willing to condemn in no uncertain terms the use of intelligence agencies in a politicised fashion, whichever party is in power.
	I hope that the Minister will comment on that, but I hope even more that lessons have been learned and that such mistakes will not be repeated.

Gavin Strang: The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) will understand if I resist the temptation to comment on his remarks. Suffice it to say that I had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we thoroughly considered the matter that he raised. His contributions are always valuable and reflect his huge experience as a former Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary, as he reminded us this evening.
	I had the privilege of serving on the Committee in the previous Parliament, from 2001 to 2005. It was different from its predecessor, with a new Chairman and new members comprising more than half the Committee. The same occurred again, with the appointment of a new Chairman and half the Committee being made up of new members. That is good and means that the Committee brings a fresh look to the issues. One of the things that struck me when reading the report was the extent to which it referred to issues in last year's report, which we worked hard to complete before the election. It is a matter of some regret to me that that report has never been debated; it should have been.
	The previous Committee was appointed just before 9/11, and the whole area of intelligence and security was transformed following those atrocities in the United States in 2001. Sadly, many of the developments in international affairs since then have served to fuel rather than dampen the rise of international terrorism. It is surely not controversial, for example, to suggest that Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib will have worked for our enemies in the global battle to win hearts and minds away from terrorism.
	With the increased threat of international terrorism, it quickly became apparent to the Committee on which I served, and to the Government, that there was an important need to increase the resources available to our intelligence agencies, and I pay tribute to the increases that have now taken place. The total funding for the agencies in 2000-01 was £862 million. The total budget this year is £1,568 million. The Government's response to the Committee's report refers to the £1 billion covering a rather wider area of security and intelligence, increasing to £2 billion. I am sure that the whole House will support those increases.
	It is one thing to increase the money available; however, the important thing is to ensure that that money is put to good use. The most important aspect of that is the increase in staffing that arose from the increased expenditure. Indeed, staff numbers at the Security Service are expected to rise about by 50 per cent. in the next three years, representing a substantial increase in addition to what has already taken place. As hon. Members have already mentioned, the Secret Intelligence Service has launched a website in the past year to aid recruitment, and it began advertising publicly for the first time in the press in May. The success of these recruitment procedures will not really become clear for at least four or five years, however, and we will not know until then whether the quality of the staff recruited will be up to the very important tasks for which they have responsibility.
	I was interested to see in the Committee's report that one of the roles of the professional head of intelligence analysis, put in place in the course of the last year, is to lead the cross-community work that is now under way to enhance the use of open source material alongside other sources. Of course, a key provider of open source information from around the world to the Government is BBC Monitoring. The Committee of which I was a member was tremendously impressed by the work of BBC Monitoring and by the potential for its future contribution. In successive reports, we expressed our concern at what was happening to BBC Monitoring, and I initiated a debate on the subject in the House of Commons on 23 March 2004.
	In the recent report, the Committee succinctly sets out the details of two to three years of unnecessary financial turmoil. The Committee is tactful, but essentially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office unilaterally reduced its contribution from £7.1 million to £3.1 million, and BBC Monitoring has now been transferred to the Cabinet Office as its sponsoring Department. I should like to put on the record that the stance taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office towards BBC Monitoring was deeply disappointing, and that it is a matter of regret that the FCO could no longer be entrusted with this tremendous national asset. It is my sincere hope that the new Foreign Secretary will recognise the importance of BBC Monitoring, particularly in the context of two of the major issues facing her Department and the people of this country: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increased threat from international terrorism.
	All those who worked on behalf of BBC Monitoring deserve credit for the fact that the present situation is not as bad as it could have been. Other contributing Departments are making up some of the financial gap left by the FCO, and funding this year has increased slightly to £24.6 million, although it is set to fall again in 2008-09 to £23.4 million. However, while the situation is not as bad as it could have been, it is not as good as it should be. If we consider the significant and welcome increases in funding to the agencies in recognition of the increased threat that we face, and if we consider the enhanced recognition of the importance of open source material to the work of the Government and their agencies, it is my view that we should also be seeing a growth in the resources and the work of BBC Monitoring. Instead, the funding shortfall will mean the closure of 69 posts. I realise that not all of those posts are currently filled, but I suggest that these cuts are taking us in the wrong direction. That does not strike me as a sign that we are looking after this asset entirely in the way we should be.
	I am pleased that the ISC has made a commitment to continue to monitor the arrangements for this important service, and I trust that Ministers will recognise the case for increasing the resources available to BBC Monitoring in the years to come, to reflect the increasing importance of the service and the growing demands placed upon it.
	The report is a little bit soft in its attitude towards the Ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services, known as the CSI. The Committee on which I served took the view that the CSI should meet regularly, although not necessarily every week or month. The report points out that Ministers consider issues such as Afghanistan in different Committees and are properly briefed by the agencies, and I do not doubt that. Nevertheless, we were convinced that there was a case for regular, if not frequent, meetings. We were particularly impressed by the equivalent arrangements that we saw in Australia.
	I am pleased to say that I can pay tribute to the Government for their decision on the Wilson doctrine. I do not think that anyone in the Chamber was in the House in 1966 when Harold Wilson set out his doctrine, although I had the privilege of serving in his Government subsequently. The doctrine stated that there would be no interception of telephones belonging to Members of Parliament. As the House will know, the interception of communications commissioner recommended, on the basis of the new regulatory powers that came into operation in 2000, that that undertaking should be abandoned, and the Prime Minister gave due consideration to that recommendation, as he was duty bound to do. I congratulate him—and the Committee on the role that it played in this—on the fact that that proposal has been abandoned. There is no question of the Wilson doctrine being changed and Members' telephones will not be intercepted by the Government of the day.

David Tredinnick: When this Committee was first mooted many years ago, I had grave reservations about it. I thought that it would be dangerous and damaging to the security services. Having read this report thoroughly and looked at the others, however, I now have to say that the Committee has made a major contribution. It has acted responsibly in carrying out its remit, and we should be grateful to it and to the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) for their work. Having said that, I have real worries about certain aspects of the report, including its structure. If I have time, I also want to talk about the costs involved.
	I should perhaps declare an interest. I have had some dealings with terrorism in the past, and with the agencies of our enemies—principally the KGB, for reasons that I will explain in a moment. I served in Northern Ireland, where it was pretty clear who the enemy was: it was the IRA. I also served with the British Army of the Rhine in Berlin, defending the border there. The enemy there was pretty clear: it was the Russians and the KGB. We used to go round the Soviet sector in British military mission cars, and the KGB used to come over to our sector in their spy cars. There were pretty clearly drawn lines about who could do what.
	I was a little involved in 9/11, in that I was in New York just after the event. Driving into the city, where I had worked many years ago, the orange horizon and the missing buildings made an indelible impression on me. I was staying in mid-town, and I remember the awful smell and the roar of the emergency vehicles and rubble trucks as they drove up and down at night. I had not realised how badly all that had affected me until I tried to make a speech about it to the Market Bosworth Rotary club. I found my eyes filling with tears, and I could not continue with my speech.
	Later, in the spring of 2004, I was involved in the launch of the British Memorial Garden Trust UK Ltd, a charity formed to support the building of the memorial garden to the 67 British victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which is currently being built in New York. The launch took place in this House, appropriately, I think, in the Churchill room. Although I am no longer involved in the project, I would ask that the House recognise that a small number of people, on both sides of the Atlantic, have worked extremely hard to complete the garden, due in the spring of next year, and to raise the necessary funding of several million pounds. I am sure that I speak for the whole House in extending to them our wholehearted support and best wishes.
	The report has several main thrusts. One of them is the efficiency and effectiveness of the security services, and the Committee has done a lot to improve the mechanism for working by following its remit of examining policy administration and expenditure. The agencies are also much more accountable now, certainly in relation to the use of resources. Reading between the lines, it must be said that financial management was not a big part of the work of the agencies in the past. Methods of redress of grievances, which were addressed by Butler and taken up by the Committee, have also been important.
	If I may say so to the right hon. Member for Torfaen, the structure of the report is quite complicated. Obviously, there are the three main agencies, but many other subsections are listed, and it is sometimes hard to see how they tie in. I very much approve of the Committee's attempt to try to find common ground between the agencies, to reduce duplication and costs. I echo the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Wirral, South (Ben Chapman) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) about the combining of the posts of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman. Reading the report, I got the feeling that the Committee was deeply uneasy about that—that it had taken advice and agreed to it, but was not too happy about it. I hope that the right hon. Member for Torfaen goes back and looks at that, and does not just accept it as read.
	Another aspect of the report that alarmed me was the paragraph on the ministerial committee. From memory, the Intelligence and Security Committee remarked that the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services had met only once in the last 10 years. What is going on? The ISC report qualifies that by saying, "It's all right, guys and girls, because they talk to each other elsewhere." That completely misses the point. The whole point of that committee is for Ministers of State and Under-Secretaries, not Cabinet Ministers, to get round a table, come up with some ideas and understand the real worries. Paragraph 76, on page 22, makes it clear that Ministers across Government need to have a clear understanding of intelligence. If the Minister for the Middle East is listening—I hope so, as we have talked and listened to each other over the years—I ask him to consider that, as it is a real concern. The report states:
	"We recommend that there should be a requirement for newly appointed Ministers and officials in key posts to familiarise themselves".
	Yes, there should be.
	Another concern, which has not been mentioned, is that the occupancy of the new GCHQ building is up by 25 per cent. The building must be bursting at the seams. What is happening about that unexpected increase in manpower and personnel, which has completely thrown the planning process? I hope that the Committee considers that.
	As for the clarity of the report, I was not really happy with its structure. According to the index, "The Intelligence Community" is dealt with on pages 5 to 11, and "The Agencies" on pages 11 to 21. Surely the agencies are part of the intelligence community. What is the purpose of that division? In the previous two Parliaments, I was the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and of the Statutory Instruments Committee, and one of the issues that we considered was how to achieve clarity in reports. If ever a report needed lines, diagrams and boxes to explain the different relationships, it is this one. In particular, on the role of the intelligence staff, I thought that sub-headings to make it clear that not everyone reports to SIC would be helpful.
	Acronyms are another issue. The report mentions SCOPE, which is not an acronym for anything, but it does not say what it means—it does not say that it is an IT intelligence system. Paragraph 75, on page 22, contains the following quote:
	"I have regular meetings with C"
	I wondered who "C" was. I thought that it must be short for CDI. Then I realised that it was CDI who had the regular meetings with C. I therefore turned back to the page of acronyms—there are 43, so it took me a few minutes to read—and C is not listed. Next time, can we manage to include C and SCOPE?
	The antiquated terminology of commissioners is another issue. We have the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and, apparently, we also have commissioners in the security services. Those who have been in the House a while know that there are also Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, which is a code name for the senior Whips who sign all the Government cheques. When they are not beating Members over the head, they go back and sign Government cheques for £20 million. I do not like that terminology; it is misleading, and we should change it. We should call them directors, monitoring officers or ombudsmen.
	Nowhere in the report is MI5 or MI6 mentioned—it is like an alien culture. The Home Secretary mentions it, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) mentioned it, everyone uses it; it is common terminology. The report should say that the Security Service is commonly known as MI5 and that the Secret Intelligence Service is commonly known as MI6, so that it is more readable.
	In 1989, I was asked to take over the British Atlantic group of young politicians. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea, the Minister for the Middle East and the right hon. Member for Torfaen came with me, and we paid visits to Canada, America and so on. We then turned the whole group to face east, and took delegations to the east. Douglas Hurd, who was then Foreign Secretary, agreed to speak at a conference where there were 100 young MPs. I asked him whether we could use Lancaster house, because had had given it to me on another occasion. I went to Brussels on a SHAPE visit and sat next to a Russian chap in the bar. I said that I had a brief to find young politicians in Russia and bring them over here. I said that that was what the Foreign Office wanted and he said exactly what I wanted, "I am a KGB man and a spy, and I will help you out". That was great; we had a good arrangement.
	The point is that east Europe has changed and a lot of our old enemies are now friends. There is a whole diaspora of spies out there and I suspect that they are available at a very cheap price. I hope that the right hon. Member for Torfaen is looking into ways of getting our former enemies to work for us. I believe that he has done a great job with the report, which takes our intelligence services forward in the right direction. One or two issues need to be addressed, but I welcome what has taken place.

Mike Gapes: Speaking as an MP with a large number of British Indian constituents, many of whom will have relatives living in Mumbai and its surrounding areas, may I begin by expressing my absolute horror and disgust at today's terrorist bombings. I hope that none of my constituents has relatives involved in the tragedy. My sympathy and commiserations go to all those affected. It is yet another outrage, occurring during a week in which the man responsible for the Beslan murders in Russia has been killed. We can also think of other terrorist events and outrages all over the world.
	As the report produced by the Committee chaired by my long-standing and right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) pointed out, there is a serious and sustained threat from international terrorism to the UK and its interests overseas, the most significant being from al-Qaeda and associated networks. The Foreign Affairs Committee drew a similar conclusion in our report, "The Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism", published just a few days ago on 2 July.
	The Intelligence and Security Committee states in its report:
	"There is increasing international tension over Iran's nuclear programme and backing of groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. There is a possibility of an increased threat to UK interests from Iranian state-sponsored terrorism should the diplomatic situation deteriorate."
	Similarly, our Select Committee drew attention to the potential difficulties of moving towards either sanctions or military action. We also noted that the Iranian regime could respond in certain ways, including asymmetrically. The ISC report refers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as another potential danger to the UK's security and, once again, the Foreign Affairs Committee report strongly concurs. All three conclusions of the ISC echo the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
	Interestingly, there is another echo, which I find apposite. The ISC notes that the Secret Intelligence Service
	"has started to implement a policy of requiring senior managers to obtain relevant professional skills, and holders of key posts within corporate services will be expected to attain professional qualifications. The Service considers these structural and training changes essential to improve operational focus, to enable more efficient management of resources, and to meet the challenge of planned growth."
	The Foreign Affairs Committee has been calling on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—though possibly with less success than the ISC—for some considerable time to ensure that its senior managers have appropriate professional skills. If the Secret Intelligence Service can do it, surely the diplomatic service can.
	I also concur with my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang), who referred to the budget for BBC Monitoring. Our Select Committee had concerns about the changes and the budget reduction, so I am pleased that the ISC has welcomed the fact that other stakeholders have made up the shortfall and come forward to ensure that the vital work of BBC Monitoring is continued for a planned period for the future. It was a matter of great concern to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, and we are pleased that a solution has been found in the short term.
	I want to point to one area where I am concerned about the ISC report. It relates to the following narrow and limited statement:
	"The Committee is currently looking into the issue of rendition and will report in due course."
	I raise that matter because for almost a year in the present Parliament and about six months in the last Parliament—going back to February 2005—the Foreign Affairs Committee has been putting questions about extraordinary rendition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We had the frustrating experience of being told that we were not being given that information because it was going to the ISC.
	I was therefore interested—perhaps my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen can correct me—that he said, I thought, that the ISC was about to begin an inquiry into this matter. We have been told by the Foreign Office for 18 months that, in fact, we were not being given the information because the ISC was carrying out that inquiry. I should be grateful for some clarification.
	I want to be fair to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In our latest report, on the information that we have discovered from different sources, including from a more open approach from the FCO more recently, we concluded that there was no hard evidence of the truth of any of those allegations, but that is based on the limited information given to us, having been told that intelligence information would not be given to us, even on a confidential basis, because it was being given to another Committee.
	I hope therefore that, when my right hon. Friend's Committee comes to a conclusion on this matter, he will be able to report to the House that he has got to the bottom of it and found out all the facts of the matter, because the Foreign Affairs Committee cannot say, on the limited information that we have been given, that we have done so, even though we have found no hard evidence. I should be grateful to the Minister if he took up that point when he responds to the debate.
	I drew attention to another concern in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis). When the ISC was established in 1994 by the then Conservative Government, it was not a Committee of the House and its secretariat was based in the Cabinet Office. Its Chairman, despite his estimable qualities, does not sit on the Liaison Committee, for example, because he has a particular role. I believe that the time has come for the House to revisit that issue. In fact, the Foreign Affairs Committee produced a special report in March 2004, in which we said that the House should consider the following questions:
	"What should be the status of the Intelligence and Security Committee? What principles and procedures should govern relations between the Intelligence and Security Services and Committees of this House?"
	We received information from the former Foreign Secretary, the Leader of the House of Commons, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw), who told us that
	"Parliament has decided that the ISC is the appropriate body to see intelligence."
	That is not satisfactory, and I should be interested if the Minister could tell me when he responds to the debate where in the proceedings on the 1994 Bill or in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 itself there is a statement that specifically supports that assertion.
	Committees of the House, appointed by Members, in confidence and subject to various qualifications, should have the right to have access to intelligence material and should not be deprived of that access on the basis of a catch-all, whereby things are pushed off to the ISC, however good and estimable its members and however fine their recommendations, because that Committee is not accountable to us as Members, even though we are having the debate today. That Committee reports to the Prime Minister; it does not report to the House of Commons. I believe that that fundamental issue relates not just to the Foreign Affairs Committee, but to other Select Committees, and I hope that we can revisit it and that the House of Commons itself can consider the way forward in the future.

Alan Beith: It is particularly interesting to follow the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. There are many ways in which Committees can co-operate, and the Intelligence and Security Committee has successfully co-operated with a number of other Committees, including the Public Accounts Committee—thanks to which we get very significant help from National Audit Office staff in some of our work—and, indeed, with the Foreign Affairs Committee.
	Perhaps some of the ways in which such things were approached in the report to which the hon. Gentleman referred were not the most helpful and constructive, but there must be some realism and some recognition that serious parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence will not happen if it is too widely dispersed. It must be done within a very controlled context, but it is quite possible for inquiries to take place in one Committee, which deals with the wider policy implications, and in the ISC, which deals with specific intelligence aspects.
	I do not want to spend the limited time that I have on such general issues, interesting though they are; I have talked about them before. Instead, I shall make a few specific points, one of which is a reflection on the Forest Gate incident that caused much concern. On the one hand, that incident led some people to say, "The intelligence must have been shown to be weak, so the police should not have gone in." On the other, there were statements emanating from within the police and from others saying, "We cannot ignore intelligence that indicates the likelihood of something very serious being plotted. We have to act."
	I wish to draw the Minister's attention to the fact that in my view, there will be other occasions when intelligence about which there cannot be certainty cannot be ignored, either. So we have to develop sophisticated police tactics that enable them to act in such circumstances without running the risk of massive community alienation. That is very difficult, because policemen have to be protected as well; they must not go into such situations with insufficient protection. But we will have to find ways of using subtle police tactics to ensure that we can respond to intelligence reports that are sufficiently serious not to be ignored, but which are not so certain that we can go in without any doubt that we will find the terrorist or the device that is the object of the inquiry. So there are lessons to be learned from Forest Gate.
	I turn to a completely different issue, to which the Government's response is incomplete: the continued failure of Departments to reach agreement on the funding of the security services' future work in Northern Ireland. We expressed concern that that might hinder planning of such work. We have been given assurances that planning is going ahead, and the Government indicated likewise in their response, but the fact is that the dispute has not been resolved. Departments are still arguing with each other about who is picking up which tab for this work. That is ridiculous and cannot be allowed to go on. I hope that Ministers will address that issue.
	A point was made earlier in the debate about co-operation between intelligence agencies. I suspect that lying behind that is an argument that is sometimes advanced by one or two people in this House, and which was more recently advanced in another place: that perhaps we should just amalgamate all the intelligence services in this changed and different world. That would be a mistake, but I want to put on the record that in the 12 years in which I have served in this work and scrutinised such agencies, I have noticed a massive change in the nature and extent of the co-operation between them. There was a great deal of mutual suspicion, rivalry, distance and separation when I first became involved in this work. However, there have been remarkable changes in the intervening years: joint operations; a great deal of secondment across agencies; partnerships of one sort or another; and agencies in which people from each of the intelligence bodies are involved, so that they become accustomed to working together.
	Such approaches have developed to such an extent that they are the envy of many other countries. We deal with and talk to people from oversight committees and intelligence agencies in many countries, and they are generally pretty envious of the degree of co-operation and co-ordination between our services. That is working, although it can be improved. The entire Iraq experience demonstrated this point, as did the role of the Defence Intelligence Staff. The Committee has taken an ever-closer interest in defence intelligence, having been encouraged to do so—and given the support to do so—by the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary, following some problems that we had.
	The substantive point that I want to make emerged from two or three of the ISC's reports and from the Butler report: the importance of ensuring that intelligence is rigorously challenged as it is brought in and analysed, and that it is cross-referenced to relevant expertise and open-source information. It is a kind of triangulation process: if someone gets a piece of intelligence, they need to make sure that they set it in the context of what they or other people know because of their expert knowledge—that signally failed to happen at certain points during the weapons of mass destruction discussion, for example—and that it is related to open-source information that could put that intelligence into a rather different context when one realises the circumstances in which it might have been generated. All those elements have to be drawn together, and that means that people sometimes have to challenge the first conclusions that are drawn from a piece of intelligence.
	Special ways to do that have been suggested both in our reports and in the Butler report, to which I shall refer briefly. Our overall view, however, is that we do not want a culture of acceptance or deference in the intelligence world. As with any good academic inquiry, there must be a culture in which things that are said are challenged—in which people say "Just a minute: that does not tally with something else", or "Can we really make that stand up?" Such discussion is necessary. It should not be repressed or discouraged, or simply institutionally not provided for.
	I am glad to say that that has been addressed in a number of ways. There are internal arrangements in the Secret Intelligence Service for a challenge process to ensure that the first obvious explanation is not automatically accepted. There is the role of the JIC Chairman, which has been discussed a fair amount today. The JIC traditionally operates on a basis of producing consensus reports. That too is envied in other countries where rival intelligence interpretations are slammed down on the desks of Presidents and Ministers with the words "You make up your mind: here is what difficult organisations think", which is not always very productive.
	We go for a consensus approach in this country, winnowing down all the intelligence to produce the consensus; but there is a danger in that. In paragraph S of our latest report, we said
	"We are, however, still concerned that, in seeking consensus on all decisions and judgements, the JIC could be missing or failing to give sufficient priority to key points or vital arguments on a particular issue. We acknowledge that striking the right tone and balance... is extremely difficult, but we recommend that the SIC should continue to work on developing and refining this process further."
	In their response, the Government mentioned the new obligation to put dissent notes on the front of a JIC paper if the chairman is aware of unresolved dissent in the interpretations of the different bodies that sit on the JIC. That is very welcome.
	Along with all that go proper channels for the expression of dissent so that staff feel that they can "hang on in there" if they are still convinced that something is wrong, and have somewhere to go. To an extent that constitutes a counsel against potentially dangerous whistleblowing that blows sources. One individual's judgment on when the national interest demands that he go public may well not be shared by a great many people if, at the end of the day, it means that we lose an intelligence source that we want to keep. Opportunities for people to express dissent to those in a higher position than the level of management immediately above them is very important. That is now an accepted element of the role of staff counsellors. In the Ministry of Defence, members of staff can talk to senior personnel who are not involved in intelligence.
	An important rule in the DIS is that a DIS senior official should see intelligence and advise on its distribution. That goes back to the issue of weapons of mass destruction, and the failure of key DIS officials who had expert knowledge to see intelligence that they could and would have challenged. A recommendation in the report that the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said he would have valued relates to guidance to Ministers and others on how to read intelligence, and how to interpret its significance. That is relevant to the triangulation of intelligence—to setting intelligence in context, and understanding what it can and cannot do for us.
	The way in which we develop, analyse and use intelligence is fundamental to making good use of the massive resources and massive effort that go into it. That is why I chose to concentrate on the issue.

Andrew MacKinlay: I have already indicated my view that apart from this welcome but very short debate, there is no parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services. Let me get this out of the way immediately: obviously I have a high regard for our colleagues who serve on the committee, but that is the only nice thing that I can say about them in the present context, although I do express the hope that they may have some regard for me too. I believe that their membership of the committee diminishes Parliament, and I invite them to reflect on what I say and on their position.
	I was a member of the parliamentary assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe last week. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave us a briefing note on the question of parliamentary oversight of the security and intelligence services. It had the audacity to include the observation that the British system was exemplary, and parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence was wonderful. I threw it across my hotel room in disgust, because either the author was blind to at least some parliamentary opinion or he really believes that. Either way, he was wrong. I challenged my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House, the former Foreign Secretary, about that point at the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said—and this view was adopted by the author of the report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—that it was a distinction without a difference, so what was the problem. I believe that if that is said often enough, people will start believing it. But it is not a parliamentary Committee. There is no parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services other than these precious minutes that we get once a year.
	The committee is anointed and appointed by the head of the security and intelligence services—the Prime Minister, who is both judge and jury. The committee let us down in the previous Parliament when it abdicated its responsibility to the Butler inquiry on such matters as the dodgy dossier. If it had been a parliamentary Committee, it would have said, "That is our business, Prime Minister. You can appoint whoever you like, but we will decide how we conduct our own inquiry." But the committee surrendered even the fig leaf of a remote relationship with Parliament.
	The committee is made up of parliamentarians, but it is not a parliamentary Committee. I listened to my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) carefully and I intervened on him on this point. He said that the committee members are selected by the Prime Minister, but he takes advice. Well, who gives that advice? I have already indicated that I would decline to serve on the committee, in the unlikely event that I were asked to do so under the present regime. It would be repugnant to me.
	I am unlikely to be invited to serve on the committee for a variety of reasons. If one rubs up the system in this country the wrong way, one is considered mad or bad, or both. I do not mean that Ministers necessarily hold that view, but the people who give the advice do so. I want to share with the House a very serious story, but I hope that no one will press me too much on the details. I recently became aware of what I consider a highly defamatory remark about me on a Government file. Since then, the permanent secretary and the Secretary of State involved have apologised to me—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. Does the point that the hon. Gentleman is making relate to the report?

Andrew MacKinlay: It relates to the issue of selection for service on the committee. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the matter, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen mentioned advisers. We do not know their names, but my concern is that they are privy to false statements about hon. Members. Presumably, such statements are forwarded to the security and intelligence services. The comment about me had been on a file since 2003 and I got to know about it only by accident.
	Reference has been made to the Data Protection Act 1998. I put in an application under the Act and found that there were vexatious, mendacious and malicious comments about me in various documents. Those comments would have disqualified me from consideration by the Prime Minister for membership of the committee. It is, therefore, not a parliamentary Committee. Under the Select Committee system, one can apply, through one's party, and be accepted or rejected. One cannot apply to sit on the Intelligence and Security Committee. A Prime Minister might decide that someone is worth considering, and their name will be submitted for the scrutiny of people whose names we do not know. The candidate could be vetoed for reasons that neither he nor anyone else are aware of. That is the danger and that is the relevance of my personal experience to the constitutional position of this flawed and unparliamentary committee.
	With the greatest respect to my colleagues on the committee, we do not know how it works. We do not know how it selects areas for inquiry. We did not know until this evening even who the committee's clerk was. My hon. Friend the right hon. Member for Torfaen told us the name, which before tonight was always considered highly secret information. The ridiculous secrecy surrounding the ISC diminishes any confidence that I as a parliamentarian might have in its ability to probe adequately the conduct, competence and management abilities of the people who run our security and intelligence services.
	I think that the ISC is seriously flawed. I hope, Madam Deputy Speaker, that you will look at the  Official Report tomorrow, and that you will consider the matters that I am raising to be absolutely valid, as they go to the heart of the selection process for the ISC. To whom is the committee accountable? It is a very serious matter if files on Members of Parliament are kept, without their knowing about it, by departmental officials. We find out about such files only when we stumble across them by accident. In some cases, they contain information about who our interlocutors are, and who would seek to gain our ear.
	I turn now to the Wilson doctrine, which is covered in paragraphs 26 to 28 of the ISC report. I wish that the Home Secretary were in his place, as it is rare for me to compliment him, but it is to his credit that he made it clear that he did not support a proposal to end the Wilson doctrine. Nevertheless, that doctrine is wholly inadequate when it comes to protecting the rights of Members of Parliament. However, what we have we need to hold. As I understand it, the doctrine deals with old-fashioned landline telephones, and does not take account of computer technology or the fact that equipment is so sophisticated now that eavesdropping can be carried out at great distances.
	I am not confident that people who do not have ministerial authority are not probing the communications of Members of Parliament. I am not making this up: my observations are based on my own painful experience of discovering comments about me in files that should not have contained them. The Executive branch of Government must assure every Member of Parliament that they are not subject to surveillance, and that no undue probing of their technologies is being carried out.
	If we had more insight into how the ISC selects its work, we might have greater confidence in it and be able to suggest areas of inquiry. I am especially concerned about one matter that in the past has caused laughter in the House, although I do not know why. I discovered, through a disclosure under the Data Protection Act 1998, that 13 officials—from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence community—met on 13 January for what was described as a "handling strategy" meeting about parliamentary questions that I had submitted in relation to Project Coast.
	When I questioned the relevant Minister about the matter, he said at the Dispatch Box that there was nothing in it at all, but I disagree. Information from court cases and South Africa's Truth and Justice Commission has revealed that a person equivalent to Dr. Mengele was working—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has points that he wants to make about his own circumstances, but I remind him that time is limited. I hope that his remarks can be related rather more directly to the report under discussion.

Andrew MacKinlay: I am astounded, Madam Deputy Speaker, as I am trying to demonstrate that we lack parliamentary accountability in this area. I have been prevented on two occasions from explaining how I think that our present system is flawed. I want to make it clear that Ministers—the Executive branch of Government—have been instructed to close me down and stop me pursuing a legitimate inquiry.
	The South African apartheid regime had a facility equivalent to our Porton Down. I believe that there was intercourse between that facility and UK intelligence and security services, and that people from the real Porton Down were also involved. There is evidence that an unhealthy sanctions-breaking attempt was covered up because some of the people involved are still members of the security and intelligence community and do not want an investigation. I do not say that the attempt was authorised by Ministers at the time, but it happened none the less.
	This is my only opportunity to shed daylight on that serious matter. It is something that the ISC—flawed though it is—should investigate. Evidence from the South African court proceedings, which is available on the web, shows that people from the UK broke the law and were involved with Dr. Wouter Basson, who has been described as a South African Dr. Mengele, in sanctions-busting—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's time is up.

Ben Wallace: The ISC was set up and given its remit in 1994. Things have moved on and we live in very different times. The Home Secretary referred to changes in terrorism, so perhaps we should examine the Committee that oversees the changes in the threat from terrorism. After all, over time, in response to that threat, other bodies, such as the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, have changed their structure and the way in which they are scrutinised. Now is the time to look at a complete overhaul of our intelligence system.
	When we discuss the current jihadi or terrorist threat, we must be careful not to confuse terrorist attacks with how we defeat terrorism. When I consider my intelligence experience during my service in Northern Ireland and the situation to date, there is not much difference. The principles of defeating terrorism remain the same, even though different groups of terrorists are trying to achieve different ends. However, that must not be used as a red herring to say that that is why we need to throw away certain rights and keep things less transparent than they should be.
	Islamic terrorists are no different from Irish terrorists. They are human beings motivated by greed, revenge, ambition, attention seeking and a range of issues that make them vulnerable to recruitment. They are also vulnerable to logistics. They need a logistical chain, whether or not it is as structured as the IRA's. They are vulnerable when they go to Pakistan to be trained or when they meet in bookshops in Leeds. Such vulnerabilities are common to all terrorist networks, even if their opportunities are fewer.
	Our intelligence services and police force must be able to exploit those vulnerabilities—to head those groups off at the pass and catch them red-handed. But saying that current terrorists are much more dangerous is not an excuse for putting people's human rights at risk or jeopardising the contribution that communities can make to defeating terrorism.
	On this tragic day of the attack in India, we should remember that terrorists have always done what works. They do not need to reinvent the wheel. The bomb attacks on trains in Chechnya in Russia worked, so the terrorists did the same thing in Spain. They took the attack to London, because those tactics worked and now they have taken the attack to India. Ministers sometimes seem to believe that terrorists are so sophisticated that we need a load of new rules because they are about to invent the atomic bomb, but the terrorists attacked the twin towers with aeroplanes and Stanley knives. Their tactics have been effective, so we should not be distracted by red herrings—by getting so high-tech that we forget how to defeat terrorists and ignore the fact that the original principles about getting inside a terrorist organisation have not changed.
	There are real questions to be asked and I hope that the chairman of the ISC will consider them over the next year. Is the overall structure of our intelligence community correct? MI5 was started in 1909, when its main thrust was to expose espionage in this country and people who were spying on it. There is also MI6 and special branch, which was originally regional and is now semi-regional and national. Is that the right way to go? I am talking about the relationship between MI5, an intelligence-gathering body, and a police force that is about evidence gathering and conviction. One has only to look at Forest Gate to start asking questions about the handover between intelligence, conviction and the gathering of evidence. That is one of the key things that we have to learn if we are to defeat terrorism. We have to do it inside the law.

John Reid: I want the hon. Gentleman to know that the Government are not opposed to looking at such structures. We were discussing strategy earlier tonight. I am firmly of the view that we should continue to look at structures, co-ordination and the best output and capability in relation to the resources that we have got. I do not think that he is arguing against where we are coming from on that. We may reach different conclusions, but he is certainly making a good point.

Ben Wallace: I am not trying to say that the Home Secretary has a different view. My view is of an FBI-type arrangement, but others will have different views. We have to look at the special branch relationship. Regional special branch is funded by chief constables and reports nationally. There is SO12 in the Metropolitan police. All of those could do with improvement. There is plenty of scope to make sure that we get that chain up to date.
	Perhaps we need to look at the powers of the services. There is something important that seems to have been missed. When I served in Northern Ireland, either in a uniform or carrying a weapon out of a uniform, I had emergency powers. As a member of the armed forces, I had emergency powers to stop and arrest people and to use a weapon outside Ministry of Defence land. We have a lot of Army operations on our mainland to assist the police or the security services.

Patrick Mercer: Does it surprise my hon. Friend, in view of his experience and mine in Northern Ireland, that, with increasing operations by military units on the mainland, the Government have still apparently given no thought to the establishment of military intelligence liaison officers around the various constabularies?

Ben Wallace: I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for that intervention. He is absolutely right. That relates to the legal powers of soldiers serving on the streets. We have to ask these questions. Has the Government given people emergency powers? The armed forces on the mainland do not have executive powers under firearms legislation to act in the way that our police forces do. For example, if, during the course of the Stockwell investigation, it transpires that soldiers were involved, we have to be careful that there is not a grey area. We have to remember that a solider has no more rights than you or I on the street in the UK—as opposed to a policeman, who does have those executive powers. That is an important issue that we need to consider.
	We also have to look at what is happening in Northern Ireland, where the Government have said that they would like to move members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland special branch to MI5. I have worked alongside PSNI special branch. They are excellent men and women who have learned that one cannot short-cut terrorism. They have learned that the hard way and they have got extremely good results. When I met a few of them recently, I said, "You do realise that if you belong to MI5, you do not have executive powers. You cannot carry a weapon in South Armagh. You cannot go and arrest someone to pull them in to interview them. You do not have all the powers that you used to use to protect yourself and to help you to get access to informers." That is important.
	I said to a current serving policeman, "Would you like to go into Turf Lodge without a gun? Would you like to go to South Armagh, to Crossmaglen, without a gun?" He said, "You can bet your bottom dollar, I'm not going there." But that is the subtle implication of some of the changes. It is important that the Government pick up the detail when it comes to reforming and moving the intelligence picture along, because if they do not, the person who will bear the brunt at the end of the day will be the individual soldier, the individual policeman, or one of the security service personnel. That is important.
	It is interesting to note that the average age of a special branch PSNI individual is about 45 in Northern Ireland; the average age of the MI5 recruits who go there is 28. That is a vast gap in experience and knowledge and a vast gap in relation to the people perhaps best placed to recruit informers and go about getting under the skin of terrorists in Northern Ireland. For all the reports, they have not gone away. The infrastructure is still there.
	In this day and age, transparency is very important. Owing to the way in which the security services started, they are obsessed with secrecy. It is important that MI5 moves more into the modern world. If it is to work alongside the police each day in offices in our regions, it must accept that there will be a drive for more transparency in not counter-espionage, but the counter-terrorism field. When the agency hands over information to the police and the police act on it and get things wrong, it is the police that get the blame. The public attacked the chain of command in the Metropolitan police over Forest Gate, but perhaps Security Service intelligence should have been considered on that occasion. MI5 must come into the real world when it comes to transparency. There is no KGB operating in the same way MI5's counter-terrorism functions, so there is a real need to examine the transparency in MI5.
	We should remember that there is no short cut to countering terrorism. The draconian laws that we pass to try to do that will have an impact on the human intelligence that we try to recruit, so they will make a difference. The end result of an operation in Northern Ireland that I joined was that 21 members of the IRA were put down, but it took more than a decade to achieve that. We must accept the rough with the smooth, and the Home Secretary was right that if we get things wrong sometimes, that is life. If we all miss the terrorist, that is life. However, we must also realise that we cannot deny people human rights as a short cut, because the end result of that will be that Muslim communities will produce no informers or sources and will not collaborate with the forces of law and order, although such collaboration and information is the only way of defeating terrorism in that community in the long term.

Dari Taylor: I express my revulsion at the bombings in Mumbai today. I am the secretary of Labour Friends of India, and I feel desperately sorry for the families and the members of the emergency services who are attempting to sort out that situation tonight.
	I have had the privilege of serving for one year on the ISC under the able chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy). This year, the Committee has subjected the heads of agencies and their teams to rigorous, often lengthy questioning. It has invariably been detailed, but it has never been soft. I have found it thoroughly offensive to read in the press that the ISC is "weak", "spineless", "ineffective" and "tame". Frankly, I do not recognise any of those words with regards to the ISC.
	To my knowledge, the agencies have never held back any information. We have never held back on any question that we wanted to ask. No member of the Committee believes that we are there to protect the reputation of the Administration. We are there to get the truth. We seek the truth and we print it. The report that we have published is thorough and wide-ranging. I was delighted to hear not only the Secretary of State, but the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), say that they agreed.
	During the year, we have not only questioned the agencies, but visited them——some more than once and many of them on many occasions. When we have not been confident that we have got the detailed response that we required, we have written and they have responded. There has been a thorough process by which we have critically and constructively examined the work of agencies. I want the House to believe that there is not a question that I would not ask, or a chance that I would let the agencies off on any score. We need to know, and if we need to improve, we need to say that we are improving. The report is thus fair, thorough and wide-ranging. When we visited security services abroad, their universal opinion was that our security services were highly professional, and served our country well. Many of them were complimentary about the work of the ISC. My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) said that we are not a parliamentary oversight committee, but I believe that we are. Our work is intense and demanding and, although I am privileged to serve on the Committee, I do not think that I am special or different.

Tobias Ellwood: The hon. Lady is making a powerful statement about the Committee's performance. However, Ann Taylor, the predecessor of the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), presented a report on the Bali bombings that was ignored by the House. What are the hon. Lady's views on that?

Dari Taylor: The hon. Gentleman rightly reminds the House that we must always discuss those reports and look at their details. The decision not to discuss the report was not appropriate. I hope that response suffices.
	I am not concerned about the report itself, but I am concerned about something that it examines—the SCOPE project which, if and when it works, will offer the security services enormous support. That IT programme will enable all intelligence organisations in the UK and abroad fundamentally to improve the way in which they work together by transferring data electronically in a secure and timely manner. There is a desperate need for such improvements because, as the intelligence community grows, the amount of material it uses grows exponentially. We need methods to transfer that material in a timely—for me, that means instantly—manner in a secure environment. The 2004 report to the House said that we needed such a programme but, in 2006, we are still saying that we need it. It is not just a complex piece of kit—the project will demand a cultural change and the involvement of highly trained people. It is therefore crucial that it is introduced, because the intelligence community needs it now.
	In conclusion, may I refer again to the statements in the press about our being weak, spineless, ineffective and tame? I do not recognise those descriptions, because my colleagues on the Committee are determined and challenging. I am positively confrontational—if I do not obtain the evidence that I want I will seek it again and again, so that I am sure that I have been given the full facts. One paper said that the director general of MI5 had charmed the Committee. I must have missed that sitting or series of sittings, because I do not remember her doing so. In my opinion, she is a tough, no-nonsense person who deals with facts, and is certainly not interested in charm. She makes demands of us, just as we make demands of her. The way in which journalists characterise us undermines our work and is thoroughly unacceptable.
	I would accept the opinions of the press as worth while if their accounts of the 7 July bombings offered a careful analysis and reported the facts. However,  The Independent printed the following headline: "If only al-Qa'ida were run by our spineless spy masters". That is unacceptable, and represents the desire of the press to sell newspapers at any cost. We have an oversight committee that works extremely hard. The agencies are part of the making of a secure community for all of us. We do not peddle the politics of fear, as the press do, and they are shameful and undermining.

Keith Simpson: In the limited time available, we have had a serious debate with some very good contributions from all parts of the House. It is important that right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed and who have at times appeared to offer criticism, whether in the Committee or on the Floor of the House, have done so in a positive way. It does nobody any service to suggest that those who offer criticism are attempting to undermine national security or the agencies involved. I am pleased that my right hon. and hon. Friends were able to participate in the debate, and I shall return to their contributions.
	One of the central issues of the debate is how we maintain and strengthen public confidence in the Government's ability to deal with the terrorist threat, the effectiveness of our intelligence and security agencies and the police, and parliamentary oversight and accountability. We are all aware of the balance that must be struck in a democracy between the needs of the intelligence and security agencies to keep certain things absolutely secret, and the need, increasingly, to explain to the public why there are restrictions and controls, and why things inevitably go wrong—sometimes disastrously wrong.
	This is not an academic debate. United Kingdom citizens have been killed, injured and kidnapped abroad, and terror is now a reality and has been symbolised by the events of last year. The threat is real and immediate. The police say that since last July they have uncovered four alleged plots, which have been stopped or disrupted. The Metropolitan police anti-terrorist branch says that it is currently involved in about 70 investigations in Britain and abroad. The Commissioner of the Metropolitan police recently said that the security position was "very grim" and that we must expect further attacks. We work, speak and live in one of the great iconic symbols, so we should bear in mind that at any time we in the House could be subject to attack.
	That does not mean that the House does not have a right to question, press and criticise Ministers, the security agencies or the police. That is not done in a carping or negative way. That is the strength of our democracy. The challenge for the Government and the intelligence and security agencies is, as many people have said, that the terrorists have to be lucky only once. Many successful operations to thwart or disrupt terrorist attacks can never be fully publicised, whereas failures or mistakes by the intelligence and security services receive maximum public attention. That is the lot of the intelligence and security services. It is the task of Ministers to explain and defend where necessary, and to take responsibility.
	The role of the Intelligence and Security Committee is an important one. The hon. Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor) spoke passionately in defence of the members of the Committee and their job. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), who speaks as shadow Home Secretary, that the "Newsnight" presentation last night was flippant and disgraceful.
	However, genuine concern was expressed on the Floor of the House about the remit of the Committee. That was referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). The remit of the Committee is that it
	"examines the expenditure, administration and policy of the three Agencies. It operates within the 'ring of secrecy'".
	We must now consider broadening the remit of the Committee, which has undoubtedly been constrained at times, and it makes that point in paragraphs 6 and 32 of its report on 7/7. Given the need to sustain public confidence and the requirement for proactive scrutiny, the Prime Minister should address the matter. The issue does not merely involve parliamentarians trying to delve into every cubby hole in our security and intelligence establishment—as much as anything else, it is about robust public confidence. A strong case has been made by hon. Members on both sides of the House, and I hope that the Minister takes it into account.
	The Committee's series of annual reports rightly praise the bravery and commitment of the men and women of our intelligence and security agencies and how they have coped with change. My hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Wallace) has pointed out that many operations are long and tedious, and we should bear in mind not only the physical bravery of those men and, increasingly, women, but the fact that much of their work is of the most mind-bogglingly boring nature. I suspect that those people need the mental attitude of a librarian, a philatelist or a Back Bencher to survive numbing tedium in which there is a small nugget of crucial evidence somewhere at some stage. If they miss it, however, everyone on the touchline will ask, "How could they have possibly missed that?"
	Criticism must be constructive, and the Committee's remit is functional in many respects. In the past, the Government have frequently noted recommendations or criticisms in replying to the Committee's reports. I was a special adviser in a previous Government, and I always liked it when the permanent secretary said that he had "noted" something, which was usually something that a Minister had said. It normally meant, "I do not give a tupenny whatnot for what he is saying. He is ignorant, but I know what is going on." At times, there is an element of that in the Government's approach. However, I welcome the Home Secretary's decision yesterday to publish the Government's strategy on countering international terrorism and the change in threat levels, both of which were called for by the Committee.
	There is no doubt that public confidence has been badly shaken by the Government's use of intelligence over Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea has referred. Indeed, the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Norwich, South (Mr. Clarke), who is my parliamentary neighbour, wrote in the  Evening Standard on 3 July:
	"The experience with suspected weapons of mass destruction undermined confidence in the capacity of our intelligence services to make accurate assessments of the risks that we face".
	That point was highlighted in paragraph 63 of the Committee's report for 2004-05. Although it is fair to highlight failures in the wider intelligence and security establishments, Ministers cannot, as my hon. Friends have eloquently pointed out, resile from their part in seeking to get evidence to support a particular case.
	Sadly, history is littered with examples of institutional mindsets on intelligence, where Ministers, generals and Presidents have determined the outcome. Today, apart from undermining confidence, that approach can ultimately lead to dreadful consequences. I point the Committee in the direction of the two official historians of the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service, Professor Christopher Andrew and Professor Keith Jeffrey, who might give the Committee useful evidence on those particular points.
	Going back over several years, the Committee has rightly been concerned that Ministers have not been more actively involved in meeting collectively to set the agencies' long-term requirements and priorities. Several hon. Members have mentioned the fact that the ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services has met only once in the past decade.
	The Committee rightly highlighted concern about the fact that since September 2005, Sir Richard Mottram has been both security and intelligence co-ordinator and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Sir Richard is a remarkable man in that he is a born Whitehall survivor. Anybody who could have survived being Lord Heseltine's private secretary when he resigned as Secretary of State for Defence, and then survived the debacle over the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for North Tyneside (Mr. Byers), when he came out with that remarkable set of phrases involving a certain word that is of course unparliamentary, is a man who knows very well how to deal with complicated situations. In the words of the Cabinet Secretary—I paraphrase—he has got the post not least because he has no more future in Whitehall and will therefore be independent. In all seriousness, I believe that Ministers should reconsider this, as there are good functional intelligence reasons for keeping the two posts separate.
	The Committee rightly recognised the expertise of the defence intelligence staff and their vital role in providing support at the military operational level as well as to other Government agencies and Departments. It welcomed the additional funds allocated to the intelligence and security services, but was rightly concerned that the agencies had not asked for more resources back in 2003-04. Indeed, they failed to spend all their additional funds at the time because the heads of the services feared that they would not be able to manage rapid expansion, with the vetting of incomers and inducting and training of personnel. I recognise that that is a serious problem, but we have been there before—in the summer of 1940. The SIS found that all its overseas operations hidden under the consular service were rounded up. Many of them legged it or had to go underground. Large numbers of SIS and Security Service personnel were retired in the summer of 1940, and hundreds of temporary people had to be brought in. That was a massive expansion that worked. There were many mistakes, but it was one of the greatest successes. In managerial terms, the Security Service, the SIS and GCHQ need to get out of that mindset.
	The Committee expressed concern that there should be a correct balance between short-term operational requirements and long-term threats. That is not easy to achieve, but I am not sure whether Ministers believe that they have got the balance right within the intelligence and security services. It welcomed the Security Service's decision to set up regional offices and to work closely with special branch. However, following the recent incident at Forest Gate, it appeared from media reports that special branch and the Security Service were, if not briefing against each other, giving contradictory briefings. That is an old, bad habit that I hope will change in future.
	The hon. Member for Stockton, South and others mentioned the implementation of SCOPE, which is a major IT programme designed to enable organisations across the intelligence community to work together. Given the challenges involved in big Whitehall IT programmes that—how can I put this delicately?—have not always worked, who is managing this programme and who is the Minister ultimately responsible for seeing that it is delivered?
	The Committee's role is important and its members should receive our congratulations on their hard work. However, we need clear ministerial leadership and accountability. There is a strong argument for a Minister who is ultimately responsible across Whitehall for counter-terrorism. The Prime Minister must deal with how we go about that, but the current system—illustrated by the Home Secretary's suggestion yesterday in response to being pressed by the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee—that the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was taking the lead, is not good enough. Greater co-ordination and integration are needed at a functional level in Whitehall. Is any individual or organisation in Whitehall thinking out of the box? Is anyone asking important questions? The Home Secretary points directly at the Minister for the Middle East. I always believed that he was in rather than out of the box.
	Agencies must believe that they will be supported, especially when there are failures. At the same time, they recognise that they are not beyond criticism. If we do not change the Committee's remit to enable it meet public concern, that anxiety will continue, to the detriment of the United Kingdom.

Kim Howells: I am pleased to have the opportunity to close the debate on intelligence and security. The Foreign Secretary greatly regrets that she cannot be here as she is travelling in the United States.
	As Minister responsible for our relations with India, I echo the words of hon. Members who mentioned the brutal murders of innocent people in the Mumbai bomb blast. The underlying message of today's debate must surely be that there is never a justification for terrorism. Our thoughts are with the victims and their families.
	I thank the Intelligence and Security Committee and its distinguished Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), for their work. My right hon. Friend has huge experience of dealing with terrorism and organised crime as one of the best Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland that this country has produced.
	Like every hon. Member, I should like to pay tribute to the exceptional work of the men and women of Britain's intelligence and security services. Earlier, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary highlighted their many successes, and the debate has emphasised their important role in protecting British citizens at home and abroad, often in dangerous circumstances. Some of us have been privileged to witness their operations first hand, as I did last week in Iraq, and we should be grateful to our people who are working for us there.
	Let me try to deal with the many subjects that have been raised today. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Ms Taylor) described the report as wide ranging and thorough. She made a spirited defence of the Committee and its report. Those of us who know its members realise that she is right.
	The hon. Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson) expressed thoughtfully and concisely the Committee's value and, as he perceived them, its strengths and weaknesses and the challenges that it faces in future. As he said, those challenges will be complex and numerous, ranging from the tedium of sustained observation of suspects to understanding the influence of Deobandi madrassah education in the Muslim world.
	Right at the beginning of this debate, the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen emphasised the importance that some so-called responsible news media place on not allowing the facts to get in the way of a good story. There is nothing that the conspiracy theorists love more than a theory that involves the security services. That is why the cool assessment of these complicated and difficult materials by the Intelligence and Security Committee is so valuable to the House.
	The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen, among others, defended the report's criticism of the merger of the posts of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and of JIC chairman. The Government do not agree with the Committee on that point. We see no clash between the roles; on the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing. The appointment of Sir Richard Mottram to the roles of SIC and JIC chairman was consistent with the recommendation in the Butler review that the post of JIC chairman be filled by someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role. Far from devaluing the JIC chairman's role, combining the posts has added further weight and authority to it.
	The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden asked about the financing of border security. The border management programme, on which my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is working closely, will re-channel existing resources into new and more effective ways of working. Additional resources will be identified as the programme develops. The e-border programme is now at the preliminary invitation to tender stage, and a contract will be agreed with the successful bidder in the summer of 2007.
	The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang) and others suggested that Ministers were not sufficiently engaged in intelligence matters, as evidenced by the fact that the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services had met only once in the past decade. That came as a surprise to me when I sought the briefing on this subject, as I seem to spend three quarters of my life talking to other Ministers about a whole range of issues, including overarching strategy and individual issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the home security issues that we have discussed in such depth today.
	The Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services will meet as and when required. It is important to recognise that Ministers are already heavily engaged in the oversight of the agencies. As the ISC report explains, Ministers regularly discuss intelligence matters in a variety of
	"other fora, including at Cabinet meetings",
	and the agency heads regularly brief their respective Secretaries of State.

David Tredinnick: Will the Minister give way?

Kim Howells: No, I am afraid that I do not have time.

David Tredinnick: rose—

Kim Howells: The hon. Gentleman should not panic. I will say something very nice about him in a moment.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, South (Ben Chapman) made a compelling case for not turning the ISC into a Select Committee. I do not want to intervene in any family matters involving the adult discussions that have taken place between the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen. I am sure that they will be able to sort their relationship out. We will be watching very carefully, and we will do what we can to help. The Government see no reason to change the present arrangements, which allow a cross-party group of parliamentarians to examine a wide range of sensitive intelligence matters in some depth without jeopardising sources or methods. The ISC's independence is not in doubt. It has consistently produced comprehensive and thorough reports that are laid before Parliament and often make uncomfortable reading for the Government.
	The hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) cited the example of the Bali bombings. He has suffered more than the rest of us from that terrible event. I saw the memorial out there, and every parliamentarian should see it. They would then understand the significance of the hon. Gentleman's comments.
	Parliament recognised, when approving the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the difficulties of handling intelligence matters within the normal Select Committee procedures. After considerable parliamentary discussion, it was decided that the best way to impart proper authority and ensure effective oversight of the intelligence agencies was by establishing the ISC and laying down the Committee's duties and obligations in legislation. Transforming the ISC into a Select Committee would require a change in primary legislation. Any move to change its status would have to take careful account of the need to maintain proper security for the agency's work. Unless a Select Committee was willing to operate under similar conditions to the ISC, the end result would be less, rather than more, scrutiny.
	My right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport met some of the survivors and victims' families, and they understand clearly why there has been a demand for an independent public inquiry. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary explained with understandable passion that, given the present circumstances, it is not a question of financial cost but of resources. We have heard already about the difficulties of recruitment. It takes time to train people, and I would not like to see those precious resources diverted, as they inevitably would be, into a long-running inquiry of that sort. Several inquiries have taken place. The Intelligence and Security Committee conducted a thorough inquiry. The London assembly also conducted one.

Mark Pritchard: Will the Minister give way?

Kim Howells: No, I do not have time, I am afraid.
	The Government are resolved to learn lessons from those reports and to strengthen our defences and resilience against the terrorist threat. We are working extremely hard at that. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen and my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, South explained the truth behind some of the allegations that information was withheld from the Committee. The ISC's report provided a thorough, clear and detailed account of what was known about the 7 July bombers prior to the attacks. The security and intelligence agencies and other relevant Departments co-operated fully with the ISC's investigation, and no relevant information was withheld. Subsequent allegations in the media, some of which have been reported in the House, that the Government or security and intelligence agencies withheld information or in some way misled the ISC are totally false. I note that the ISC has investigated the claims and satisfied itself that they are not true.
	The Home Secretary is considering carefully the important question of intercept as evidence, but we should not assume that it will somehow be a magic device for making the task easier. We should certainly listen to some of the advice of people with experience. There is no evidence that other countries get better results through their use of intercept evidence than the United Kingdom. We want to maintain the co-operation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies on which those results are predicated. In February this year, the then Home Secretary told Parliament that the Government
	"are undertaking to find, if possible, a legal model that would provide the necessary safeguards to allow intercept material to be used as evidence."—[ Official Report, 2 February 2006; Vol. 442, c. 479.]
	I understand that the Home Office is leading work on two evidential legal models—a PII plus model, which seeks to protect sensitive material through a combination of public interest immunity hearings and a pre-trial sift procedure, and an examining magistrates model based on continental regimes. The Home Secretary will consider detailed reports on that work in November.
	On the question of the implementation of the Butler review, the Government accepted its conclusions and implemented its recommendations. I note that the ISC's annual report commented favourably on the matter. The Butler recommendation about the limitations of intelligence being systematically included in intelligence assessments has been implemented. As the ISC noted in its annual report, a confidential guide covering the nature and use of intelligence has been circulated to readers of intelligence across government. Intelligence assessments now carry assessment-based boxes, which highlight the extent or limitations of intelligence coverage on a particular issue.
	We have had a very good debate tonight. I am only sorry that I have not been able to cover every hon. Member's contribution. The contributions were many and varied—
	 It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

PETITION

Waste Plant (Thundersley)

Bob Spink: I rise to present a petition against a hazardous asbestos waste transfer and storage plant that is being planned for the Manor trading estate in my constituency. The good people of Thundersley living around that plant are deeply concerned because it is in direct conflict with residential homes, schools and other workers on that trading estate. It is entirely inappropriate to site the plant there, particularly when there are much more suitable areas that do not conflict with residential homes, schools and so forth.
	I present a petition put together by Mr. A. J. Bryant, Terry Turpin and others who cared enough about their community to sign the petition. They know that the House will listen seriously to what they say.
	The petition of the residents of Thundersley and Benfleet:
	Declares that the proposal for a further change to the use of the Manor Trading Estate to allow the storage of hazardous asbestos waste would introduce unacceptable risk and increased pressure of use of local roads and is particularly inappropriate in view of the immediate proximity of residential homes and a primary school, the petitioners further believe there are much more appropriate sites for this activity in the local area.
	The Petitioners therefore implore the House of Commons to call upon the Government to do all within its power to ensure that Essex County Council reject the application as requested by the Member of Parliament for Castle Point.
	And the Petitioners remain, etc.
	 To lie upon the Table.

FOOD LABELLING

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. —[Mr. Michael Foster.]

Jim Dowd: I am particularly delighted that you, Mr. Speaker, are in the Chair to accept my thanks for giving me the opportunity to address the House briefly this evening.
	My concern on the matter of front-of-pack food labelling goes back a number of years, but arises principally from the obesity report of the Health Committee, of which I am a member, published in the last Parliament in 2003-04. The background covered a number of different issues, of which food labelling was just one small part. However, the position in the UK today is such that obesity and diet-related ill health are major problems to individuals, communities and the national health service.
	British business, British society and the British economy suffer as a consequence. Nutrition and health claims made on food packaging can often be confusing and sometimes border on being downright misleading. For example, a low-fat claim may legitimately ignore the fact that the same produce is high in salt. Supermarkets have a huge influence on how we shop, cook and eat. National Consumer Council research has shown that supermarkets need to do more to help customers to eat more healthily and the most vulnerable in society often have the poorest diets, which is a major factor in health inequality.
	The Health Committee report of 2003-04 was, I think, our magnum opus. The Committee did much valuable work during the previous Parliament—issues of modesty notwithstanding—and I believe that our report on obesity was the greatest thing that we did.
	I am delighted to see that the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Amess) is in his place, not only because he can give testimony to what I have said, but because he is a strong supporter of the points that our Committee raised about front-of-pack labelling. I also pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman as the author of early-day motion 2055 on this very subject. A shrewd reading of the Order Paper will demonstrate that he has a slot next Tuesday under the ten-minute rule procedure. Currently, there is a reference to amending statutory orders legislation, but I suspect that it may change between now and next Tuesday. I should also add that I have agreed through all the proper channels that he may speak for a few minutes. I will sit down in time for him to have a couple of minutes before my hon. Friend the Minister replies.
	I want to draw the House's attention to what the Select Committee recorded in our report on the issue. With your forbearance, Mr. Speaker, I shall quote a couple of paragraphs from the report. It said:
	"Nutritional labelling is intended to help consumers make sound nutritional decisions when buying food, but the current state of much labelling seems to be having, if anything, the opposite effect. We have repeatedly heard the argument, both from the food industry and from the Government, that there are no such things as good or bad foods, only good or bad diets. However, both the food industry and the Government have embraced the concept of labelling certain foods as 'healthy' with great enthusiasm, inviting the obvious conclusion that other foods must be, by definition, less healthy."
	Our recommendation was:
	"The Government must accept the clear fact that some foods, which are extremely energy-dense, should only be eaten in moderation by most people, and we therefore recommend that it introduces legislation to effect a 'traffic light' system for labelling foods, either 'red—high', 'amber—medium' or 'green—low' according to criteria devised by the Food Standards Agency, which should be based on energy density. This would apply to all foods. Not only will such a system make it far easier for consumers to make choices, but it would also be an incentive for the food industry to re-examine the content of their foods to see if, for example, they could...move their product from the 'high' category into the 'medium' category."
	We regarded such a system as a necessity and as a discipline on both the food producers and the food retailers.
	In fact, the Government, to give them credit, said in their response to our report that they had
	"started work with the FSA to develop criteria that take account of fat, salt and sugar levels to indicate the contribution that the food makes to a healthy balanced diet."
	They continued:
	"We will work with the food industry to develop the signposting approach further on the completion of FSA consumer research. Our goal is, by early 2006, for there to be: a clear straightforward coding system...that is in common use...and that busy people can understand at a glance which foods can make a positive contribution to a healthy diet, and which are recommended to be eaten only in moderation or sparingly."
	The Government's response was entirely reasonable. Sadly, I do not know how Government calendars work—I have not been privy to them for some time—but I do not think that we are in early 2006 anymore. So while progress has been made, to coin a phrase, there is much done, but much more to do.
	The Food Standards Agency consulted and decided in March this year that the model of food labelling that it wanted to impress on others was for clear MTL—multiple traffic light—signage on the front of packs and the GDAs, the guideline daily amounts, on the back of packs. I fully support its decision. It has received strong support from many in the industry: Sainsbury's, the Co-op, Waitrose and Asda have all willingly accepted such a system, although there is a minor issue about Sainbury's definition of fat, but at least it has gone most of the way to try to achieve that aim. Marks and Spencer has said that it is willing to consider that system as well and is in consultation with the Food Standards Agency. The agency's position has also received strong support from the National Consumer Council,  Which?, the Consumers Association, the British Heart Foundation and very many health charities that are concerned with the issue.
	The issue on front-of-pack labelling is essentially that of the traffic light system versus guideline daily amounts. There has been stiff resistance to the traffic light system, however, and it comes principally not from food retailers, but from food processors. In particular, I mention Nestles—or Nestlé as it prefers to be called—PepsiCo, Kraft, Kellogg's and Danone. The Food and Drink Federation appear to be opposed, but as the people who pay the federation's salaries are Nestlé, PepsiCo, Kraft, Kellogg's and Danone, that is hardly a surprise or a revelation.
	There has been heavy lobbying of all Members—I am sure that I cannot be alone in that—by spokespeople from such organisations, who have tried to tell us why the traffic light system is completely wrong. I met someone from Kraft Foods to discuss why the guideline daily amount was the way to make progress on this issue. They gave me a presentation, which included a suggestion of what their packs would look like. I have that with me, and although I know that I cannot use audio-visual aids in the Chamber, when I look at it I really do not have a clue what any of it means. For example, a packet of cornflakes tells me that it has 17 per cent. of my saturate diet for that day. So what do I do? Do I carry an organiser around with me so that I can work out how many saturates I had in my bowl of Kellogg's? Do I then ask myself how many saturates are in the sandwich that I have at lunchtime? This is what we in the Committee generally found about the state of labelling, before the initiative: it is fact without information, and it confers nothing to the consumer.
	The chap who came to see me subsequently sent me a letter, in which he said that he hoped that our meeting had clarified matters. Well, I have to say to the corporate director of Kraft Foods that it had exactly the opposite effect, and it has made me more animated on the subject than I have previously been.
	After the hon. Member for Southend, West had the temerity to table his early-day motion on this issue, which I signed, there was a positive plethora of letters from Kraft, Kellogg's, Nestlé and PepsiCo—and, amazingly enough, Danone managed to get in on the act. The first letter on the early-day motion arrived on 10 May, and it was signed by somebody on behalf of their public affairs company. By 26 May, they had decided that matters had got so bad that they sent the same letter saying, in effect. "We can't possibly have this system." But they got senior executives in all five of the companies involved to sign it as well.
	They did not think that I would keep the original letter, and therefore could compare them. The letter contains the following astonishing revelation:
	"The arrival of GDA labels in stores comes as new research reveals that the majority of UK shoppers (97 per cent.) are in favour of food manufacturers providing consistent and clearer food labelling".
	Well, what did the other 3 per cent. want? Did they want more obscure and opaque labelling? Did they want no labelling at all? This is absolutely ridiculous. We have since discovered that consumers find the GDA labelling system informative to a limited degree, but not enlightening. That is the subject that I wish to address.
	The Food and Drink Federation—the front organisation for many of the companies that I have mentioned—stated in a letter to me:
	"We believe that the MTL system, with its "stop/go" instructions for consumers, takes the dumbed-down route and delivers virtually no useful information to help people balance their diet. It could also seriously mislead consumers as they fail to take account of portion sizes and frequency of consumption."
	It then goes on to give a very detailed and technical description of why traffic lights cannot work—what they will not tell people, and what they will tell people. All I thought when I read it was that it proves the old maxim that the best place to hide a tree is in a forest; the idea is to give people so much information that it becomes functionally useless.
	Let us look at where we are now. Today, I received a message from Sainsbury's, which has done a lot of work on this issue. It has launched its "wheel of health" on the front of its packs. It states:
	"We launched the Wheel of Health in January 2005. It is compatible with the FSA's recommendations. It is honest and transparent, we don't duck the issue of putting Red on products."
	The letter goes on to detail a number of further changes: Sainsbury's is also providing GDA for some 2,100 lines, and it will extend that to all products, beyond the categories specified by the Food Standards Agency.
	Let us see what has actually happened for consumers. In 2005, 94 per cent. of Sainsbury's customers found the "wheel of health" symbol easy to understand. That highlights the point that the Committee was trying to make. Also, 77 per cent. found that colour-coding was useful, and
	"76 per cent. said that it would influence their purchasing decisions".
	Let us see if that is the case. Sainsbury's cite two products. Sales of its all-butter croissants are down because their "wheel of health" is mainly red, whereas sales of its healthier standard loaf—
	"with 15 per cent. less salt, and all-green"—
	have gone up. So that will affect customers' behaviour; this is the sort of information that they need.
	In conclusion, I received a report today from  Which?, the largest European consumer organisation, with 700,000 members. On reading it, I felt like chucking away all the notes that I had written in the past few days and simply reading it out this evening instead, because its conclusion is so damning.  Which? tested the Tesco guideline daily amount system, the FSA's multiple traffic light system, the scheme used by some food and drink manufacturers—Pepsi, Danone and so on—and a hybrid system.  Which? said:
	"The research confirms that the Food Standards Agency traffic light labelling scheme is the most useful for all consumers, particularly those on a low income."
	The key findings were as follows:
	"Using their red, amber and green traffic light system to compare levels of fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt, 97 per cent. of respondents were able to correctly identify and compare recommended levels of nutrients...The Tesco scheme proved to be the weakest system for understanding, with just 37 per cent. of consumers being able to correctly interpret the meaning of the Tesco colour coding...When respondents were asked to compare different suggested labelling schemes, nine in ten...said they found the FSA system very or fairly easy to use and over nine in ten (93 per cent.) said they could understand it quickly or at a glance."
	That is exactly what the Health Committee recommended to the Government, and we believe that that is what they accepted. I ask my hon. Friend to ensure that she brings to bear all the pressure that she can on these recalcitrants.
	Tesco does not back many losers. We should advise it not to back losers on this occasion, and to do what consumers want and need.

David Amess: I congratulate the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Jim Dowd) not only on securing this debate but on the manner in which he introduced it. The Minister probably also welcomes the debate, because it strengthens her hand in dealing with this issue. I know that she and her ministerial colleagues take the Health Committee's work very seriously and have particular regard for its report on obesity. During the obesity inquiry, it was very clear that the food and drinks industry was in denial on this subject: it wanted to talk about fitness, rather than the amount of fat, sugar and salt that we eat. The Health Committee was having none of that, hence this very simple labelling suggestion.
	I entirely support the hon. Gentleman's remarks. A clear system has been suggested, and the prevarication of these powerful organisations is an absolute disgrace. I simply say to the Minister that I hope, as the hon. Gentleman hopes, that she can charm the industry into adopting this simple labelling system. But if she fails—I hope that she does not—I hope that the Government will adopt the ten-minute Bill on single food labelling that I am seeking leave to introduce on Tuesday.

Caroline Flint: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Jim Dowd) for securing this debate, which comes at an important moment, as this issue breaks into the public consciousness. There is a certain rivalry and competition between retailers and food manufacturers in respect of labelling, which is healthy. I also welcome the presence this evening of the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Amess), and thank him and my hon. Friend for their contributions to the Health Committee's report on obesity. That report provided not only the Department of Health but all of us in government who are working to tackle the issues associated with obesity with clarity in terms of the way ahead, and with the purpose and support to enable us to move forward.
	I have spent considerable time during the past year having joint meetings with the Food Standards Agency and different industry stakeholders on this issue. At some of those meetings, I have had various products put on the desk in front of me and have been told that the FSA's proposed model will be a nightmare for all concerned in the industry. Interestingly, a year ago, the argument was whether to have front-of-pack labelling to define products that are high in salt, fat and sugar.
	Things are different now. Although there is still some progress to be made in the proper labelling of packs, there has been a shift in understanding of the scientific reasons for the need to tackle obesity and of the health needs of the community, partly because of the public pressure that has been exerted. That pressure has been enhanced by Members of Parliament who have raised the issue on a number of occasions, stressing its importance as a piece of the jigsaw of work that we are having to undertake. Of course, that work includes recommending physical activity, but it also includes giving consumers informed choice, which is what they desperately need.
	Part of that informed choice is the ability to differentiate between products. When I embarked on my journey a year ago, I was concerned mainly about the products that present the hardest choices. How can one shepherd's pie or one lasagne be differentiated from another? Many people buy processed products because they lead busy lives, but some may do so because they have no guidance to help them determine whether one shepherd's pie is healthier than the one next to it in the cabinet. Such complex products were an important issue for me, but so were cereals, which are a meal in themselves at breakfast time.
	It is interesting to note the way in which things have moved on as a result of the labelling debate. It must be said that much of that has been initiated by the industry, which now seems to want to put front-of-pack labels on everything from soft drinks to products which, in our view, speak for themselves and do not really need the labels. I am not saying that I am against that, but we were examining what we considered the most difficult area. When we were designing the model with which the agency helped us and which the Government support, we wanted to end up with something that was sound.
	The model had to be sound on a number of fronts. For one thing, it had to provide clear guidance that people understood. During the deliberations of the past year, it has concerned me that many people still find guideline daily amounts difficult to understand. When asked whether they would support action on GDAs, most people say that they would. When asked whether they understand GDA information on a pack, their answers are slightly different. I understand that some of the organisations which, according to my hon. Friend, do not support the FSA model are embarking on a huge campaign to educate the public on GDAs. I am sure that there will be a great deal of money behind that campaign, but perhaps what is most important is to devise a simpler way for people to understand what they are buying and subsequently consuming.
	As a shopper myself, I know how much time I have when going around the stores. I want to see at a glance what is in the various products when I am shopping for my family. It should be borne in mind that there are different GDAs for men and women and for children. It is a complex issue, and some people say that they are not prepared to live or die for it. At the end of our deliberations, the agency said, "If you want GDAs that is okay, but what is really important is clear information about products that contain high levels of salts, sugars and fats. How can we make it easier for people to differentiate between products? How can we make it easier for them to shop?"
	As was pointed out by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Southend, West, we need to find a way of providing consumers with the best possible information. It is not my job to tell people what to eat, but I think it is part of my responsibility—and the Government's responsibility—to gear information in a way that allows people to make choices for themselves. If we are ever to conquer the problem of rising levels of obesity, families—parents, but also children—must understand labelling. They must be in the driving seat: they must choose health for themselves. As was pointed out in the White Paper "Choosing Health" , we can play our part in Government by taking action on school meals and working with industry to reformulate and provide better choice between foods, but ultimately we will win only when people make the choice for themselves.
	My hon. Friend mentioned significant data relating to the new Sainsbury's labelling, and gave examples. I would add that it is helping people to make informed choices between brands of soup, for instance. That does mean that sales of some products are falling, but product sales of healthier choices are going up. It is interesting that just providing information causes behaviour change. We get a lot of information about our diet and various foods every day, but it is not always clear how much that drives people to make changes in their lives.
	We have agreed with all parties to the debate on the need to commission independent research to evaluate some of the systems that are being promoted and used, to discover which ones change behaviour the most. I hope that we can do that in a spirit of co-operation and that all sides will be prepared to accept the results of that independent research if it proves its worth.
	The evidence is clear that consumers are overwhelmingly in favour of front of pack signpost labelling and they clearly prefer the colour-coded labels, which was borne out by the Which? report published this week. The issue is not good foods or bad foods, but people making informed choices. I am not saying that people should never eat chocolate or cakes—not least because that would make me a bit of a hypocrite—but it is a question of balance. The red, amber and green labels are not about stopping people eating certain foods, but about helping them to achieve that balance. The colours indicate high, medium and low levels of nutrients, not good or bad foods. That is not the language that we are using.
	In every test, formats that did not have a colour element performed significantly worse than those that did. Consumers also wanted some numerical information, but they were less receptive to percentages. Some people find percentages difficult. Some people have English as a second language, and there are various other barriers to understanding information, one of which is time. What information are we evaluating when we stand in front of the freezer cabinet and choose what to put in our trolley or basket for that week? Nine out of 10 consumers said that they found a colour-coded approach very or fairly easy to use and that they could understand it quickly or at a glance. As I have said, consumers also told us that they particularly wanted to see signposts on foods whose nutritional quality is hard to judge, such as ready meals, sandwiches, pizzas, burgers and breakfast cereals.
	Evidence is continuing to emerge as new labelling appears on our shelves and consumers get to use it in their shopping experience. That evidence has informed the agency's work. The FSA carried out many tests and evaluated different models before it reached the recommended approach, which the Government have endorsed. The core principles that the FSA has applied are pragmatic and progressive. They will provide the consumer with consistency and give business the opportunity to tailor their labelling to fit their customers' needs. Sainsbury's has gone for the wheel of health and others have chosen an oblong label on the front of packets.
	As I have said, the approach is not about demonising foods, but helping busy people to assess quickly the nutritional quality of complex foods so that they can make their choices easily. On GDAs, our approach is flexible enough to allow manufacturers and retailers to provide additional information such as calorie content or GDAs if they wish. However, GDAs are not simple to use and the manufacturers will have to produce better arguments if they wish to pursue them instead of colour coding.
	I began work on this matter a year ago, and I welcome the progress that has been made. I hope that the Select Committee involvement of my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Southend, West has helped to move things along, but I am delighted that more than one third of the retail sector is committed to schemes that meet the FSA model. Sainsbury and Waitrose are so committed, and Asda and the Co-op will be soon.

Jim Dowd: Has my hon. Friend noticed that, with one or two significant exceptions, the retailers are most receptive towards the scheme? The food producers are trying to hide behind the retailers, who are closest to the customers.

Caroline Flint: That is absolutely true. The retailers have been helping us a lot, in other areas of public health, with their understanding of consumer behaviour. Moreover, it is interesting to see how some of the brand products have ended up competing against retailers' products. Finding out what impact that has, in terms of the products that are put in trolleys and taken out of the supermarket, would make an interesting piece of research.
	We need to encourage more retailers to take up the FSA model. We have committed ourselves to the independent research that I mentioned earlier, which I think will keep us engaged with the industry. In addition, we know that Europe is looking closely at what is happening in the UK. The EU has responsibility for legislation on food labelling across Europe, and I know that some of the companies mentioned by my hon. Friend are already making their case there. They want to find out what works, because that is the most important factor in this matter.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.